Societal Approaches To the Study of War
| Date | 01 December 1965 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336500200402 |
| Published date | 01 December 1965 |
| Author | Michael Haas |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
SOCIETAL
APPROACHES
TO
THE
STUDY
OF
WAR*
By
MICHAEL
HAAS
Department
of
Political
Science, University
of
Hawaii
1.
Introduction
Societall
conditions
have been
related
to
fluctuations
of
war
and
peace
since
the
dawn
of
civilization.
The
factor
cited
most
often
as
responsible
for
propensities
to
external
aggression
among
preliterate
peoples
is
the
desire
to
preserve
tribal
solidarity
(Wright,
1942,
I,
78;
Murphy,
1957).
Armed
clashes
of
the
ancient
em-
pires
of
Egypt,
Assyria,
Babylon,
Persia,
Macedon
and
Rome
were
conscious
at-
tempts
to
suppress
insurrections
and
ex-
ternal
sources
of
potential
imperial
disunity
(cf.
Bozeman,
1960).
In
the
sixteenth
and
seventeenth
centuries,
when
religious
sen-
timents
and
dynastic
claims
were
invoked
to
legitimize
wars,
more
international
aggression
occurred
than
in
any
previous
era
of
history
(Sorokin,
1937,
pp.
297-98).
But
when
conflicts
between
Protestants
and
Catholics
and
those
between
rival
royal
houses
were
resolved
within
the
framework
of
the
newly
arising
European
state
system,
the
use
of
force
in
interna-
tional
politics
did
not
cease.
The
terri-
torial
state
system,
however,
did
make
it
possible
for
religious
conflict
to
be
resolved
short
of
war,
and
by
the
end
of
the
eigh-
teenth
century
there
was
a
fading
away
of
dynastic
quarrels.
Meanwhile,
nationalism
and
imperialism
flourished
in
the
nine-
teenth
century
to
guide
decision
makers
in
the
use
of
military
means
for
seemingly
just
goals.
Ideologies
extolling
particular
forms
of
political
and
economic
arrange-
ments
have
been
utilized
in
the
twentieth
century
to
sanction
both
internal
and
ex-
ternal
war
(Aron,
1954).
Parallel
with
the
changing
course
of
international
history,
writings
of
promi-
nent
social
theorists
from
Plato
through
Lenin have
usually
linked
societal
conditions
within
states
to
the
aggressive
behavior
of
states
in
foreign
affairs.
Yet
in
our
own
day
societal
factors
are
assigned
a
much
lesser
degree
of
attention
than
was
for-
merly
the
case.
It
is
more
fashionable
to
speculate
on
the
psychological
basis
of
war
and,
alternatively,
to
treat
international
aggression
as
a
product
of
the
very
structure
of
the
international
system
(Waltz,
1959) .2
According
to
those
who
focus
on
war
as
rooted
in
the
minds
of
men,
to
use
UNESCO’s
phrase,
the
individual de-
cision
maker
of
a
state
entering
war
must
be
better
understood
psychologically.
Ana-
lysis
of
the
process
of
arriving
at
a
decision
to
go
to
war
has
pointed
very
often
to
such
irrational
aspects
as
overpreoccupation
with
hostility
(Zinnes,
North,
Koch,
1961).
The
systemic
approach,
on
the
other
hand,
stresses
that
there
may
be
features
of
the
international
environment
which
make
war
more
probable
than
would
otherwise
be
the
case.
For
example,
Lewis
F.
Richardson
(1960,
p.
177)
finds
that
the
more
boundaries
a
country
has
with
other
states,
the
more
likely
it is
to
participate
in
war.
The
imperial
or
hierarchically
dominated
international
system,
such
as
classical
Rome
succeeded
in
creating,
doubtless
has
a
higher
potential
for
inter-
national
tranquillity
than
does
a
system
of
many
independent
and
sovereign
states.
Fortunately,
the
newer
approaches
have
stimulated
much
new
theory
and
research
on
the
subject
of
war.
Advances
in
the
societal
level
of
analysis
have
emerged,
308
although
only
very
recently,
and
they
are
codified
in
the
following
discussion.
Ac-
cordingly,
it is
the
task
of
this
paper
to
examine
changing
foci
in
the
societal
level
of
analysis,
to
systematize
the
two
main
societal
approaches,
to
indicate
whether
empirical
findings
require
a
modification
of
traditional
theory,
and
to
integrate
the
societal
approach
with
both
the
psycho-
logical
and
systemic
levels
of
analysis.
2.
Early
theorists
Throughout
writings
of
the
theorists
who
relate
domestic
conditions
of
states
to
warlike
behavior,
various
sorts
of
inter-
nal
factors
have been
stressed
in
different
periods
of
time.
The
most
common
argu-
ment
is
that
war
is
a
function
of
the
type
of
government
or
of
economic
conditions.
Plato
(n.d.,
pp.
64-67)
advises
states
wishing
to
avoid
war
to
have
a
cohesive
people
and
an
economic
system
with
a
moderate
level
of
consumption.
Cohesion
ensures
a
loyal
citizenry,
which
is
neces-
sary
to
deter
attacks,
whereas
moderate
prosperity
means
that
the
state
has
little
to
gain
economically
from
war
and
is
not
at
the
same
time
an
attractive
bait
for
states
desiring
the
booty
of
war.
Although
Plato
regards
democracy
as
unstable
and
warlike,
to
such
philosophers
of
the
En-
lightenment
as
Kant,
Bentham
and
Paine,
the
lesson
which
dynastic
wars
taught
was
that
republics
with
representative
in-
stitutions
are
much
more
peaceful
than
monarchical
despotisms
(Waltz,
1959,
pp.
82-83).
Aristocratic
elites
are
warlike
and
oppressive,
so
new
elites
must
be
in-
stalled,
the
argument
went.
By
reducing
the
frustrations
of
governmental
restric-
tions
and
by
expanding
the
share
in
de-
cision
making
to
encompass
future
soldiers,
chances
of
war
would
decrease:
there
would
be
fewer
internally
generated
polit-
ical
tensions
to
release
externally,
and
no
sane
man
would
vote
to
go
to
a
frivolous
war
which
might
mean
his
death.
The
economic
aspect
of
Plato’s
advice
was
also
modified
by
later
thinkers.
The
advocates
of
economic
liberalism
believed
that
preoccupation
with
the
problems
and
benefits
of
industrialization
would
make
a
stable
international
environment
more
profitable.
Indeed,
according
to
classical
economists
and
sociologists,
conquests
for
economic
gain
characterize
poor,
agrarian
countries,
rather
than
industrial
societies,
where
enrichment
is
secured
most
effi-
ciently
through
extensive
economic
pro-
duction
and
trade
(Silberner,
1946).
The
overall
consensus,
then,
was
that
democracy
and
capitalism
would
be
har-
bingers
of
international
tranquillity,
but
there
was
dissent
from
this
view
on
the
part
of
Karl
Marx
and
Friedrich
Engels.
While
they
never
analyzed
war
at
length
in
any
single
work,
their
critique
of
pre-
vious
theory
was
unusually
devastating.
The
comprehensive
scope
of
their
suc-
cinctly
presented
theory
of
war
merits
special
consideration.
3.
Marxist
theory
According
to
the
Marxian
dialectical
view,
one
economic
system
is
far
more
peaceful
than
its
antecedents,
but
that
system
has
not
yet
arrived.
War
accompa-
nies
class
struggles
of
precapitalist
and
capitalist
societies,
but
in
a
communist
world
there
are
no
classes,
so
there
are
no
wars
(Marx
and
Engels,
1959).
Under
communism
both
aristocratic
tyranny
and
bourgeois
democracy
will
have
been
tran-
scended ;
the
most
peaceful
political
system
turns
out
to
be
one
with
no
visible
govern-
ment
at
all.
There
will
be
no
elites
to
compel
men
to
fight,
and
there
will
be
no
states
to
attack
or
to
defend.
Even
as
history
progresses
toward
com-
munism,
war
will
be
less
of
a
problem.
So
even
Marx
acknowledges
that
capital-
ism
is
more
peaceful
than
feudalism,
and
his
reasoning
goes
as
follows.
Communism
can
emerge
only
when
capitalism
has
developed
to
the
fullest
extent,
whereupon
capitalism’s
internal
contradictions
will
be
greatest,
and
it
will
collapse.
And
as
capitalism
is
spread
more
globally
its
inner
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