Solicitor‐Client Communications and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue–A New Zealand Precedent
| Author | P. E. Kilbride |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1966.tb01105.x |
| Published date | 01 January 1966 |
| Date | 01 January 1966 |
86
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
29
proffered evidence is both credible and relevant to the issue of guilt.
The crime of perjury is widely enough defined to cover any cases of
abuse and would appear to offer
a
sufficient deterrent against false
evidence at the first trial.
PRANK
B. BALDWIN.
SOLICITOR-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS
AND
THE
COMMISSIONER
OF
INLAND
REVENUE-A NEW
ZEALAND
PRECEDENT
A
RECENT
article in this
Review
raised the possible effect
on
the
privilege of communications between
a
solicitor
and
his client of
provisions such
as
those of section
16
(7)
of thc Finance Act
1962.
The decision in
Commissioner of Inland Revenue
v.
West-Walker
tends to abate any alarm which such provisions might cause
a
solicitor
or
his client. There,
a
strong majority in the Ncw Zealand
Court of Appeal
a
held that the privilege remained intact despite
section
168
of the Land and Income Tax Act
1928,
which required
every person,
whether
a
taxpayer
or
not,
on
demand by the Com-
missioner, to furnish such information,
or
produce books and docu-
ments in his knowledge, possession
or
control,
as
the Commissioner
considered necessary. The defendant,
a
solicitor, had refused with-
out his client’s authority to furnish information relating to
property transactions of the client. The majority held him to
be privileged and excused in law from complying with the
Commissioner’s demand.
The basis of their reasoning was the presumption against implicit
alteration of the common law. The following extract is typical of
the approach adopted
:
‘c
Where the legislature uses plain unequivocal language capable
of only one meaning, it must be taken to mean what it has
plainly expressed whatever may be the consequences, But,
unless the language produces
a
conviction that
it
was the inten-
tion of the legislature to effect what would constitute
a
most
serious interference with the liberty of the subject and to
perpetrate what. can fairly be regarded
as
injustice, one should
be slow to attribute such an intention to the legislature.
.
.
.
I
recoil from the proposition that
it
was the intention of the
legislature to trample underfoot in such an oblique fashion
an
old and cherished principle established
‘
for the perfect adminis-
tration of justice, and for the protection of the confidence which
exists between
a
solicitor and his client.’
In
my opinion, this
common law right has been left untouched by statute.”
(1966)
28
M.L.R.
18
at
pp.
26-26
(J.
A.
Speed).
f19541
N.Z.L.R.
191.
Pair,
’K.
M.
Cfreeson, Hay
arid,
North
JJ.
;
Stnnton
J.
dissenting.
There was
in
fact
no
possibility
of
tho client waivin hie privilege, since
neither defendant nor the Cornmissioner knew his whore&outs.
Bulliuant
v.
Att.-Oen.
for
Victoria
[1001]
A.C.
19G
at
p.
200.
Other
authori-
tiee relied
on
in
the majority judgments included
Stradling
v.
Morgan
(16GO)
For footnote
6
nee next page.
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