Special Reasons
| Author | Pauline M Callow |
| Pages | 470-538 |
CHAPTER 11: SPECIAL REASONS
Chapter 11
Special Reasons
See s 34, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 – disqualification for a minimum period for certain offences unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to disqualify for a shorter period or not at all.
1. The Meaning of “Special”
Whittall v Kirby
[1947] KB 194, [1946] 2 All ER 552, November 1946, KBD (DC) The four criteria for finding special reasons.
The defendant had pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of drink, contrary to s 15, Road Traffic Act 1930. He argued that there were special reasons for not disqualifying, under s 15(2), Road Traffic Act 1930. The magistrates had no knowledge of any previous motoring convictions against the defendant; they found that retention of his licence was essential to his livelihood; in setting the fine they took account of that fact that they did not intend to disqualify him. They did not disqualify. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: “… none of the facts found by the justices can amount to a special reason …
“… The limited discretion [not to disqualify] must be exercised judicially. The reasons inducing the court to exercise it must be special, and special is the antithesis of general. The facts that a man is a first offender or that he has committed no motoring offence for many years are reasons of the most general character … There is no indication in the Act that Parliament meant to draw any distinction between drivers who earn their living by driving or who drive for purposes connected with their business and any other users of motor cars …
“What then can be said to be a special reason beyond saying that it must be one that is not of a general character? … the reasons must be special to the offence, and not to the offender … [Quoting from the judgment in the Northern Ireland case of R v Crossan [1939] 1 NI 106] ‘A “special reason” within the exception is one which is special to the facts of the particular case, that is, special to the facts which constitute the offence. It is, in other words, [1] a mitigating or extenuating circumstance, [2] not amounting in law to a
The Meaning of “Special”
defence to the charge, yet [3] directly connected with the commission of the offence, and [4] one which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment. A circumstance peculiar to the offender as distinguished from the offence is not a “special reason” within the exception.’ I respectfully and entirely agree with and adopt this passage …”
Appeal allowed.
Chatters v Burke
[1986] 1 WLR 1321, [1986] 3 All ER 168, [1986] RTR 396, 17 June 1986, QBD (DC)
Seven-point checklist for assessing whether special reasons exist. See also the cases under the heading “The Distance Driven and the Degree of Danger”, page 503 et seq, where the checklist was applied.
The defendant had pleaded guilty to, inter alia, driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s 6(1)(a), Road Traffic Act 1972 as substituted by s 25 and Sch 8, Transport Act 1981. He had been to a party. On leaving, he thought he had had too much drink and asked someone else to drive. The driver lost control; the car left the road and stopped in a field. The defendant then drove the car off the field and back onto the road; he immediately stopped the car, which now had a flat tyre, got out, and waited for the police. Breath analysis later revealed 51 µg alcohol in 100 ml breath.
The justices accepted the defendant’s submission that there were special reasons for not disqualifying under s 93(1), Road Traffic Act 1972, on the ground of the very short distance driven. They did not disqualify him from driving. The prosecutor appealed.
Question(s) for the Court: Whether on the facts the justices came to a correct determination and decision in point of law.
Held: “… seven matters … ought to be taken into account by justices [on] a submission … that special reasons exist … First of all they should consider how far the vehicle was in fact driven; secondly, in what manner it was driven; thirdly, … the state of the vehicle; fourthly, whether it was the intention of the driver to drive any further; fifthly, the prevailing conditions with regard to the road and the traffic upon it; sixthly, whether there was any possibility of danger by contact with other road users; and finally, what was the reason for the vehicle being driven at all.
“Of those seven matters … item six [is] the most important, but clearly the distance which is driven is of itself not a sufficient determinant as to whether special reasons should be found or not.
“[Looking at] the matters which the justices took into account, … The distance actually driven … was very short and that which he drove upon the highway was minimal. The manner of his driving is not commented upon as having caused any difficulty. The state of the car, apart from its flat tyre, was without any particular unusual feature …
“… [The defendant] was not intending to drive the vehicle further … The conditions of the road are not spelt out in the case … As to the possible risk of danger, the justices clearly had in mind the shortness of the travel upon the highway; and as to the reason for moving the vehicle, the defendant said that he had thought that it was the right thing to do …
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CHAPTER 11: SPECIAL REASONS
“Reviewing the decision of the justices against the seven criteria to which I have made reference, it seems to me that there was more than one factor taken into account here and that the evidence was sufficient to justify the view which the justices took.”
Appeal dismissed.
Emergencies
2. Emergencies
Taylor v Rajan; Fraser v Barton
[1974] QB 424, [1974] 2 WLR 385, [1974] 1 All ER 1087, [1974] RTR 304, [1974] Crim LR 188, 21 January 1974, QBD (DC)
Where the facts disclose a special reason, that does not mean that the driver automatically escapes disqualification. When exercising the discretion whether or not to disqualify on the grounds of emergency, the court must consider, objectively, all the circumstances, and distinguish the outward and return journeys. On the facts of these cases, the drivers should have been disqualified.
In both cases a motorist had pleaded guilty to driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s 6(1), Road Traffic Act 1972, but argued that there were special reasons for not disqualifying under s 93(1), Road Traffic Act 1972.
In Taylor v Rajan, the defendant was suffering from influenza and had arranged for someone else to take his place at one of the restaurants he managed; he was at home and intended to remain there; he had been drinking brandy. He received a telephone call saying his deputy was himself ill and unable to be at work; there was no responsible person at the restaurant to secure the premises and remove the cash. The defendant therefore drove to the restaurant. He could have asked his father, who owned the restaurant, to go, but he preferred not to trouble his father. The defendant stayed at the restaurant for an hour and a half, and did not drink while there. He was stopped for speeding while driving home, and blood analysis later revealed 102 mg alcohol in 100 ml blood.
In Fraser v Barton, the defendant returned home at 11.30 p.m., having consumed a large amount of alcohol. At 1.30 a.m. he received a telephone call from a friend who said she was having serious domestic trouble and asked him to go and see her at once; he telephoned for a taxi but could not get one; he called the only minicab number he had, but there was no answer. He then drove to his friend’s home; he was stopped while driving on his return journey, and blood analysis later revealed 230 mg alcohol in 100 ml blood.
In both cases the justices found special reasons and did not disqualify. The prosecutor appealed.
Question(s) for the Court: (both cases): (1) Whether the circumstances in which the respondent decided to drive were such that the justices were entitled to find a special reason in respect of that journey; (2) if so, whether the special reason could continue so as to cover the journey home.
Held: (Taylor v Rajan): “… If a man, in the well-founded belief that he will not drive again, puts his car into the garage, goes into his house, and has a certain amount to drink in the belief that he is not going to drive again, and if thereafter there is an emergency which requires him … to take his car out … then that … can in law amount to a special reason for not disqualifying …
“… The mere fact that the facts disclosed a special reason does not mean that the driver is to escape disqualification as a matter of course …
“One of the most important matters which justices have to consider in the exercise of this discretion is whether the emergency … was sufficiently acute to justify the driver taking his car out …
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CHAPTER 11: SPECIAL REASONS
“The court … must consider the whole of the circumstances … the nature and degree of the crisis or emergency; … whether there were alternative means of transport, or methods of dealing with the crisis … They should have regard to the manner in which the defendant drove … and … to whether the defendant acted responsibly or otherwise.
“… the test is not a subjective one … The matter must be considered objectively and the quality and gravity of the crisis must be assessed in that way.
“Last … if the alcohol content in the defendant’s body is very high, that is a very powerful reason for saying that the discretion should not be exercised in his favour. Indeed if the alcoholic content exceeds 100 milligrammes per 100 millilitres of blood, the justices should rarely, if ever, exercise this discretion in favour of the driver.
“… there will often be a distinct difference in the situation presented to the driver on his outward journey when he goes to deal with the emergency, and on his homeward journey when the emergency has been dealt with. It will generally be much more difficult for the driver to justify using his car to go home, the emergency having been dealt with …
[In Taylor v Rajan, if the justices] “had really considered the...
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