Sources of campaign funding for incumbents versus challengers in list proportional representation systems: The case of Colombia
| Published date | 01 June 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/01925121221080713 |
| Author | Gert-Jan Put,Bart Maddens,Gertjan Muyters |
| Date | 01 June 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Research Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121221080713
International Political Science Review
2023, Vol. 44(3) 370 –386
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/01925121221080713
journals.sagepub.com/home/ips
Sources of campaign funding for
incumbents versus challengers in
list proportional representation
systems: The case of Colombia
Gert-Jan Put
Department of Political, Social and Communication Sciences, Research Institute TRANSITIONS, Université de Namur,
Belgium
Bart Maddens
Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium
Gertjan Muyters
Public Governance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract
Previous work on candidate campaign finance in list proportional representation systems has focused
on differential electoral returns of spending for incumbent and challenger candidates. This article asks
whether incumbents and challengers in these systems fund election campaigns from different sources. We
hypothesize that incumbents receive more: (a) contributions from individual and corporate donors; and (b)
financial support from party organizations, as party elites strategically deploy resources to constrain intra-
party competition. The analysis is based on a dataset on campaign funding sources of candidates for two
legislative elections in Colombia (2014 and 2018). The results confirm that party organizations transfer more
financial resources to incumbents than to challengers. Contrary to expectations, parties do not specifically
support the electorally most vulnerable incumbents. We also find that challengers receive higher levels of
non-corporate private donations than incumbents. These findings provide insights into individual campaigns
and demonstrate how parties coordinate intra-party competition through campaign funding.
Keywords
Campaign funding, incumbents, candidates, intra-party competition, Colombia
Introduction
This article investigates the sources of candidates’ campaign funding in list proportional representa-
tion (PR) electoral systems. We analyse differences in funding sources between incumbent and
Corresponding author:
Gert-Jan Put, Department of Political, Social and Communication Sciences, Université de Namur, Rempart de la Vièrge
8, bus 3550, Namur, 5000, Belgium.
Email: gertjan.put@kuleuven.be
1080713IPS0010.1177/01925121221080713International Political Science ReviewPut et al.
research-article2022
Original Research Article
Put et al. 371
challenger candidates. The empirical analysis relies on a novel and built-for-purpose dataset on
highly detailed campaign funding sources of candidates for two legislative elections in Colombia.
The Colombian variable open/closed list PR system enables us to verify whether results are different
in different list settings. By looking at the income side of individual campaigns, this study takes an
innovative approach to the incumbent–challenger distinction in the campaign finance literature.
Where do incumbent and challenger candidates draw their resources from to fund individual
campaigns in list PR systems? This question has not yet been addressed by earlier research on
campaign spending in this broad family of electoral systems. Instead, scholarly interest has largely
focused on the electoral returns of candidates’ campaign expenses. The classic contentious issue in
this line of research is whether expenses by incumbents are more or less effective than spending by
challengers (e.g. Green and Krasno, 1988; Jacobson, 1990).
Research on whether a relationship exists between incumbency status and campaign contribu-
tions in list PR systems has received much less attention. Do incumbents receive more contributions
and do they draw campaign funds from different sources compared to challengers? In the US con-
text, private donations for incumbents and challengers have in fact been investigated quite exten-
sively (e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2014). Outside the US, scholarly
knowledge on the sources of candidates’ campaign finance still remains relatively limited.
This article offers a first investigation into the campaign funding sources of incumbent versus
challenger candidates in list PR systems. Theoretically, we link the existence of a financial incum-
bency advantage in such systems to two different literatures. First, we hypothesize that incumbents
receive more contributions from individual and corporate donors. Similar to what is reported in
research on campaign income patterns in the US (Fouirnaies and Hall, 2014), we argue that incum-
bents in list PR systems have better access to donations than challengers. Second, we contend that
the campaign finance behaviour of party elites in these systems strengthens the financial incum-
bency advantage. Drawing from recent literature on intra-party competition in list PR systems
(Cheibub and Sin, 2020), we develop the hypothesis that incumbents in these systems are more
likely to receive financial support from their party organizations. Financial transfers from party
organizations to the incumbents’ campaign coffer allow party elites to coordinate intra-party com-
petition in favour of incumbents. If parties indeed use financial transfers as a strategic tool to pro-
tect their incumbents in list PR systems, we may also expect these transfers to depend on the
electoral vulnerability of incumbents. The more threatened the position of the incumbent, the larger
the financial boost the party will give to this incumbent. In this way, party transfers may function
as an important driver of higher spending levels for incumbents (e.g. Cox and Thies, 1998).
The empirical analysis leverages campaign finance data on 3077 candidates for the 2014 and
2018 Colombian Lower Chamber elections. Detailed information on candidates’ campaign finance
is made publicly available by the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). Colombia is an excellent case
for investigating individual funding patterns, as it has a liberal campaign finance regime with few
restrictions on private donations and with an option for parties to funnel public subsidies to candi-
dates. Moreover, the Colombian institutional context with its strong heterogeneity in terms of dis-
trict magnitude allows for a test of our hypotheses on candidates running under different list PR
ballot structures and dealing with varying levels of electoral vulnerability.
We run linear and generalized linear models with four distinct funding sources as dependent
variables: personal funds, private donations, corporate donations and party transfers. The statistical
models show that party organizations transfer more financial resources to incumbents than to chal-
lengers. But contrary to what was expected, they do not specifically support marginal incumbents,
who are electorally more vulnerable. Moreover, challengers consistently receive higher levels of
private donations than incumbents, which may indicate that challengers aim to compensate for
their parties’ efforts to coordinate intra-party competition with financial resources.
To continue reading
Request your trial