Status-quo enhancing versus status-quo challenging change in global economic governance: the case of China in finance and trade
| Published date | 01 December 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221139997 |
| Author | Michael Sampson,Jue Wang |
| Date | 01 December 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221139997
International Relations
2023, Vol. 37(4) 613 –633
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178221139997
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Status-quo enhancing versus
status-quo challenging change
in global economic governance:
the case of China in finance
and trade
Michael Sampson
Leiden University
Jue Wang
Leiden University
Abstract
When a state is dissatisfied with an international institution it has different strategies available
to it to secure change. These strategies are increasingly well understood due to research in the
areas of regime complexity and institutional selection. But while there is an understanding of
how the structure of a regime can influence the chances of success of different change proposals,
there is less clarity on how the content of proposed changes impacts their success. In this
article we decompose proposed institutional changes into two sub-types: Status-quo challenging
and status-quo enhancing. Status-quo enhancing changes promote reforms that advance the
objectives of the existing regime and so serve to drive change that would otherwise be limited
by the inertia of existing institutions. Conversely, status-quo challenging changes undermine the
stated goals of the existing regime. We develop these sub-types by comparing China’s attempts
to secure changes in the global finance and trade regimes and find that for China status-quo
enhancing changes have met with more success than status-quo challenging approaches because
they have created more opportunities for productive coalition building.
Keywords
China, finance, global economic governance, international institutions, regime complexity, trade
Corresponding authors:
Michael Sampson, Leiden University, Wijnhaven, Turfmarkt 99, The Hague 2511 DP, The Netherlands.
Email: m.d.sampson@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Jue Wang, LIAS, Leiden University, Mattias de Vrieshof 2, Room 1.05B, Leiden 2311BZ, The Netherlands.
Email: j.wang.18@hum.leidenuniv.nl
1139997IRE0010.1177/00471178221139997International RelationsSampson and Wang
research-article2022
Article
614 International Relations 37(4)
Institutional change under complexity
When a significant mismatch develops between the position of a member state within an
international institution and the power of that member, it is likely to seek changes that
reflect its new status. Whether these attempts at change succeed can be crucial in deter-
mining the evolution of an institution and the future prospects for cooperation in that
issue area. With their increased economic power, states such as China and India have
become increasingly dissatisfied with aspects of the institutional arrangements around
global economic governance.1 While there is widespread consensus that changes are
needed, there is disagreement on the precise content of those reforms.2 Which of these
reform proposals are more likely to succeed?
Existing research sheds light on the ways in which multiple overlapping institutions
within a regime create opportunities for dissatisfied states to pursue their goals by utiliz-
ing the ambiguity that arises from multiple institutions producing overlapping sets of
rules.3 The existence of such complexes creates opportunities for strategic action.4
Depending on the characteristics of a regime complex, available change strategies for
dissatisfied states can include regime shifting (the use of existing alternative institu-
tions), competitive regime creation (creating new institutions to challenge existing ones),
or attempting to secure internal change without exercising such outside options.5 In com-
plexes that are characterized by higher degrees of functional differentiation between
institutions, that is, complexes populated with institutions within the same issue area that
differ in their roles, a strategy of regime shifting is more difficult, while a strategy of
regime creation is more likely. An example of such institutional differentiation within the
same regime is the WTO and the Food and Agricultural Organization with respect to
agriculture rules.6 In a highly differentiated institutional environment use of alternative
institutions is thus limited by the existence of fewer alternative functionally equivalent
institutions that serve the same niche.7
Similarly, in areas with clearly defined jurisdictional boundaries, dissatisfied states
are likely to be constrained in needing to deal with the institution that is considered the
appropriate setting for a particular issue.8 The degree of dominance of a focal institution
therefore also determines the range of feasible options available to dissatisfied states.
Finally, the organizational density, and resource availability in an issue area can also
mean that the development of new institutions is often constrained where density is high
and resource availability is low.9 In some cases the strategy of competitive regime crea-
tion might sometimes be precluded altogether simply because it too costly.10
Related to the structural constraints of the regime, the response of existing institu-
tions to challengers can also constrain the prospects for success of change proposals.
Existing institutions can either respond favorably and adapt to challenges in order to
remain relevant, granting concessions to dissatisfied powers in return for their sup-
port.11 At other times they can successfully resist change, and the degree to which they
can do so often depends on the ability of the dissatisfied states to exercise meaningful
outside options.12
The above-mentioned structural features are important in determining the chances of
success for challenger states’ change proposals. However, focusing solely on the struc-
tural features of a regime can result in neglect of other important factors driving
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