Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 by Stephen Kotkin
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702019876379 |
| Author | Robert E. Johnson |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
Stephen Kotkin
Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941
Penguin: New York, 2017; 1154 pp.: $54.00 (cloth)
ISBN 978-1-14301-559-8
Reviewed by: Robert E. Johnson (johnson@chass.utoronto.ca), University of Toronto,
Canada
As the figure of Josef Stalin recedes from living memory, the myths and contro-
versies that he engendered continue. In today’s Russia, where the GULAG
Archipelago is officially sanctioned and widely read, the predominant verdict on
the Soviet leader remains ‘‘Yes, but.’’ In this second volume of a projected trilogy,
Stephen Kotkin, arguably the most original and prolific Russianist of his gener-
ation, offers still another version of this enigma: almost all that anyone might ever
want to know about Stalin, and then some.
We begin with the denunciation of Nikolai Bukharin in January 1929 for ‘‘right
deviationism’’—a signal that there would be no more concessions to peasants:
rapid industrialization would proceed, and agriculture would be collectivized what-
ever the price in human lives. Some 900 pages later (21 June 1941), German panzers
are revving their engines on the USSR’s border. Kotkin divides his exposition into
three roughly equal parts: 1929–1934 (collectivization); 1935–1938 (the terror-
purge); and 1939–1941 (Stalin’s dealings with Hitler). During these years, the
Soviet leader went from mere dictatorship to ‘‘forging despotism in mass blood-
shed’’ (xii). This is a compelling arc, but instead of simply tracing it, Kotkin
digresses. He can’t resist describing Stalin’s cinema, Hitler’s hypochondria, and
even Molotov’s love letters—all interesting, but not essential to his story. Herein
lies a problem.
He writes in a lively and engaging style, breaking each chapter into compact sub-
sections. His method is to zero in on an issue, review relevant evidence (usually
from primary sources), and offer a cogent conclusion. For example, having
described the horrors of agricultural collectivization and the accompanying loss
of life across the republics of the USSR, he argues that ‘‘there was no ‘Ukrainian’
famine. This was a Soviet famine’’ (129). His point is not to dispute the massive
scale of Ukrainian deaths or the brutality of grain confiscation, but to recognize
that the same methods were used elsewhere with equally horrendous results, as in
the lower Volga and Kazakhstan.
On the murder of Sergei Kirov, which later provided the pretext for launching
the Great Purge:
[Stalin] was capable of anything.... [But] there is no evidence whatsoever that Stalin
killed Kirov (despite the work of several commissions under Khrushchev aimed at
discrediting the dictator). And there is copious evidence that [Leonid] Nikolaev [whose
wife may have been having an affair with Kirov] did it. (235)
The official autopsy found traces of semen in the victim’s underwear, and the bullet
trajectory suggests Kirov may have been shot while in a recumbent position.
490 International Journal 74(3)
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