Spatial Effects of the Poll Tax: A Preliminary Analysis
| Date | 01 June 1989 |
| Published date | 01 June 1989 |
| DOI | 10.1177/095207678900400203 |
| Author | Ronan Paddison |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Spatial Effects of the Poll Tax:
A
Preliminary Analysis
Ronan Paddison
University of Glasgow
The introduction of the Community Charge has probably gathered more
widespread opposition than any of the legislation aimed at reforming the basis by
which British local government is financed (Newton and Karran, 1985). Earlier
reforms of the system of local government finance, introduced in the first and
second Thatcher administrations, had sought by a variety of methods to control
what the centre argued was excessive local spending, and had generated
considerable opposition amongst local authorities.
Local politicians, and the opposition national parties both saw the changes as
an assault on local autonomy, a view increasingly shared by professional bodies
representing accountants and valuation officers. Opinion polls in the early 1980’s
had indicated that ’most people would be willing to pay at least a limited amount
of additional taxation, rather than see major services deteriorate’ (Game, 1984,
p.10). Yet in spite of this, and the concerted attempts by the centre to control the
local fisc, it was not until the poll tax legislation that such reform was to confront
widespread popular opposition from the general mass of the population.
In Scotland opposition to the principles of reform has been consistent. At the
outset the earlier introduction of the change to Scotland than to England and
Wales was resented, not only (and more obviously) by Nationalist and Labour
Parties, but also, according to some polls, by a proportion of Conservative
politicians and voters. To some the ’imposition’ of the community charge became
symptomatic of the gulf separating the Thatcher ’English’ administration and
Scotland, as a clear example as any of the dominance of the periphery by the
centre. The resolve to replace the rating system and to avoid the electoral damage
created by the revaluation crisis of 1985 had resulted in the introduction of a
system which Scots, from widely differing class and partisan positions, saw as
socially unjust. Even though in the period running up to the implementation of
the community charge in April 1989 the opposition has become split - notably
10
over whether to pay or not to pay - the extent of the perceived injustice is
indisputable.
As far as the individual householder is concerned opposition to the change is
easily explained: the tax is seen as unfair and socially unjust (Bailey, 1986). The
Green Paper, ’Paying for Local Government’ (Cmnd. 9714) claimed that the
community charge would be less regressive than domestic rates. On several
grounds the claim has to be dismissed. For one the insistence of a minimum
payment of 20% of the charge will disadvantage certain groups previously
exempted from paying rates, such as pensioners receiving full rates rebates.
This statement needs to be qualified in the light of the increases in social
security benefits payable in Scotland which are designed to at least partly
compensate for this deleterious effect. However, Table 1 shows that despite these
rebates, the community charge could still account for more than five percent of
the net income of the poorest groups. Prior to April 1988 full rebates were
available for the poorest households.
Table 1: Net Income at which the Full Community Charge becomes payable.
The figures in the boxes show the net weekly income at which certain categories
of individuals and households would become liable for full contributions at given
levels of poll tax.
11
The minimum 20% of payment level was proposed within the White Paper
’Reform of Social Security’ (Cmnd. 9691) and if the proposals of it are taken
alongside those of the Green Paper - and which have now been enshrined in the
legislation - the system promises to be considerably more regressive than the
existing one. Using data provided in the Green Paper itself, and notwithstanding
rebates, it is clear that households with net actual incomes of less than £200 per
week (accounting for well over 50% of households nationally) will be
disadvantaged considerably, while the opposite will be true for households
enjoying incomes of above £200 per week.
The argument that the reform is advantageous to certain social groups and
penalising to others is bome out by opinion data measuring support for the new
system. A recent MORI poll based on the question ’do you support or oppose the
government replacing the system of domestic rates with a fixed charge paid by
people in each household over the age of 18?’ revealed that opposition overall (at
61%) was nearly double the level of those who favour the change, but that the
pattern of preferences was differentiated by social class (Table 2).
Table 2: Opinion Poll Preferences towards the Replacement of Rates’
Note: Question: ’Do you support or oppose the government replacing the system
of domestic rates with a fixed charge paid by people in each household over the
age of 18?’
Source: MORI poll, June 1988, conducted on a Britain-wide basis
Thus while opinion was almost equally divided amongst the professional classes,
at the other end of the social spectrum opposition in social classes D and E
reached 71 %, while support only reached 20%. Even though in no social group
did a clear majority favour the change, the pattern of support was clearly divided
across the social...
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