Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland
| Author | Ian McAllister,Bernadette C. Hayes |
| Published date | 01 December 2001 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00346 |
| Date | 01 December 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Sowing Dragon’s Teeth: Public Support
for Political Violence and Paramilitarism
in Northern Ireland
Bernadette C. Hayes
Queen’s University
Ian McAllister
Australian National University
While much attention has been devoted to political efforts to solve the Northern Ireland problem,
less attention has been given to the role of political violence in sustaining the conflict. We argue
that one of the reasons for the intractability of the conflict is widespread exposure to political
violence among the civil population. By 1998, thirty years after the conflict started, one in seven
of the population reported being a victim of violence; one in five had a family member killed or
injured; and one in four had been caught up in an explosion. Such widespread exposure to
violence exists alongside latent support for paramilitarism among a significant minority of both
communities. Using 1998 survey data, we show that exposure to violence serves to enhance public
support for paramilitary groups, as well as to reduce support for the decommissioning of para-
military weapons. Overall, the results suggest that only a lengthy period without political violence
will undermine support for paramilitarism and result in the decommissioning of weapons.
These creatures Aeetes ordered him to yoke and to sow dragon’s teeth;
for he had got from Athena half of the dragon’s teeth which Cadmus
sowed in Thebes … And when he had sowed the teeth, there rose armed
men from the ground …
Jason and the Argonauts
The most visible and dramatic manifestation of the post-1968 Northern Ireland
conflict has been political violence. Comparative studies show that Northern
Ireland is easily the most intense violent conflict in Europe, accounting for the
majority of terrorist incidents in Europe (US Secretary of State, 2001). The various
paramilitary organizations that operate in the province are the most highly organ-
ized and equipped in Europe, particularly on the republican side. The statistics of
violence suggest that in its duration and intensity relative to population size, the
conflict approaches that of a war rather than a local insurgency, with substantial
numbers of the population being exposed to many aspects of the violence, from
intimidation and physical injury, to being caught up in a bomb explosion or riot.
Most of the research on the Northern Ireland problem has assumed that the
violence is a consequence of the political problem; once a permanent settlement
between the communities is reached, violence will become irrelevant and swiftly
disappear. Less attention has been given to analysing how public exposure to
violence serves to mould popular attitudes towards the use of violence as a political
© Political Studies Association, 2001.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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B E R N A D E T T E C . H A Y E S , I A N M C A L L I S T E R
tool, and in turn to engender further political violence. In other words, violence
may not simply be a consequence of other (mainly political) things, but it may feed
off itself in a continuous and perpetual cycle, as in the proverb of the dragon’s
teeth. The apparent widespread support for – or at the very least, ambiguity
towards – paramilitary organizations suggests that there is a significant minority
prepared both to condone political violence and to participate in it. It is the role of
political violence in sustaining paramilitary support that is the topic of this article.
Aggregate Patterns of Violence
The political violence that Northern Ireland has experienced since 1968 continues
a long tradition of violent conflict dating back several centuries. Secret societies
emerged in Ireland in the eighteenth century, using direct action to express agrar-
ian discontent. Most of these secret societies were based in the south, but they
occasionally committed outrages, mainly against unpopular landlords, in the north
(Williams, 1973). By the end of the century the secret societies were represented
in the north by two sectarian groups, the Peep O’Day Boys, who were Protestant,
and the Defenders, who were Catholic (Clark and Donnelly, 1983). In turn, these
groups were replaced by two organizations with overtly political goals, the Orange
Order and the United Irishmen, respectively (Senior, 1966; Elliott, 1982). The loyal-
ist and republican organizations which have employed political violence since 1968
are very much the direct descendants of these agrarian groups, which used similar
methods, for similar ends, centuries before.
The rapid industrialization of Belfast in the nineteenth century transferred these
rural conflicts into an urban setting. Largely based on linen, and later shipbuilding
and engineering, Belfast was one of the first industrial cities in the British Isles. The
insatiable demand for labour generated by these new industries attracted both
Protestants and Catholics from all over the north into Belfast, and their contiguity
in working class areas of the city has provided the basis for violent conflict ever
since. Throughout the nineteenth century Belfast was the scene of periodic com-
munal rioting, causing around 60 deaths (Budge and O’Leary, 1973). The widespread
disturbances that accompanied the 1886 Home Rule Bill resulted in 86 deaths across
the province, many of them in Belfast (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 21). Succes-
sive observers of the conflict have noted the importance of the urban interfaces
between the two communities as the touchstone for the conflict (Boal et al., 1976);
for the most part, these interfaces were established during the nineteenth century.
The post-1968 violence dwarfs any previous conflict in scale, intensity and
duration. More people have died in communal violence in the past quarter century
in Northern Ireland – 3,289 by the end of 19981 – than in any similar period in
Ireland over the past two centuries, with the possible exception of the 1922–23
Irish Civil War (Table 1).2 In addition, over 40,000 people have been injured,
representing almost 3 per cent of the population. If we extrapolate these figures to
Britain, some 111,000 people would have died, with 1.4 million people injured.
This represents just under half of all British deaths (265,000) during the Second
World War. Further extrapolating the deaths to the United States, some 526,000
would have died, more than died during the Second World War (405,000) and
nine times the American war dead in Vietnam.
P U B L I C S U P P O R T F O R V I O L E N C E I N N O R T H E R N I R E L A N D
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Table 1: The Scale of the Political Violence, 1969–98
Estimates (000s)
N. Ireland
Britain
USA
Deaths
3,289
111
526
Injuries
41,837
1,406
6,673
Shooting incidents
35,669
1,188
5,161
Bomb explosions
15,246
503
2,388
Persons charged with terrorist offences
18,258
589
2,797
Note: Figures for persons charged with terrorist offences date from 31 July 1972.
Source: Elliott and Flackes (1999).
The large number of incidents underlines the intensity of the conflict, with over
35,000 shooting incidents and 15,000 bomb explosions. Many of these bomb
explosions have occurred in Belfast or Londonderry, which were the targets of
intense and sustained bombing campaigns by the IRA during the 1970s.3 Such
levels of violence, maintained over a long period of time, have inevitably drawn
many people into the paramilitary organizations. Estimates of paramilitary mem-
bership are difficult to make with any accuracy, but police statistics show that since
1972, over 18,000 people have been charged with terrorist offences. It is a reason-
able conclusion that more people in Northern Ireland have participated in illegal
paramilitary organizations than at any time since the United Irishmen rising of
1798. Once again, extrapolating these figures to Britain or the US show the inten-
sity of the violence; shooting incidents alone would have numbered over 1 million
in Britain, and over 5 million in the United States. Around half a million British
people would have been charged with a terrorist offence, and nearly 2.8 million
Americans. By any standards, what Ulster people euphemistically call ‘the Troubles’
is, in fact, a war.
Three main agencies have been responsible, in various ways, for the deaths that
have occurred during the course of the conflict.4 The Provisional IRA have been
responsible for by far the largest number of deaths – 1,696 by the end of 1998, or
just under half of the total (Table 2).5 In the early stages of the conflict, the Official
IRA was active in violence, but they regarded most of their operations as ‘defensive’
and did not emulate the Provisionals’ indiscriminate car bombing campaign that
resulted in many civilian deaths during the early 1970s. The Official IRA declared
a ceasefire in 1972, and thereafter reduced their military capacity, eventually
becoming an entirely political organization by the late 1970s (O’Brien, 1999). At
the same time, dissidents within the Official IRA who wanted to continue with the
use of force formed the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which has
specialized in the assassination of high profile individuals; for example, they were
responsible for the assassination of the Conservative Northern Ireland spokes-
person Airey Neave in 1979 (see Taylor, 1997). Of the 335 deaths attributable to
non-IRA republicans, the INLA has been responsible for 117, or about one-third.
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Table 2:...
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