‘Snatch, Grab and Jury Speculation’: Reviewing the Use of Force in Robbery: R v Martins [2021] EWCA Crim 223
| Author | Mark Thomas,James J Ball |
| Published date | 01 August 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183211026828 |
| Date | 01 August 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Case Note
‘Snatch, Grab and Jury
Speculation’: Reviewing the
Use of Force in Robbery
R v Martins [2021] EWCA Crim 223
Keywords
Robbery, force, snatch, grab, inferences
The offence of robbery, contrary to s 8 of the Theft Act (TA) 1968, is committed where a person steals,
and immediately before, or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or
puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. The phrase ‘uses force
on any person’ is not defined in the TA 1968 but has been subject to judicial consideration. Martins was a
case concerning the role of the trial judge in determining whether sufficient evidence existed from which
the jury could be satisfied that the defendant had used force on the victim.
The appellant, Joseph Martins, (M), alongside his co-accused, Christian Thembo, (T), were alleged to
have stolen keys and a smartphone from the victim, Rokibul Dewan, by use of force. In particular, the
victim alleged that M had taken the keys and phone from his hands. The victim made repeated reference
to M ‘snatching’ and ‘grabbing’ those items from him. To prevent M from leaving with the property, the
victim stood in front of a gate, blocking M’s only route of escape. The victim then alleged that T pushed
him, and M then caused the victim to fall to the ground and suffer a broken leg. M claimed that he did not
steal the phone or keys; it was T who stole such property. M and T were charged with robbery (‘count
one’) and inflicting grievous bodily harm (‘count two’). M was also charged with theft as an alternative
to robbery (‘count three’).
At trial, defence counsel for M and T made submissions of no case to answer against the prosecu-
tion’s case in respect of count one. Their submissions were that force had not been used ‘in order to
steal’. This submission was made on account of the time difference between the initial taking of the
keys/phone and the force applied at the gate. The learned recorder, Mr Recorder Guest, accepted this
submission, identifying that he would not permit count one to continue against T and, in respect of
M, would not permit the prosecution to present its case on the basis that the theft involved a
continuing act and that force was applied at some point during that continuing act. In response, the
prosecution sought to change the basis upon which the charge was brought: instead of arguing
that there was a continuing act, the prosecution would bring the charge ‘on the basis that [the
initial taking of the keys and phone by M] did constitute some sort of force by taking it from his
hands’ (at [6]).
Defence counsel objected to this change of course on account that her case had been presented on the
basis of a continuing act and that there remained insufficient evidence to prove that force had been
applied when the keys and phone were snatched. The learned recorder found no favour with the first
submission, ruling that the victim could be further cross-examined if necessary. In respect of the second
submission, the learned recorder ruled (at [9]):
The Journal of Criminal Law
2021, Vol. 85(4) 320–324
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183211026828
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