Standing alongside your friends
| Author | Hugh Ward,Han Dorussen |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343316628814 |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Standing alongside your friends:
Network centrality and providing
troops to UN peacekeeping operations
Hugh Ward & Han Dorussen
Department of Government, University of Essex
Abstract
Why do countries contribute troops to UN peacekeeping? Recognizing the incentives to free ride on the contribu-
tions of other countries, existing explanations have tended to focus on the private benefits of providing troops. There
has been particular emphasis on some major contributing countries that gain financially from providing peace-
keepers. An alternative explanation could be that countries prefer to deploy troops to peacekeeping alongside
countries with similar foreign policy preferences in order to maximize jointly produced private benefits. Accordingly,
the willingness to provide peacekeepers should depend on which other countries are providing troops to peace-
keeping operations. The implications are explored within the context of games on networks, and it is demonstrated
that in equilibrium countries that are more Bonacich central in the network of foreign policy preference contribute
disproportionally to UN peacekeeping. Based on actual contributions to UN peacekeeping from 1990 until 2011,
we find that policy complementari ties explain why countries provide a larger proportion of peaceke epers to a
particular mission. Importantly, centrality in the network of policy complementarities matters and not simply that
countries have moderate policy preferences. There is robust evidence for the prevalence of peacekeeping alongside
your ‘friends’; in effect, countries with a lot of ‘friends’ contribute more peacekeepers.
Keywords
games on networks, liberal peace, network analysis, peacekeeping, policy complementarities
Introduction
When raising money for charitable purposes, churches
and rotary clubs regularly organize events where mem-
bers are encouraged to give because they observe their
friends doing the same. Besides peer pressure, the suc-
cess of such events derives from the enjoyment to be
had from doing things together; for example, when
neighborhood organizations pick litter or look after
community gardens. Peer pressure via social networks
also contributes to turnout in elections (Abrams,
Iversen & Soskice, 2011). In this case, an additional
element is that people with similar political views are
particularly relevant. We argue that benefits from
peacekeeping alongside countries with similar foreign
policy preferences can similarly explain why countries
contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UN PKOs).
There is a renewed scholarly interest in peacekeeping,
where recent research has emphasized its importance in
stabilizing post-conflict situations (Doyle & Sambanis,
2006; Fortna, 2008; Ruggeri, Gizelis & Dorussen,
2013) as well as its relevance for protecting civilians
(Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013). Over the last
30 years, peacekeeping has evolved from ‘traditional’ to
‘new’ peacekeeping (Ratner, 1995): peacekeepers are
now more likely to be deployed to civil wars rather than
interstate conflict, are more often authorized to use force,
and tend to operate under broader and more demanding
mandates (Heldt & Wallensteen, 2006). These develop-
ments have led not only to the deployment of a larger
number of peacekeepers – from about 10,000 in 1985 to
Corresponding author:
hdorus@essex.ac.uk
Journal of Peace Research
2016, Vol. 53(3) 392–408
ªThe Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343316628814
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more than 100,000 in 2014 – but also to their deploy-
ment into more risky environments. Fortna (2008) and
Sambanis & Doyle (2007) note that peacekeepers are
regularly deployed to so-called ‘hard cases’, while Rug-
geri, Dorussen & Gizelis (forthcoming) detail their
deployment to local conflict hot spots. Ruggeri, Dorus-
sen & Gizelis (2013) and Dorussen & Gizelis (2013)
examine the interaction between peacekeepers and the
local population and find evidence of cooperation but
also conflict. The UN Secretary-General faces an increas-
ingly daunting task, namely to find adequate numbers of
sufficiently competent peacekeeping troops to be
deployed into risky situations, making it germane to
examine why countries contribute troops to peacekeep-
ing operations.
1
Contributing to peacekeeping operations may yield a
combination of public and private benefits (Khanna,
Sandler & Shimizu, 1999; Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Bove
& Elia, 2011). Peacekeeping provides public goods for
the international community if it enhances international
security through monitoring peace agreements and sta-
bilizing post-conflict societies. It also contributes to
upholding international norms in (post-)conflict situa-
tions, such as the responsibility to protect, human rights
and transitional justice, and gender equality. Well-known
collective action problems affect the provision of such
public goods (Olson, 1965). Countries have incentives
to free ride on the contributions of other countries leading
to an underprovision of peaceke epers and inequitable
burden-sharing (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966; Khanna,
Sandler & Shimizu, 1998, 1999). Apart from obvious
concerns about potential lack of peacekeepers, peacekeep-
ing is more valuable to the international communityif it is
seen as a global responsibility with a fair sharing of the
burden rather than a hegemonic imposition of values.
Observing an increased tendency of a small number of
countries to shoulder the financial burden of peacekeep-
ing, Shimizu & Sandler (2002: 666) conclude: ‘The reli-
ance on a few hegemonsto keep the peace comes at a price
as these ‘‘larger shareholders’’ in peacekeeping operations
pursue an agenda in keeping with their preferences.’
In joint-production models, contributions to the pub-
lic good simultaneously yield private benefits (Cornes &
Sandler, 1984). Because operations are located in a
specific geographic region, the stability provided by
peacekeeping can be treated as an impure public good,
more beneficial for countries in the same region or with
region-specific interests (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997: 727).
Peacekeepers thus deliver public goods for the whole
international community while also securing private,
country-specific, benefits. A large number of participating
countries, however, may crowd out any advantage for a
particular country. In joint-production models, positive
contributions can occur in equilibrium even though
public-goodelements still incentivize countries to contrib-
ute less the more others contribute. Empirical evidence
suggests that jointly produced benefits matter for the pro-
visionof peacekeepers (Khanna,Sandler & Shimizu, 1999;
Gaibulloev,Sandler & Shimizu,2009; Bove & Elia,2011).
Others simply consider private, in particular financial,
benefits as the primary motivation for providing peace-
keepers. UN funding for peacekeepers exceeds the cost of
providing troops for most poor member countries, mak-
ing it profitable for them to deploy peacekeepers. Finan-
cial incentives have often been suggested as the primary
motivation behind the large number of peacekeepers
from countries like India, Bangladesh, and Nepal.
Furthermore, the deployment of peacekeepers may pro-
vide troops with valuable operational experience.
Peacekeeping alongside countries with similar foreign
policy preferences providesbenefits so far unacknowledged
in the literature on the economics of peacekeeping. More-
over, once thisis brought into focus an alternativeexplana-
tion of why some states make disproportionate
contributions can be construed. By definition public-
goods benefitsare independentof what particular countries
are contributing. The same holdsfor some private benefits
such as financial gains. However, many benefits are in fact
conditionalon the participationof specific other countries.
For instance, leaders find it easier to garner domestic sup-
port for a peacekeeping mission if allies join in. A smaller
country may expect to secure foreign policy advantages
from contributing to an operation, but only if a major
power favors it and supports it with troops. Peacekeeping
only pushesup standards if peacekeepersoperate alongside
well trained, disciplined troops.Finally, the specific norms
that peacekeepers promote are likely to depend on what
other countriesare sending troops. The main contribution
of our articleis to examine the role of politicalaffinity in the
decision of countries to provide peacekeepers.
We adapt a model developed by Ballester, Calvo
´-
Armengol & Zenou (2006) to deal with provision of
public goods where there are also jointly produced pri-
vate benefits. The model is extremely flexible. It can
include jointly produced private benefits that are either
1
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has
increasingly intervened in order to contain intra- and interstate
conflict using a variety of approaches. In this special issue, Bo
¨hmelt
(2016) uses network analysis to study mediation, while Wilson, Davis
& Murdie (2016) examine the relevances of networks of
nongovernmental organizations in peacebuilding.
Ward & Dorussen 393
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