Statutory Nuisance
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300615 |
| Published date | 01 December 1999 |
| Date | 01 December 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Statutory
Nuisance
accused's part would
not
be enough: see, for example,
Becerra
(1975)
62 Cr App R 212; 41 JCL 41. Following the decision in the present case,
however, it seems that that would
now
be enough for an operative
withdrawal, at least in a case of spontaneous violence. If this seems
somewhat surprising, it should be remembered that withdrawing does
not
absolve the accused from liability as a secondary party for those acts
committed whilst he was still a party to the
violence-here,
no doubt,
for offences involving the causing of serious bodily harm. That said,
however, it may still be open to question
whether
it should be
enough
for disassociation for the accused in a joint enterprise to simply walk
away. Secondary participation involves intentionally assisting or
encouraging the principal offender in the commission of the crime.
Where aparty unambiguously communicates withdrawal from
the
joint
enterprise to the others involved those elements would, ordinarily, cease
to exist. However, will this necessarily be so, in a case of pre-planned
or
spontaneous violence, in
the
absence of any such communication of
withdrawal?
David
Cowley
Statutory Nuisance
R v
Bristol
City
Council,
ex p
Everett
[1999] 1 WLR 1170
The Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal against the decision of
Richards J, which was reported in [1998] 3 All ER 603
and
noted in 63
JCL 1. The question was
whether
an exceptionally steep internal stair-
case in a dwelling house was 'injurious or likely to cause injury to
health' within s 79( 1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
Richards J held
that
'the
premises cannot constitute astatutory nuisance
by reason of
the
fact that they are in such astate as to create alikelihood
of accident causing personal injury;
...
(it) cannot give rise to a statutory
nuisance
even
if
it does create such a likelihood'. He also held that
the
abatement notice which
the
authority had issued was a nullity
and
that, in
any
event, its withdrawal by the authority was lawful. Before
Richards J,
the
issues as to the abatement notice
and
its withdrawal
were, in
the
light of his interpretation of the Act on the major issue,
subsidiary and, indeed, irrelevant.
Before the Court of Appeal, the general issue was as to the
manner
in
which
of s 79,
Mummery
Uagreed with Richards J that,
if
the terms of
s 79( 1)(a) stood alone, injury arising
out
of an accident due to
the
state
of the premises might be said to be within the words 'prejudicial to
health'
and
'injurious to health'. Mummery LJ stated (at 1174G-H) that
'in their ordinary meaning the words '"injurious or likely to cause injury
to health" are apt to cover accidental physical injury caused by the state
of the premises. They are
not
restricted to infection, disease or other
determinations of a person's physical or mental condition'. Health is
not
defined in
the
Act
and
there is no warrant for confining it in ordinary
539
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