Steponaviciene's (Jura) Application v One of the Coroners for Northern Ireland
| Jurisdiction | Northern Ireland |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] NIQB 90 |
| Date | 16 November 2018 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Northern Ireland) |
1
Neutral C itation No: [2018] NIQB 90
Judgme nt: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Ref: McC10781
Delivered: 16/11/18
IN THE HIGH C OURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IR ELAND
________
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
________
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY JUR A STEPONAVICIENE
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
-v-
ONE OF THE CORONER S FOR NOR THERN IRELAND
________
McCLOSKEY J
Introduction
[1] This challenge i s brou ght by Ju ra Steponaviciene (he reinafter “the
Appli cant”), a national of Lithuania and the mo ther and ne xt of kin of Laurynas
Steponavicius deceased (“the deceased”), also a Lithuanian national, who died on 11
February 2016 at HMP Maghaberry where he was detained on remand. This death
is the subject of a pendi ng inqu est. The subs tantive hearing was cond ucted on 05
November 2018.
[2] The R espondent is one of the Co roners for Northern Ireland (hereinafter “the
Coroner”). The inques t into the death of the de ceased, involvi ng the Corone r and a
jury, was scheduled to commence on 28 August 2018. The Applicant is challenging
the p reliminary ru ling of the Coroner promu lgated on this date at the outset of the
proce edings, in the absence of the jury. One o f the el ements of the context in which
this ruling was made is the Coroner’s proposal, itself uncontroversial, that one of the
questions which the jury will be invited to answer is whether the deceased died by
his own act i.e. by suicide. By his preliminary ruling the Coroner decided that the
jury would be directed to answer this question by the application of the civil
standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities.
[3] Contend ing that the approp riate standard of p roof i s the cri minal one, namely
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Applicant’s case is that i n making the imp ugned
ruling the Coroner erre d in l aw.
2
Parties and Procedure
[4] These proceedings were initiated later in the day upon which the Coroner
made the impugned ruling. There were two further material developments on this
date. First, leave to apply for judicial review was granted, inter - partes, by
McAlind en J. Second, the Coroner determined to adjourn the inquest and, in doing
so, to di scharge the ju ry which had been sworn. Given these circu mstance s, this case
has been progressed on a fast track eve r since .
[5] Two interested parties, each of which is legally represented in the inquest
arena, have signifie d their interest to this court. They are, respectively, the Northern
Ireland Prison Service (represented by Ms Fiona Fee, of counsel) and the Belfast
Health and Social Care Trust (represented by Mr Aiden Corrigan, of counsel).
Properly, neither party has sought the court’s permission for an active role involving
the provision of evidence and/or argument. Evidence from neither was requ ired,
given that the rel evant factual matrix is complete and, further, both interested parties
recog nised that the court would receive full legal argument from the two protagonist
parties.
[6] The court enquired whether the appropriate legitimus c ontradictor in this type
of litigation conte xt is an agency o ther than the Coroner (see Re Darley’s Applic ation
[1997] NI 384). I refer also to the observations of the Court of Appeal in Re Jordan’s
Application s [2016] NI 107, in which the coroner appealed against a first instance
decision of the Hig h Court on judicial review quashing a jury inquest verdict. On
behalf of the judicial review claimant, the Coroner’s entitlement to bring such an
appeal was challenged. This challenge was rejected by the Court of Appeal: see [14]
– [22] generally. The following passages are of some resonance in the present
context:
“[16] It is apparent from the extensive litigation
concerning the c onduct of inquest proceedings that difficult
and complex issues arise in such proceedings with some
regularity. T he coroner will often welcome the direction of
the supervisory court on the law and procedure that he
should follow. It is not difficult to conceive of a case stated
procedure w hereby the coroner could pose questions for the
opinion of the Court of Appeal or Divisional Court as
appropriate. By that mechanism the coroner could
proactively determine the issues on which he sought
guidance and his involvement need not be adversarial.
[17] However in the absence of such a mechanism the
coroner, as in this c ase, generally becomes a party to an
adversarial process. We agree with the Divisional Court
in R v HM Coroner for Lincoln, ex p Hay [2000] Lloyd's
Rep Med 264 that the coroner should, where possible, assist
the c ourt by deposing to what took place before him, setting
3
out the reasons for his decisions, and if appropriate
appearing in court to assist in an amicus role. The
opposing parties should then conduct the adversarial
argument. No perception of bias could arise in those
circumstanc es.
[2016] NI 107 at 114
[18] On occasions there may be no opposing parties
concerned w ith coronial decisions. In those circumstances,
if the supervisory jurisdiction of the Div isional C ourt is
invoked, it may be that the coroner is the only realistic
opposing party. There are also circumstances where an
applicant raises in judicial review proceedings an issue of
general importance to c oroners concerning the substantive
or procedural law governing the c onduct of inquests. In
such cases a coroner may feel it appropriate to support a
particular view and thereby enter into the adversarial
argument. The danger is that depending upon the
circumstanc es a justified perception of bias may arise.”
[7] The present case is a typical illustration of a fast track inquest judicial review
which, imperceptibly, has developed its own litigation dynamic. Leave to apply for
judicial review was granted later on the date when the impugned decision was
promu lgate d. The reafte r, the court’s primary co ncern was expedition, as the
ensuing timetable confi rms. The Coroner was the Applicant’s nominated judicial
review respondent. During the pre-substanti ve hearing phase, the court
acknowl edge d the i nterest of the thi rd and fourth parties noted in [5] above
following notificati on from the m. In this context I refer to O rder 53, Rule 5(3), the
“all persons directly affected” provision and Rule 9(1), the “proper person to be heard”
provision. Ne ither was raised from any quarter. At that stage all necessary
preliminary and preparatory steps were being completed by the two protagonist
parties.
[8] I take into account that having regard to the issue to be determined by the
court no perception of bias objection could properly be directed to the Coroner.
Furthermore, guidance from the court on an important question of law will benefit
all concerned and will apply to other inquests. One adds to the mix the essentially
prosaic factors outlined immediately above. In these circumstances I consi der that
the Coroner is an appropriate judicial review respondent, conso nant with the Re
Jordan guidance.
[9] There is one further and final introductory issue. I am satisfied that this
challenge is not blighted by the satellite litigation virus which was at one time
prevalent in the history of thi s cou rt. See Re McLuc kie’s Application [2011] NICA 34 at
[26] and Re Offic ers C and Others A pplication [2012] NICA 47 at [8]. Given that both
the factual and the legal matrices for bringing this challenge are complete and
having re gard to the guidance factor noted above, I consider this is o ne of tho se rare
To continue reading
Request your trial
6 cases
-
James Hugh Allister, Benyamin Naeem Habib, Steve Aiken, The Rt Hon. Arlene Isobel Foster, Barroness Catharine Hoey of Lylehill and Rathlin and William David, The Rt Hon. Baron Trimble of Lisnagarvey and Secretary of State for Nothern Ireland and Clifford Peeples and (1) The Prime Minister (2) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (3) Chancellor of The Duchy of Lancaster
...Furthermore, Thoburn is not binding on this court as a matter of precedent: Stepanoviciene v One of the Coroners of for Northern Ireland [2018] NIQB 90 at paras [21] – [26] and [74]. [347] Some consideration of the stature of EUWA 2018 is appropriate at this juncture. Just as the accession ......
-
LLD, by her mother and next friend v Secretary of State for the Home Department
...AR 689; [2010] INLR 529 Steponaviciene, In the matter of an application for judicial review v One of the Coroners for Northern Ireland [2018] NIQB 90 Uphill (Widow and Administrator of the Estate of Malcolm Ernest Uphill) v BRB (Residuary) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 60; [2005] 1 WLR 2070; [2005] 3......
-
Abdul Said and Secretary of State for The Home Department
...ground of challenge. The doctrine of precedent does not require this court to follow those decisions: Re Steponaviciene’s Application [2018] NIQB 90 at paras [22] ff and [74]. The question is whether we should as a matter of choice do so. [43] The three English cases under scrutiny constitu......
-
Prosecutor's General Office of the Republic of Latvia v Ventis Kilgasts
...of his decision. We would observe that by the doctrine of precedent it is not binding on this court: see Re Steponaviciene’s Application [2018] NIQB 90 at para [24]. [34] In Danfelds there were two conjoined appeals against decisions of the District Judge ordering the extradition of the app......
Request a trial to view additional results