Sir Anthony Mason
| Author | Leslie Zines |
| DOI | 10.22145/flr.28.2.1 |
| Date | 01 June 2000 |
| Published date | 01 June 2000 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
SIR ANTHONY
MASON
Leslie Zines
Anthony
Frank Mason came to
the
notice of
many
in
the legal profession early
in
his
career.
He
was
admitted
to the
New
South Wales Bar
in
1951
and
three years later
had
his first significantsuccess
in
aconstitutional challenge to provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act,
arguing
that
provisions
purporting
to give
power
to the registrar
were
contrary to
Chapter
III
of
the
Constitution.! Shortly afterwards
he
endeavoured
to
appear
for
Fitzpatrick
in
the proceedings before the
House
of Representatives against his client
and
Browne for
contempt
of Parliament
but
he
was
denied permission.
He
has
said
that
that
experience
had
aconsiderable effect
on
his outlook
in
respect of
the
principles
of
natural
justice
and
the importance of the courts
in
protecting the citizen.
In
1964
he
was
appointed
Solicitor-General of
the
Commonwealth. While
he
was
the
fourth
person
to hold
that
position (the others being Garran, Knowles
and
Bailey)
he
was
the
first Solicitor-General
who
was
not
also Secretary of the Attorney-GeneralIs
Department. His
main
duties were, therefore, to act as counsel
and
adviser to
the
Commonwealth. This gave
him
insights into the institutions
and
organisation of
government
which
no
doubt
played their
part
in
the formation of his later judicial
views
on
public law.
His experience as Solicitor-General
may
also
have
had
an
influence
on
the
emphasis
he
placed
on
the different roles
and
attitudes of judges
and
administrators
in
relation
to
individual
rights
and
duties.
In
an
address
at
Sydney University
in
1975
he
said:
One
has
only
to
compare
an
appeal
book
with
its
wealth
of
material
and
accumulation
of
detail,
mostly
in
the
form
of
direct
evidence,
related
to
the
case
in
hand,
with
the
exiguous
and
superficial
statement
of
facts
contained
in
atypical
departmental
file, to
realise
that
there
is a
world
of difference
between
judicial
determination
and
administrative
decision making.2
Nevertheless
that
same
experience
showed
that
the courts
should
have
regard
to
the
problems of government
and
also ensure they
did
not
trespass
upon
the
proper
functions
of
the executive
and
the administration. For example,
in
holding
that
the
Court
should
not
interpret s
81
of the Constitution (providing for appropriations "for
the
purposes
of the Commonwealth") so as to require
it
to determine
whether
any
specific
appropriation
was within afederal power,
he
emphasised practical problems:
It
has
been
the
practice,
born
of
practical necessity
...
to give
but
a
short
description
of
the
particular
items
dealt
with
in
an
Appropriation
Act.
No
other
course
is feasible because,
1
2RvDavison (1954) 90 CLR 353.
A
Tay
and
E
Kamenka
(eds), Law Making in Australia (1980)
at
18.
To continue reading
Request your trial