STATEMENTS OF REASONS FOR JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1970.tb01262.x |
| Date | 01 March 1970 |
| Author | Michael Akehurst |
| Published date | 01 March 1970 |
STATEMENTS
OF
REASONS
FOR
JUDICIAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
A.
THEGENEI~ALRULE
THE
general rule is that thee is
no
duty
to
state
reasons for judicial
or
administrative decisions.'
A
statemat of
reasons
is not
required
by the
rules
of
natural justiceYa
and
therefore thme is
no
duty
to
state
reasons for the decisions
of
c~urts,~
juries,* licensing justiccsy6
administrative
bodies
and
tribunals
Even in the days before the Jervis
Acts
of
1848,
justices
of
the
peace were never required to state
reasons
for their decisions.s The
record
which
WI&S
returned to the King's Bench in certiorari proceed-
ings contained the document which initiated the proceedings, the
pleadings (if any), the evidence (only in criminal cases), and the
adjudication, but
not
the reasons,
dass
the justices chose to
state
1
The authoritiea are reviewed
in
Pure Spring Co.
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
National
Reaenue
[1947] 1
D.L.R.
501.
633639.
See
also the
msea
oiM
below,
notes
2-9.
a
Fountaine
v.
Chesterton, The Times.
August
20,
1968.
3
Re Ross and Board
of
Commisswmrs
of
Police
for
Toronto
[1953] 3
D.L.R.
597,
602;
R.
v.
Wybourn,
The Times,
January
91, 1969.
See also note
8,
below.
The position may be different where a judge exercises a judicial diwretion
(as
opposed
to
an administrative discretion), according
to
Eo
p.
Merchant
Banking
Co.
of
London, re Durham
(1881) 16
Ch.D.
623,
635,
8s interpreted in
Pure Spring
Go.
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
National
Rmenue
[1947]
1
D.L.R.
501, 553, 645
and
Hawkins
v.
North
of
Scotland Cadian Mortgage
ad
General Inoestment Trust
LM.
[1939] 4
D.L.R.
436, 448.
But
it
is
arguable that the
Canadbn
cases misinterpret
Re Durhom.
What Jessel
M.R.
said
in
that
case
was that
a
Chsncery judge ex:fcieing a judichl discretion
(approving
a
composition with credikrw) mu& investigate the objections
brought before him
to
the proposed arrangements, and
. . .
give his
opinion
on
them judioially,
of
course, and with sufficient
reat~on~s."
This
may
only
mean that thO judge must heve sufficient m8sone,
not
+hat he need
st!te
them;
a
few lines
later
Jessel
M.R.
d&nd
8
judicial
discretion
as
a
dimetion foutnded
on
mfi~ent reasons."
In
Grimshaw
v.
Dunbar
[1953]
1
Q.B.
408
a
county
court
judge exercised
a
judicial discretion without
ht'ng reaeons;
his
decision
WM
ravereed by the
Court
of
Appeal, but
no
objection
was
taken
to
his failure
to
date reasons.
or
domestic tribund~.~
4
Ex
p.
Harritqton
(1888) 4
T.L.R.
435, 487.
6
Ibid.
See
also note
8,
below.
6
Minister
of
National Reaenue
v.
Wrights' Canadian
Ropes
Ltd.
[1947]
A.C.
109,
1%;
Re Ross
and
Board
of
Commissioners
o
Police
fw
Tomto
[1963]
3
D.L.R.
597,
602;
Daaies
v.
Price
[lsSS]
1
W+k.
4M, 440
(C.A.).
7
Ex
p. Penny
(1879)
L.R.
8
Ch.
446;
Fountatne
v.
Chesteh, The Times,
August
20,
1968.
*
R.
v.
Inhabitants
of
Audly
(1699) 91
E.R.
448;
Inhubitants
of
South
Cadbur
v.
Inhabitants
of
Braddon
(17lO)
91
E.R.
616;
R.
v.
Inhabitants
of
Bedel
&37)
95
E.R.
2p6,
246.
Although these were civil csgee, there
is
no
indication that the rule w88 different in criminal cases;
in
Inhabitants
of
south
Cadbuy
v.
Inhabitants
of
Braddm
the En
's
Bench said:
I'
the justices are
not bound
to
express the reason
of
their jufgment in the judgment,
no
more
than
other
courts
. . ."
(italics added).
154
MAR.
1970
STATFXENTS
OF
REASONS
FOR
DECISIONS
155
them.* Since indusion
of
the adjudication in the record was com-
pulsory but inclusion of the reasons was not,
it
follows that
a
state
mat of reasons
did
not form
ia
necessary part of the adjudication.
The rule that reasons need not be stated
at
the time
of
a judicial
or
administrative decision is reinforced by the rule that members
of
.a
tribunal cannot
be
compelled, during subsequent litigation,
ta
give evidence about the reasons for their decision.1°
B.
GROUNDS
rn
REASONS
When a decision can only be taken
on
a finite number
of
alternative
grounds, fixed by law, there
is
authority for holding that the
decision must indicate which of the
grounds
forms the basis of the
decision, even though
no
reasons
need
be stated
for
the decision.
The distinction between grounds and reasons may be made clearer
by the following example. Magistrates
do
not
have
an
unlimited
discretion to imprison; they may only imprison someone for com-
mitting one
or
more
of
a
number
of
offences which are d&ed by
law and which they are given jurisdiction
to
try. Their judgment
must indioate the offence for which sentence of imprisonment is
imposed, even though
it
need not state the magistrates’ reasons for
finding the accused guilty
of
that offence
(e.g.
the
reasons
why
the magistrates believed the pmsecution’s evidence and not the
accused’s evidence).
There are two particular contexts in which the
courts
have
arrived at this conclusion.”
It
is uncertain how far such examples
9
Per
Denning
L.J.
in
R.
v.
Northumberland
Compensation
Appeal Tribunal,
et
p.
Shaw
[1952] 1
K.B.
338,
359.
See
also
Fitegerald and Elliott,
‘’
Certiorari
:
Errors
of
Law
on
the Face
of
the Record
”
(1963-64) 4
Melbourne
Unioersity
Law
Reaiew
552, 574.
10
Ward
v.
Shell-Mez
and B.P.
Ltd.
[1951]
2
All
E.R.
904
(administrative
tribunal);
Duke
of
Buccleuoh
v.
Mdropolihn
Board
of
Works
(1872)
L.R.
5
H.L.
418,
462
(arbitrator). It is uncertain
to
what extent this immunity is
enjoyed
by officials who do
not
exercise judicial functions.
In
Green
v.
Garbutt
(1912)
28
T.L.R.
575
ik
waa held that
a
policeman, defending
an
action for
false imprisonment, w&g obliged
to
supply further
and
better particulars
about his reawns for suspting the plaintiff of having committed
a
felon
.
The
House
of
Lords distinguished
khu
cese in
Liaersidge
v.
Anderson
[194&
A.C.
??6
(internment by Home Secretary under wartime emergency legislation)
by givlng
an
extensive inkerpretation of the wartime legisletion.
It
is
submitted
tha4
the House of Lords could have refused the plain6iff’s appli-
cation for further and better particulars in
Liaersidge
v.
Anderson
on
a
different
ground,
aiz.,
the difference between
the
atatus
of
the Home Secretary
and the
status
of
a
policeman; in other words, the House of Lords could have
held that the Home Secretary, when exercising
ony
type of
statutory
power,
was
not
obliged
to
give remons for his decision, because his deoision (unlike
the
act
of
a
police canstable) shared the
&B~B
presumption of
y&lidity
m
the
decision of
a
competenk
court
or administrative tribunal.
11
Hebegs
corpus
and false imprisonment canes
can
be regded
en
a
third con-
text
in which the caurbs have insisted
upon
a
statement
of
the gmunds for the
decision. Arguably, such
cases
could
be distinguished m,,being baaed
on
the
Petition
of
Right
(3
Car.
1,
c.
l),
which prmdes that
no
person shall be
imprisoned or detained without
muse
shewn,
or
without being char
ed
with
somethin
to
which he
msy
make
an
answer according
to
law.”
?See
elso
R.S.C.,
%rd.
64,
r.
7
(11.)
But,
with
the
exception
of
warrants issued
by
the
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