Sleeping hegemons: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity transgressions
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310396267 |
| Author | Eelco van der Maat |
| Published date | 01 March 2011 |
| Date | 01 March 2011 |
Sleeping hegemons: Third-party
intervention following territorial
integrity transgressions
Eelco van der Maat
Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University
Abstract
It is not clear why some territorial transgressions lead to intervention by the international community and others do
not. As most territorial transgressions lead to a reaction from the international community but a few, however, do
not, this study examines the main determinants for non-intervention by capable members of the international com-
munity, following violation of the territorial integrity norm by a deviant state. This article focuses on which char-
acteristics of the norm-transgressing state, the conflict, and the state capable of enforcing the norm affect the
occurrence of non-intervention. This comparative study examines six major alleged transgressions of the territorial
integrity norm – the occupation of Tibet, the Suez crisis, the 1967 six-day war, the Indonesian occupation of East
Timor, the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara, and the 1989 Gulf crisis – using a multi-methodological
approach based on qualitative methods, most notably fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Analysis reveals
that the absence of high security costs to the hegemon in combination with (a) strategically important security rela-
tions between the transgressor and the hegemon or (b) absence of military and economic vulnerability are generally
necessary and sufficient for non-intervention.
Keywords
causal complexity, fsQCA, territorial conflict, third-party intervention
Introduction
It is a commonly heard complaint that the USA or the
broader international community has a dual standard
when it comes to upholding its norms.
1
This dual stan-
dard seems to apply even to norms as strong and firmly
institutionalized as the territorial integrity norm, which
Zacher (2001) shows to have ‘become a central pillar of
the international order’, especially following the Second
World War. It is striking, for example, that in some
instances of territorial aggrandizement, such as when
Iraq forcefully invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait,
the international community reacted with a swift mili-
tary intervention in order to restore the prewar territorial
boundaries. Yet in other cases, for example when
Indonesia invaded would-be-independent East Timor
or when Israel occupied the Sinai, West Bank and Gaza
Strip, the international community seemed unwilling to
intervene. Why do capable members of the international
community sometimes go to great lengths to uphold
norms and at other times seem unwilling? This article
aims to present us with empirical insights into this ques-
tion by focusing on the firmly established territorial
integrity norm.
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following
research question, ‘Why do capable states intervene in
some instances of transgression of the territorial integrity
norm and not in others?’ and the sub-question, ‘Which
characteristics of the norm transgressing state, the con-
flict and the capable power affect the occurrence of
1
Examples with respect to non-proliferation, arms trade and preven-
tion of genocide abound.
Corresponding author:
eelco.van.der.maat@vanderbilt.edu
Journal of Peace Research
48(2) 201–215
ªThe Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343310396267
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