Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: Transferred Intent and the Scope of Vicarious Liability

DOI10.3366/elr.2016.0343
Date01 May 2016
Author
Published date01 May 2016
Pages211-216
THE FACTS

Bazela and Somerville were managed by Smith at a scaffolding yard. All were employed by Harsco.1 Smith threw a hammer towards Bazela, with whom he was jamphing. It flew about thirty feet. Somerville, uninvolved in the banter, was hit on the head. Smith “did not intend to throw the hammer at” Somerville. However, he “admitted fault to [Harsco]”, and was sacked for gross misconduct.2 Somerville sued Harsco for Smith's delict. The sheriff held that:3

[I]t cannot be said that throwing a hammer in the direction of an employee with whom one is having a lighthearted exchange about going to the shop for rolls for the morning break is connected with one's duty to instruct an employee about the work of the defenders. This was in my opinion a frolic of Mr Smith's devising and execution and was unconnected with what he was employed to do.

On appeal, the question for Sheriff Principal Mhairi Stephen QC was whether the sheriff had erred in holding that Harsco was not vicariously liable for Smith's actings. It was held that the sheriff had not. Two points of interest arise from the decision
ASSAULT: TRANSFERRED INTENT

The Sheriff Principal held that the facts in Somerville involved assault:4

the Sheriff [was] correct to regard the circumstances of this case as similar to those in Wilson.5 The facts … are consistent with this being an assault on a fellow employee in the course of a prank.

This is broadly true. However, in Wilson, the pursuer's hair was deliberately pulled by the defender's concupiscent employee: it involved just two people, and a straightforwardly intentional delictual act. The facts were simpler than in Somerville. Carefully read,6 the latter judgment discloses that Smith deliberately threw the hammer, intended that it fly towards (but probably not hit) Bazela, did not “aim” for Somerville, but was reckless as to Somerville's injury

The difference between the two cases presents an opportunity to discuss whether transferred intention (A, who aims at B but hits C, is held liable for having intended this outright) may render a person liable for assault in the Scots law of delict. The position is unclear. For example, the first edition of Glegg on Reparation states vaguely, under reference to English authority, that “if there is the intention to injure one person, and by accident the violence takes effect on another, an assault is committed”.7 But there seems to be no Scots authority, or detailed discussion, directly on point.8 In Somerville, A was held to have committed assault because he recklessly hit C whilst throwing at B. Whilst, therefore, the case seems to go against a doctrine of transferred intent it is understandably silent on the point, discussion of which would in any event have been obiter. The question thus remains open as to the position Scots law should adopt.

Although apparently extant in England9 and alive and well in...

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