Simple Objections and Complex Reality: Theorizing Political Radicalism in Seventeenth-Century England
| Author | Richard Ashcraft |
| Published date | 01 March 1992 |
| Date | 01 March 1992 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1992.tb01763.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political Studies
(1
992).
XL,
99-1
15
Simple Objections and Complex Reality:
Theorizing Political Radicalism
Seventeenth-century England
in
RICHARD
ASHCRAFT
University
of
California,
Los
Angeles
I
wish to express my appreciation to the editor of
Political Studies
for allowing
me to respond at length to David Wootton’s temperate yet challenging critique of
my work on Locke.’ Wootton’s article is significant both for the comprehen-
siveness of his critique and because he raises issues that merit more extensive
discussion than they received in either of my two books. What follows is not only
a reply
to
Wootton
-
although
it
is that
-
but also a consideration
of
what
assumptions guide one’s interpretation
of
political theory which, far more than a
dispute about matters
of
fact or evidence, underlie most of the criticisms
of
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises
of
Government.
I
hope,
therefore, to demonstrate to those readers who would otherwise have little
interest in an exchange of views regarding the interpretation of Locke that the
latter is merely the terrain
-
though an important one
-
upon which con-
temporary battles concerning the conceptual and methodological character of
poltical theory are fought.
Let me begin by distinguishing between criticisms of an argument
I
did not
make, criticisms
of
the argument
I
did make, and criticisms of an argument I
might have made but did not. The first argument
I
did not make, and one that is
repeated throughout Wootton’s essay, is that Locke was a ‘social egalitarian’, ‘an
egalitarian democrat’, or an adherent
of
‘social radicalism’ (pp.
83,
84,
79).
Wootton thus follows other critics in mistakenly attributing to me a view that
I
do not hold, namely, that ‘Locke was an economic radical’
or
a ‘Leveller’.’ In
the preface to
Revolutionary Politics,
I
cautioned the reader against reading into
my usage of radical the social or economic ideas of some Civil War radicals;
’
David Wootton, ‘John. Locke and Richard Ashcraft’s
Revolutionary Politics’. Political
Studies,
40
(1992), 79-98; Richard Ashcraft,
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s
Two
Treatises
of
Government
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986);
Locke’s Two Treatises
of
Government
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1987).
*
Wootton, ‘John Locke’, pp.
83,
84,
80,
90; Jeffrey Friedman, ‘Locke as politician’,
Criticof
Review,
2
(l988), 64-101, pp. 82-3,945; David McNally, ‘Locke, Levellers and liberty: property and
democracy in the thought of the first Whigs’,
History
of
Political Thought,
10
(1989), 1740, at p. 17.
Part
of
what
I
mean
by
my characterization of Wootton’s essay as comprehensive is that he has cited
and incorporated into his critique thecomments ofother reviewers of my work.
I
will, in turn, include
their criticism
in
my response. Wootton indicates that he has found the articles by Friedman and
McNally ‘particularly helpful’ (p.
82,
n.
13).
0032-32 17/92/01 10099-1
7
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1992
Political Studies
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Debate
rather, what
I
was concerned to demonstrate from the actions and ideas of
individuals
-
including Locke
-
who engaged in political resistance to the
established authorities in late seventeenth-century England was the meaning
of
political
radicalism. This cautionary point was restated in
Locke’s
Two
Treatises
of
Government,
in which
I
argued that Locke’s political thought ought to be
understood in terms
of
‘a radical moral egalitarianism rooted in the assumptions
of
theology and philosophy’ coupled with ‘a conservative defence
of
social-
economic ineq~ality’.~
In pursuing their attacks upon the false notion
of
socioeconomic radicalism,
my critics have
(1)
argued that Locke’s political thought ought to be viewed in
terms
of
his close political association with the Earl of Shaftesbury:
(2)
cited the
Constitutions
of
Carolina
as a model
of
Lockean political society and as evidence
against his holding radical political views;5 and
(3)
pointed to Locke’s economic
writings, but especially the memorandum he drafted on the Poor Law while he
was
a
member
of
the Board
of
Trade, as evidence that he cannot be characterized
as a radical.6
That Locke’s political thought developed in the context of his association with
Shaftesbury is not an issue in dispute; what my critics contend
is
that since
Shaftesbury was not a ‘radical egalitarian’, a democrat
or
a
Leveller, it follows
that Locke cannot
be
any of those things either.’
I
never attached any
of
those
labels to Shaftesbury. In the context of discussing the Exclusion crisis elections,
I
cited a number
of
contemporary tracts which accused the Whigs (and
Shaftesbury) of reviving Leveller ideas, noting that in terms
of
Shaftesbury’s aims
‘or
those of the other Whig leaders’ such
‘
“levelling” accusations do appear
to
be
ridiculous’.* My point was that what worried contemporaries was the number
of
former Levellers
or
Commonwealthsmen who were politically active members
of
Shaftesbury’s entourage; the fact that Shaftesbury (like the Levellers)
organized massive petition campaigns among tradesmen, mechanics and
apprentices; and the fact that many
of
the arguments in the tracts published by
or
on behalf
of
Shaftesbury reminded contemporaries of arguments advanced by
the Levellers. These are contextual points, for which
I
presented evidence,
relating to a reconstruction of the kind of political atmosphere which prevailed in
1680-83,
from which
I
was careful to disassociate Shaftesbury’s
intentions.
If in order to function as the leader of a political resistance movement in the
1680s,
Shaftesbury does not have to be characterized
as
an egalitarian democrat,
then neither
do
we have
to
view his defence of the ancient constitution as an
expression of political conservatism, as some of my critics maintain.’ Robert
’
Ashcraft,
Revolutionary Politics,
p. xvii;
Locke’s Two Treatises,
pp.
10.
260-5.
A
Wootton, ‘John Locke’. p. 82; Friedman, ‘Locke as politician’, pp. 67.73-9; McNally, ‘Locke.
Levellers and liberty’, pp. 18-25,
Wootton, ‘John Locke’, pp. 82,84-6; Friedman, ‘Locke as politician’, p. 74; McNally, ‘Locke.
Levellers and liberty’, pp. 224,
40.
Wootton, ‘John Locke’, pp. 83, 87-9; McNally, ‘Locke, Levellers and liberty’, p. 33; Neil
J.
Mitchell, ‘John Locke and the rise of capitalism’,
History
of
Political
Economy
18
(1986). 291-305.
’
Wootton, ‘John Locke’, p. 82; Friedman, ‘Locke as politician’, pp. 75, 82; McNally, ‘Locke,
Levellers and liberty’, pp. 21, 23, 25. Peter Schouls’s review graphically illustrates the numerous
interpretive mistakes that arise from failing to maintain a clear distinction between Shaftesbury’s
views, contemporary reaction
to
those views, and my interpretive assessment
of
both; see
P.
A.
Schouls,
Cmadian Journal ofPhilosophy,
19 (1989), 101-16, at pp. 112-13.
’
Ashcraft,
Revolutionary Politics,
p. 247.
’
Friedman, ‘Locke as politician’, pp. 74-5; McNally, ‘Locke, Levellers and liberty’, pp. 20-25;
Martyn P. Thompson, ‘Significant silences in Locke’s
Two
Treatises
of
Government:
constitutional
history, contract and
law’,
Historical Journal.
31(1988), 275-94, at’p. 282.
Thus,
Friedman and
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