Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism
| Author | Luigi Bonanate |
| Published date | 01 September 1979 |
| Date | 01 September 1979 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002234337901600302 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Some
Unanticipated
Consequences
of
Terrorism*
LUIGI
BONANATE
University
of
Turin
The
spread
of
terrorism
in
democratic
societies
forces
one
to
examine
once
more
the
rela-
tionship
between
society
and
political
violence.
From
a
conceptualization
of
terrorism
based
on
the
cross
between
two
types
of
characteristics
(tactical-strategic;
instrumental-finalistic)
some
observations
appear
which
make
common
explanations
of
the
causes
of
terrorism
unsatisfactory.
For
this
one
might
substitute
the
hypothesis
that
societies
which
must
cope
with
terrorism
are
’blocked’,
i. e.
incapable
of
advancing
and
at
the
same
time
immune
to
disintegration.
In
this
interpretation,
the
appearance
of
terrorism
becomes
an
indicator
that
the
society
in
question
is
only
apparently
democratic.
But,
at
the
same
time,
this
study
denounces
the
inability
of
terrorism
to
eliminate
the
block,
to
the
point
of
involuntarily
acting
as
a
restabilizing
element.
I.
On
the
difficulties
of
studying
terrorism
Some
methodological
precautions
must
accompany
reflection
on
such
a
delicate
(ideologically
speaking)
and
complex
(in
the
general
dimensions
of
political
vio-
lence)
problem
as
terrorism.
Very
often
it
has
been
the
object
of
insults
and
accusa-
tions
rather
than
of
analyses,
giving
rise
to
moralistic
positions
rather
than
scholarly
discussions.
The
very
word
’terrorism’
con-
tains
a
fundamental
ambiguity
from
the
viewpoint
of
linguistics
and
of
political
analysis.
In
it
the
descriptive
and
prescrip-
tive
aspects
merge
inextricably,
so
that
in
describing
as
’terrorist’
the
behavior
of
a
certain
political
group,
an
evaluation
is
at
the
same
time
suggested;
reciprocally,
when
an
action
is
considered
’terrorist’,
it
is
presumed
that
its
structure
has
also
been
described.
All
the
fundamental
problems
of
vio-
lence
in
politics,
in
its
various
manifesta-
tions,
share
this
’natural’
ambiguity:
one
need
only
think
of
attempts
at
distinguish-
ing
original
violence
and
violence
as
a
re-
action,
just
and
unjust
war,
and
so
on
(Young,
1977).
In
the
case
of
terrorism,
the
ambiguity
is
strengthened
by
the
fact
that
as
far
as
violence
in
general
is
concerned,
any
political
group
can
find
at
least
one
case
in
which
it
is
acceptable
(for
example
for
self-defense,
or
in
the
case
of
the
right
to
resist),
yet
no
political
group
wants
to
define
itself
as
terrorist;
furthermore,
only
the action
of
the
other
side
can
always
and
solely
be
defined
as
terrorist.
So
that,
while
we
are
used
to
living
with
many
manifesta-
tions
of
violence
and,
in
a
sense,
we
con-
sider
them
inevitable,
when
confronted
with
actions
which
we
call
terrorist
our
condem-
nation
is
unanimous
-
except
by
the
pro-
tagonists,
who
naturally
exclude
the
fact
that
their
behavior
can
be
terrorist.
In
a
sense,
this
unanimous
condemnation
of
ter-
rorism,
together
with
relative
indifference
towards
other
violent
political
actions,
seems
to
indicate
that
terrorism
is
seen
as
being
at
the
paroxysmal
level,
and
hence
unbearable,
of
a
kind
of
violence
which
can
instead
be
bore.1
The
result
is
that
deciding
whether
an
action
is
terrorist
(today
much
more
fre-
quent
than
some
years
ago:
in
1963
no
one
defined
as
’terrorist’
the
killing
of
J.
F.
Kennedy,
though
it
would
today
be
recalled
in
those
terms)
is
more
the
result
of
a
verdict
than
the
establishing
of
a
fact;
the
formulating
of
a
social
judgement
rather
*
Thanks
to
financial
support
from
the
Italian
National
Council
for
Research,
in
the
past
few
years
the
author
has
worked
assiduously
on
ter-
rorism..
In
this
paper,
he
has
tried
to
synthesize
(without
repeating)
the
main
conclusions of
works
published
in
1978.
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