Sigurdson v British Columbia Electric Rly. Company
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 1952 |
| Year | 1952 |
| Date | 1952 |
| Court | Privy Council |
Canada (British Columbia) - Negligence - Motor-car - Collision - Liability - Contributory negligence - Principles applicable - Alleged misdirection.
The appellant, who wished to drive his motor-car from one side of a road to the other, after beginning to turn across had to wait for traffic passing on the other side, and in fact stopped his motor-car, after making the appropriate hand signals, on a street car track which ran down the centre portion of the road. A street car belonging to the respondent company collided with the appellant's motor car causing injury to him and damage to his car. On a claim by him for damages the evidence of the respondent's motorman, who had had an unobstructed view, was that he did not notice the appellant's car until he was about 75 feet away, that he then applied his brakes and sounded the gong, but could not avoid running into the motor-car. The jury found that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the motorman in failing to keep a proper look-out, and that the appellant was not guilty of contributory negligence. Judgment was entered accordingly for the appellant. On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, before whom the finding of negligence on the motorman's part was not disputed, found the appellant and the respondent equally to blame and apportioned the damages accordingly.
On appeal by the appellant it was contended on behalf of the respondent that there had been misdirection by the trial judge in that, inter alia, he had failed to make clear to the jury that one party is not solely liable in a case where both parties have been negligent unless he saw and recognized the negligence of the other party leading to the danger and thereafter failed to avoid it when he could have done so by the exercise of reasonable care and skill. The respondent contended that where one party (A) actually knows of the dangerous situation created by the negligence of another (B) and fails by the exercise of reasonable care thereafter to avoid the danger A is, generally speaking, liable, but that if A by reason of his own negligence did not actually know of the danger or by his own negligence or deliberate act has disabled himself from becoming aware of the danger he can only be held liable for a proportion of the resulting damage:—
Held, that no authority had been cited for such a far-reaching proposition which, if correct, would seem to provide the respondent in such a case as the present with a means of escaping its 100 per cent. liability by relying on the failure of the motorman to keep a proper look-out. Moreover, the proposition was directly contrary to the second of the rules propounded by Greer L.J. as useful tests in The Eurymedon [
The language of Viscount Birkenhead in The Volute [
APPEAL (No. 3 of 1952) from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (April 30, 1951) varying a judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (December 13, 1950).
The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee: On November 20, 1948, the appellant brought an action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia claiming damages for personal injuries suffered by him on August 6, 1948, and for damage to his motor-car, by reason of the alleged negligence of the driver of a street car owned and operated by the respondent.
Having regard to the fact that the jury must be assumed to have taken a view of the facts favourable to the plaintiff wherever there was a conflict of evidence or room for doubt it would suffice to set out the facts proved by the plaintiff and his witnesses together with any evidence for the defence tending to support his case. They were as follows:- The accident occurred on August 6, 1948, at about 5.45 p.m. on Broadway in the City of Vancouver in broad daylight. Visibility was good and the road dry. The plaintiff was driving his motor-car on the south side of Broadway in an easterly direction. The defendant's street car was travelling on the right-hand set of lines in the centre portion of the road also moving in an easterly direction. The street car was at all material times to the rear of the plaintiff's motor-car, and the driver (or motorman as he was called) had an unobstructed view between his street car and the plaintiff's motor. The plaintiff was minded to turn to his left to cross to the north side of Broadway to get some gasolene at a garage on that side at a point about 75 feet beyond the intersection of Heather Street and Broadway. That would necessitate his crossing the track which the defendant's street car would follow. Before turning to his left the plaintiff observed the defendant's street car at the intersection of Broadway and Willow Street, a distance of 600 feet to the rear of his motor-car. There was no other eastbound traffic. At the same time he saw three or four motor-cars approaching in a westerly direction on the north side of Broadway. He judged he would not be able to pass safely in front of the first of these motor-cars, but observed a wide gap between the first and second of the cars through which he considered he could proceed with safety. The plaintiff accordingly gave the appropriate sign indicating his intention to turn to his left across the street car tracks and proceeded to do so. When on the track the gap in the westerly moving line of motor-cars closed up making it unsafe to proceed further. He accordingly stopped his car on the tracks, giving the appropriate hand signal. At this moment the street car was between 200 and 250 feet away to the west with a still unobstructed view. The plaintiff looked again at the westbound traffic, found it still unsafe to cross and so remained stationary where he was and glanced back again at the street car which was by now passing fast across the intersection of Heather Street. Seeing that he was then in imminent peril he attempted to back off the track, but before he could do so the street car struck him a violent blow dragging or pushing his motor-car a distance of some 60 feet and demolishing it to such an extent that it had to be sold for scrap.
The action was heard by Wood J. and a common jury and on December 13, 1950, judgment was entered for the plaintiff for $20,688.55 and costs, the jury having found that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence which caused the plaintiff's injuries and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia both as to liability and quantum of damages, and on April 30, 1951, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the verdict of the jury and finding the plaintiff and the defendant's driver equally to blame and apportioning the damages accordingly. The quantum was not disturbed. Sloan C.J.B.C. found there had been misdirection of the jury. Sidney Smith J.A. held that properly interpreted the verdict of the jury was in conflict with the evidence and was in substance perverse, and that in any event there had been misdirection. Bird J.A. agreed with the result and subsequently handed down his reasons in which he stated his concurrence with the views expressed by the Chief Justice.
All the judges in the Court of Appeal, having regard to the view they took, appeared to have felt no difficulty in substituting their own findings on matters of fact for the verdict of the jury without ordering a new trial.
The plaintiff now appealed to Her Majesty in Council asking that...
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