Sovereignty and trading states: denuclearization in Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine
| Author | JeongWon Bourdais Park,DaHoon Chung |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211069754 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211069754
International Relations
2022, Vol. 36(3) 480 –503
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178211069754
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Sovereignty and trading
states: denuclearization in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, South
Africa, and Ukraine
JeongWon Bourdais Park
KIMEP University
DaHoon Chung
Sogang University
Abstract
The paper explores the cases of denuclearized countries, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, South
Africa, and Ukraine and primarily intends to answer the questions of how (process), why (reasons
for denuclearization), and for what (benefits and gains) did these four countries abandon their
strategically advantageous nuclear arsenals. For conceptual analysis, ‘a trading state’ is employed,
for they commonly faced the imminent need of guaranteeing state sovereignty and the influence
of changing security dynamics. The four cases exhibit both generalizable commonality and
distinctive experience in the process of denuclearization. They demonstrate that two mutually-
reinforcing forces, ‘global-scale structural change in world politics’ and ‘pressure for regime
creation or change’, interactively led to the final decision to enact complete denuclearization,
albeit not effortlessly. Furthermore, unveiling the differences in the process of denuclearization
– in terms of resistance, negotiation tools and leverage, stage of nuclear development, domestic-
grown technology, internal justification for legitimacy – helps to clarify the gains and benefits
received in return for denuclearization. Shedding light on these four countries, under pressure
from nuclear weapons states, complements conventional realism-leaning interpretations of
nuclear politics and offers policy insights to understand countries with nuclear ambition in
contemporary world politics.
Keywords
nuclear disarmament, Post-Soviet denuclearized states, South Africa, sovereignty, trading state
Corresponding author:
JeongWon Bourdais Park, KIMEP University, 4 Abay Avenue, Office 320, Valikhanov bld., Almaty 050010,
Republic of Kazakhstan.
Emails: jw.bourdais.park@gmail.com; jwpark@kimep.kz
1069754IRE0010.1177/00471178211069754International RelationsBourdais Park and Chung
research-article2022
Article
Bourdais Park and Chung 481
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons is seemingly no longer
the most effective method of national security defense. Despite this, among the nuclear
weapon states (Table 1), arms races and military competition – including upgrading
nuclear technology for both military and civilian use – has strengthened rather than
declined.1 As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2020) stated
in their annual report, the ‘[m]odernization of world nuclear forces continues despite
overall decrease in number of warheads’.2 In parallel, selective pressure to denuclearize
certain countries that have displayed nuclear ambition and pursued corresponding tech-
nological development has grown harsher.
From a nuclear weapon state’s point of view, either recognized or de facto, nuclear
power status may offer an array of benefits – namely psychological security, pres-
tige, stronger negotiation leverage, centralized power in domestic politics, legiti-
macy, technological advance and spill-over to other related industries. Nevertheless,
due to its immense lethal and destructive potential, no nation is tolerant of a neigh-
boring country’s development and retention of nuclear armaments. Yet, nuclear dis-
armament threshold countries underwent a certain period of resistance due to the
complex meaning and multiple values attached not only to actual ‘possession of
nuclear arsenals’ but also to ‘recognition as nuclear states’ even temporarily. In this
regard, this article investigates the four cases of the denuclearized countries in ques-
tion: South Africa and the three post-Soviet nuclear successor states, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. While ample research on cross-national comparisons of
nuclear power states has long been readily available, there is relatively a dearth of
comparative research that focuses on already-denuclearized countries. Our study
attempts to fill this lacuna by examining the denuclearization process in the context
of structural changes in world politics. To date, only the above-mentioned four coun-
tries have either completely dismantled or ceased retention of already-weaponized
nuclear capabilities, while there are numerous cases of ceased development of
nuclear weapons programs at earlier stages, such as Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Japan,
Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The difficulty and complexity involved in denuclearization emanate from the ques-
tions of state sovereignty and security.3 At the end of the Cold War, rapid economic glo-
balization and the neoliberal world order reached many countries of the former Soviet
bloc, leading to the tangible process of ‘denuclearization and marketisation’. For weaker
countries, including newly-independent states, preserving the multiple aspects of sover-
eignty with full exercise is often limited. Conventional realism proponents pay insuffi-
cient attention to the diverse motivations and reactions of weaker states to pressure from
hegemonic powers and/or structural constraints in world politics.4
Arguably, nuclear weapons were one of the important factors sustaining the Cold War
system.5 It is a widely-accepted view that their existence served only as mechanisms of
deterrence, given the fact that, when considering actual deployment of nuclear weapons
in real world, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs represented their first and last use.
Nevertheless, the debate over the limited function of nuclear arsenals as a tool of defense
and deterrence is not a moot question.6 As Szalai noted, ‘[n]uclear strategy is a curious
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