Stopping the Arms Race in Outer Space
| Author | Allan M. Din |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338302000303 |
| Published date | 01 September 1983 |
| Date | 01 September 1983 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Stopping
the
Arms
Race
in
Outer
Space
ALLAN
M.
DIN
Institute
of
Theoretical
Physics,
University
of
Lausanne,
Dorigny,
Switzerland
The
militarization
of
outer
space
has
been
accelerating
in
recent
years
and
is
likely
to
reach
a
climax
sometime
during
the
second
half
of
this
decade.
The
advent
of
spacebased
weapon
systems
is
particularly
disquieting
and
a
consequence
of
such
a
development
will
be
an
increasing
risk
for
triggering
—
either
accidentally
or
intentionally
—
a
nuclear
war.
Existing
arms
control
treaties,
like
the
ABM
treaty,
appear
to
offer
a
gradually
diminishing
protection
against
this
growing
military
buildup
and
a
special
effort
will
be
needed
to
stop
the
trend.
Triggering
nuclear
war
A
growing
number
of
people
around
the
world
feel
that
the
danger
of
a
global
nuclear
war
has
been
increasing
steadily
in
recent
years
and
that
moreover
few
sincere
efforts
are
being
made
to
reverse
this
process.
This
feeling
is
based
principally
on
the
manifest
trends
towards
disproportionate
nuclear
weapon
stockpiles
and
more
accurate
missiles.
However,
beyond
the
basic
concern
of
danger
it
appears
to
be
more
difficult
to
point
out
specific
probable
scenarios
for
starting
a
nuclear
war.
After
all
-
so
the
argument
goes
-
nuclear
weapons
have
assured
38
years
of
relative
peace
and
the
politicians
in
charge
are
sensible
enough
to
refrain
from
pushing
the
button
of
holocaust.
The
confidence,
that
in
face
of
nuclear
deterrence
reason
and
restraint
will
prevail,
is
basically
responsible
for
the
present
state
of
affairs.
This
attitude
is
only
likely
to
change
if
one
is
able
to
present
a
credible
scenario
for
triggering
nuclear
war
which
shortcircuits
the
real
and
perceived
safety
mechanisms.
The
characterization
of
such
a
scenario
involves
two
important
parameters.
These
are
aggregated
numbers -
and
therefore
neces-
sarily
somewhat
diffuse
-
representing
a
characteristic
length
scale,
which
I
will
call
L,
and
a
characteristic
time
scale
T.
As
L
one
may
take
the
geographic
extent
of
a
possible
conflict
region
with
an
ap-
propriate
weight
factor
for
the
strategic
importance
of
the
region.
Thus,
for
example,
a
conflict
in
the
Middle
East
might,
as
compared
to
a
conflict
in
Central
Africa
over
an
area
of
the
same
size,
be
assigned
a
higher
L-value.
The
scale
L
may
also
be
incremented
due,
for
example,
to
an
increase
in
the
number
of
warheads
and
their
precision,
which
would
allow
a
greater
area
to
be
destroyed
(unless
of
course
the
target
coverage
were
complete).
A
large
L
scenario
clearly
re-
presents
a
greater
risk
for
triggering
a
nuclear
confrontation.
The
characteristic
time
scale
T
is
basically
determined
by
the
time
it
would
take
the
weapons
in
a
given
war
scenario
to
hit
and
destroy
their
targets.
The
present-
day
strategic
ballistic
missiles
correspond
to
a
T
of
the
order
10-30
minutes.
A
small
T
scenario
leaves
open
the
possibility
of
surprise
attacks
and
it
is
generally
acknowledged
that
for
T
approaching
or
coming
below
the
threshold
of
the
human
reaction
time,
launch-
on-warning
strategies
may
have
to
be
adopted
with
all
the
perils
of
erroneous
counter-
measures
this
entails.
A
credible
nuclear
war
scenario
requires
the
presence
of
both
a
large
L
and
a
low
T-value.
This
is
to
some
extent
the
case
in
the
issue
of
the
socalled
euromissiles.
Here
a
strategically
important
and
large
region,
i.e.
Central
Europe
and
the
western
part
of
the Soviet
Union,
corresponding
to
L
of
the
order
5000
km,
is
under
the
threat
of
ballistic
missiles
with
a
T
of
about
10
minutes.
The
question
is
whether
one
can
imagine
an
even
more
critical
scenario
where
the
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