Social justice and the distribution of republican freedom
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116684759 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Author | Jonathan Peterson |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(1) 67–86
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116684759
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Article
Social justice and the
distribution of republican
freedom
Jonathan Peterson
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University, New Orleans,
LA, USA
Abstract
A republican theory of social justice specifies how republican freedom should be distrib-
uted. The goal of this paper is to assess the plausibility of two recently proposed prin-
ciples of republican social justice: an aggregative maximizing principle defended by Philip
Pettit in Republicanism and a sufficiency principle of republican social justice offered by
Pettit in On the People’s Terms. The maximizing principle must be rejected because
it permits under-protecting vulnerable members of society in favor of increasing the
freedom of the powerful. The sufficiency principle avoids the most basic objection to
the maximizing principle, but it is at best an incomplete theory of social justice. Social
justice requires principle(s) for determining the justice of distributions above the
sufficiency threshold and republican theory does not determine which principle(s)
should govern distributions above this threshold. Republicans must therefore decide
whether they will incorporate an independent commitment to equality within their
theory of social justice.
Keywords
Equality, freedom, social justice, republicanism
Freedom-based accounts of social justice must address (at least) two important
questions. The first asks which ideal of freedom the state should secure or promote.
The second asks how freedom should be distributed among the members of a
political community. Republican theorists have recently claimed to offer distinctive
and attractive answers to both questions. In answer to the first question, repub-
licans hold that the state ought to aim to secure freedom as non-domination. On
this view, political freedom consists in independence from the will, arbitrary power
Corresponding author:
Jonathan Peterson, Loyola University New Orleans, 6363 St. Charles Ave, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA.
Email: peterson@loyno.edu
or sway of others. In this paper, I am concerned with the question of the distribu-
tion of republican freedom. A republican principle of social justice specifies how
republican freedom should be distributed among the members of the political
community. The goal of this paper is to assess the plausibility of some principles
of republican social justice recently proposed by Philip Pettit.
No theorist has done more to develop a republican theory of social justice than
Pettit. In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Pettit argued that
the goal of republican policy should be to maximize expected freedom as
non-domination. He claimed, however, that policies designed to maximize non-
domination tend to produce an equal distribution of republican freedom. This is an
attractive claim. It seems to capture two important desiderata for a political
society, namely that we should have as much freedom as possible and that freedom
should be distributed equally.
1
Since the publication of Republicanism, Pettit has modified his view. He now
holds that a republican theory of social justice will seek to promote a form of equal
freedom as non-domination. He understands this to mean that a republican state
will seek to secure equal freedom in a set of choices understood as basic liberties.
To set the degree of freedom that the state must secure, Pettit appeals to a suffi-
ciency principle. If the state secures the freedom of each citizen in a broad range of
basic choices to a sufficient degree, then each will equally enjoy the status of a free
person (Pettit, 2012: 81, 85, 88).
This paper engages with Pettit’s republican account of social justice.
2
It defends
two main claims. The first claim is that the maximizing principle defended by Pettit
in Republicanism must be rejected because it permits under-protecting vulnerable
members of society in favor of increasing the freedom of the already powerful. The
second claim is that the sufficiency principle that Pettit currently defends is at best
an incomplete theory of social justice. This is because an adequate theory of social
justice must be concerned with inequalities in freedom above the equal status
threshold set by the sufficiency principle. Republicanism does not determine
which principle(s) should govern distributions above the equal status threshold
and thus does not determine which, if any, inequalities above the status threshold
are acceptable from the point of view of justice. Republican theorists of social
justice must thus decide on a principle or principles to govern inequalities above
the threshold. More generally, they must decide whether and to what extent they
will embrace an egalitarian theory of social justice.
The paper has three parts. In the first part, I provide a brief introduction to the
republican conception of freedom as defended by Pettit. In the second part,
I discuss and reject the maximizing principle. In the third part, I examine Pettit’s
sufficiency principle. I argue that the principle fails to provide a complete account
of the demands of social justice.
Freedom as non-domination
On the republican view, freedom is defined as the absence of domination (Pettit,
1997: 51). The crucial feature of this theory is that it regards domination rather
68 European Journal of Political Theory 19(1)
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