Spoilers of peace: Pro-government militias as risk factors for conflict recurrence
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318800524 |
| Author | Christoph V Steinert,Janina I Steinert,Sabine C Carey |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Spoilers of peace: Pro-government militias
as risk factors for conflict recurrence
Christoph V Steinert
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
Janina I Steinert
Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford
Sabine C Carey
Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim
Abstract
This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of
conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since
these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-
conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts com-
pared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace
negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disar-
mament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from
peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the govern-
ment, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counter-
insurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes
between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same
actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of
conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic
regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as
counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term
consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state
actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.
Keywords
conflict, conflict recurrence, pro-government militias, spoilers, violent non-state actors
Introduction
The US military encouraged Sunni tribal groups to fight
insurgents in occupied Iraq between 2005 and 2008
(Clayton & Thomson, 2014: 920). This ‘Sunni Awa-
kening militia’, consisting of local tribes, sided with the
US-led coalition forces against al-Qaeda (Clayton &
Thomson, 2014: 931). In the fight against the pro-
Russian separatist movement, the Ukrainian government
relies on allied fighters, such as the so-called ‘Aidar
Battalion’ that has criminals and anti-Semites in its ranks
(Amnesty International, 2014). President Assad’s regime
in Syria is supported by militia groups such as the Ala-
wite ‘Shabiha’ militia (Heydemann, 2013: 67). Serving
as ‘shock troops’ and controlling army units to defend
defections, the Shabiha forces are presumably
Corresponding author:
christoph.steinert@gess.uni-mannheim.de
Journal of Peace Research
2019, Vol. 56(2) 249–263
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343318800524
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