Some Legal Determinants of External Finance in Scotland: A Response to Lord Hodge

Date01 January 2017
Pages30-54
Author
Published date01 January 2017
DOI10.3366/elr.2017.0388
INTRODUCTION

Two apparently unconnected events inspired the author of this paper to write it. First, the author read Lord Hodge's article “Does Scotland need its own Commercial Law?1 which posed the question whether Scotland requires its own commercial law2 and, if so, what principles should be adopted when reforming or modernising Scots law.3 About the same time, the author had an informal conversation with a London counterparty on a debt finance transaction in which the counterparty indicated that certain of his international bank clients were unwilling to allow their corporate borrowers a blanket permission to incorporate new Scottish subsidiaries on the grounds that taking fixed security over their shares was too difficult – but that blanket permissions for the incorporation of English companies and Channel Islands companies would pose no issue.

The central tenet of this paper is that Lord Hodge is undoubtedly correct that “[i]t cannot be in Scotland's commercial interest to promote legal particularism which will add to transactional costs”.4 This paper posits that the key to any reform of Scots commercial law should be to reduce transaction costs. Accordingly Scots law should not automatically adopt rules5 used by our English cousins but instead should look to empirical and theoretical economic literature to provide the most legally efficient rules for any proposed amendments to Scots commercial law. Following Lord Hodge's observations on transaction costs, it is the contention of this paper that the foregoing analysis is only applicable where English and Scots law currently diverge. By reviewing the existing theoretical and empirical literature, this paper will review access to external corporate debt finance and propose changes to attract external debt finance to Scotland. Given the methodology employed, policy questions about the desirability of proposals such as fixed security over moveable assets and the existence of floating charges are ignored in the analysis of this paper.6 The final part of this paper critiques the analysis conducted in the rest of the paper.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The aim of this paper is to build on Lord Hodge's analysis with a view to proposing a guiding principle for any future reforms of elements of Scots commercial law. Accordingly it is necessary to examine Lord Hodge's argument before building on his conclusions.

What is commercial law?

Before we examine whether Scotland needs to have its own commercial law, it is important to identify what commercial law is. Indeed, it has been stated that, when discussing commercial law in general, it is “customary” to ask what commercial law is.7 Lord Hodge explains that the basic framework for Scots commercial law is divided between obligations and property rather than law and equity,8 however this does not explain the legal rules that we are analysing. Goode on Commercial Law defines commercial law as:

that branch of law which is concerned with rights and duties arising from the supply of goods and services in the way of trade. Its scope is not clearly defined, and no two textbooks adopt the same approach as to the spheres of commercial activity that ought properly to be included in a work on the subject. There are, indeed, some who question whether commercial law is a subject at all, suggesting that the apparent monolith is in reality no more than an agglomeration of distinct subjects (sale, negotiable instruments, carriage of goods and the like), the boundaries of which may overlap but which otherwise share little in common beyond the underlying foundations of the law of contract.9

This covers a very wide category of activities, and as Goode has shown, this often overlaps with other subjects. He further states

The law affecting business transactions is not a seamless web, nor is it a jigsaw in which, with careful study and some luck, all the pieces can be fitted neatly together to make a harmonious whole. Rather it is a collocation of ill-assorted statutes bedded down on an amorphous mass of constantly shifting case law.

But if we view the commercial law as the totality of the law's response to the needs and practices of the mercantile community, then, indeed, commercial law exists and flourishes in England, adapting constantly to new business procedures, new demands.10

The central character in discussion on commercial law must be ‘the business’, as commercial law is the collection of laws that apply to any activity a business undertakes. Thus it must encompass interactions between individuals and business (consumer law), interactions between businesses and their staff (labour law), law that govern the assets a business owns (property), voluntary dealings between businesses and others (contract), involuntary dealings between business and others (delict) and dealings between a business and the state (regulatory law).

The theme running through all of those categories is that commercial law is relevant whenever a business tries to do anything – i.e. whenever it undertakes a transaction. Goode on Commercial Law goes on to state:

It is conventional to treat commercial law as confined to personal property and the provision of services….services include the provision of finance, which is frequently secured on land by a mortgage or by a fixed or floating charge; and no treatment of commercial interests can be considered complete without at least some consideration of the nature of a floating charge and priority problems arising from conflicting security interests.11

Thus commercial law is not just interested in the interaction between incorporated (and unincorporated) businesses and individuals, but also between businesses and other businesses – the interaction between corporate businesses and their (normally corporate) providers of debt finance also forms part of the nexus of commercial laws. What about corporate vehicles themselves? Goode states:

In Continental Europe commercial law is considered to include company law, whereas English lawyers treat the latter as a distinct branch of law and regard commercial law as concerned primarily with transactions rather than with institutions.12

Similarly, Scottish texts on commercial law often do not include company law, although not necessarily as a matter of principle.13

Accordingly, the general question Lord Hodge posed and answered is whether or not Scotland needs its own law in relation to transactions undertaken by businesses.14

Does Scotland need its own commercial law?

Lord Hodge answers his own question with a mixed answer. Whilst he acknowledges the role for Scots specific rules in certain fields (such as property), he questions their value in the context of commercial law.15 The general theme coming from the article in question is that transaction costs are reduced by using legal rules familiar to commercial counterparties.16 Lord Hodge does include the phrase “within their proper sphere”,17 however the argument is persuasive without this caveat. A logical extension of this is that in order for Scots law to remain competitive and be chosen as the governing law of a voluntary commercial arrangement, it should adopt English or international legal rules as its commercial law. There is weight to this argument, but when taken to its furthest conclusion it risks appearing defeatist: only by conforming commercial law fully to other legal systems can additional transaction costs of utilising Scots law instead of English law be mitigated.

If commercial law is fundamentally the law of transactions undertaken by businesses; then transaction costs are inextricably linked to commercial law. It is therefore necessary to consider what transaction costs are. Transaction costs have been defined as including:

the costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached.18

Why, then, are transaction costs important to the economy as a whole? Coase has demonstrated that without transaction costs, efficient outcomes will occur regardless of how legal rules allocate risk amongst parties.19 As a corollary, the presence of any transaction costs means risk allocation by any particular law will affect how efficiently transactions are conducted within that regime. What, then does efficiency mean in an economic context? An efficient transaction is one in which either all parties experience a gain on their position (a Pareto superior transaction) or one which produces a net gain across all participants (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).20 Under a Pareto superior outcome, no-one is harmed from the transaction.21 Whilst a popular ideal, it has been stated that “in the world of government policy choices, or choices of law, almost every move makes someone worse off”.22 This makes the Kaldor-Hicks model more useful from an analytical perspective, as it permits individuals to be harmed by a policy approach so long as the overall result is a positive one.23 Kaldor-Hicks itself has been criticised as a metric for analysis because it inherently favours the status quo,24 and it suffers from the Scitovsky paradox (it can produce outcomes that state that A is superior to B and that B is superior to A),25 nevertheless it remains a particularly helpful metric to measure efficiency.26 Whichever metric is used, increased efficiency increases wealth to society as a whole and therefore should be encouraged.27 The issue then becomes identifying the best method for law to improve efficiency under either metric. Posner explains: where there are low transaction costs, the market will automatically produce efficient outcomes (as per the Coase theorem) – accordingly, when transaction costs are not low, the role of the law makers should be to “mimic the market”.28

This is usually taken as meaning that there should be an ex post allocation of rights by a court to the party that...

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