Strange, Susan 1986. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 207 pp. Hc and pb, £7.95
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338702400214 |
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
207
Strange,
Susan
1986.
Casino
Capitalism.
Oxford:
Basil
Blackwell.
207
pp.
Hc
and
pb,
£7.95.
The
cover
of
this
book
gives
the
impression
of
a
certain
casino
with
the
exciting
new
entertainer
Susan
Strange
as
its
top
of
the
bill
feature.
The
show,
however,
is
an
intellectual
one:
as
Professor
of
International
Relations
at
the
London
School
of
Economics,
Susan
Strange
unveils
the
workings
of
vicious
circles
that
have
emerged
in
the
contemporary
world
financial
system,
with
floating
exchange
rates
and
unpredictable
fluctuations
both
in
interest
rates
and
in
crucial
prices
like
the
oil
price.
At
the
root
of
all
the
economic
problems
of
the
last
15
years
is
a
financial
system
which
is
becoming
progressively
more
like
a
global
casino,
with
professional
speculators
as
players,
but
with
outcomes
that
affect
us
all.
Explaining
how
such
a
chaos
could
emerge,
she
cleverly
fuses
economics
and
politics
(Ch.
2).
Two
chap-
ters
(4,
5)
-
poetically
entitled
’Betting
in
the
dark’
and
’The
guessing
game’
-
specify
the
nature
of
a
financial
system
which
becomes
more
unruly,
hit
by
distrust,
less
transparent
(no
one
can
calculate
the
amount
of
short
term
credit
floating
around
in
the
system)
and
there-
fore
nearly
impossible
to
regulate.
This
analysis
implies
that
both
the
old
liberal
capitalism
with
its
City
of
London,
as
well
as
the
classical
US
New
Deal
era,
involved
financial
systems
more
open
to
supervision
and
control.
Two
chapters
(3
and
6)
are
devoted
to
rejections,
first
of
alternative
explanations
of
the
contemporary
economic
problems,
second
of
several
reform
proposals.
Strange
is
very
critical
against
the
’hegemonic
stability
theory’
which
claims
that
since
the
US
is
now
on
an
equal
footing
with
other
core
countries,
it
can
no
longer
provide
the
collective
good
of
’leadership’.
She
rather
argues
that
the
US
is
still
strong,
despite
all its
real
economic
problems.
Paradoxically,
the
only
realistic
reformism
she
can
hit
upon
involves
that
the
strongest
and
most
influential
state,
the
US,
understands
that
it
is
in
its
self-
interest
to
’cool
the
casino’
(Ch.
7).
In
addition,
it
would
also
help
if
Western
Europe
could
provide
more
of
its
own
defense,
since
that
would
deprive
US
authorities
of
the
possi-
bility
of
forcing
Western
Europe
to
accept
US
inactivity
and
irresponsibility
in
economic
poli-
cies
just
because
Western
Europe
is
still
depen-
dent
on
the
nuclear
umbrella.
LM
Webber,
Carolyn
&
Aaron
Wildawsky
1986. A
History
of
Taxation
and
Expenditure
in
the
Western
World.
New
York:
Simon
and
Schuster.
734
pp,
USD
24.95.
Joseph
Schumpeter
once
suggested
that
a
nation’s
fiscal
structure
provides
the
skeleton
of
its
politics.
Two
American
social
scientists
have
taken
this
epithet
at
face
value,
and
have
made
a
panoramic
investigation
of
how
govern-
ments
-
ancient
and
modern -
tax
their
citizens
and
spend
their
money.
Webber
&
Wildavsky
have
written
a
historical
comparison
of
fiscal
systems
that
considers
the
political
regimes
which
these
systems
sustain
as
well
as
the
societal
cultures
in
which
they
are
embedded.
They
discuss
the
fiscal
history
of
the
West
in
the
light
of
three
ideal-typical
ways
in
which
social
life
is
organized:
in
hierarchical,
market
and
in
sectarian
orders.
Hierarchical
orders
are
ruled
by
strong,
unaccountable
leaders
and
bring
with
them
the
propensity
to
tax
heavily.
Market
orders
are
distinguished
by
relatively
responsible
rulers,
and
because
their
leaders
must
constantly
bargain
with
citizens
who
feel
entitled
to
keep
as
much
of
their
money
as
they
can,
market
orders
will
not
tol-
erate
excessive
taxation.
Sectarian
orders
are
characterized
by
political
movements
which
devote
themselves
to
achieving
maximum
equality
in
the
distribution
of
resources.
This
can
sometimes
lead
to
great
hostility
towards
the
state
and
its
fiscal
policies,
or
it
may
stimu-
late
active
state
intervention
and
highly
redistributive,
welfare
policies.
This
is
a
useful
overview
of
the
history
of
taxation
and
govern-
ment
expenditure
in
the
Western
world.
How-
ever,
its
classificatory
scheme
is
inadequate
and
proves
too
restrictive
to
contain
satisfactorily
its
fascinating
medley
of
fiscal
structures
and
processes.
Moreover,
it
precludes
discussion
of
important
fiscal
historians
and
theorists
like
Schumpeter
and
Ardant,
who
are
very
nearly
overlooked
in
an
otherwise
good
index
and
a
long
bibliography.
This
could
well
prove
a
memorable
tome,
but
more
because
of
its
affluent
accounts
than
for
its
tight
taxonomies.
TLK
Authors
of
Book
Notes
in
this
issue:
Nils
Petter
Gleditsch
(NPG),
PRIO
Torbjorn
L.
Knutsen
(TLK),
PRIO/Vanderbilt
University
Lars
Mjoset
(LM),
PRIO/University
of
Oslo
Marek
Thee
(MT),
PRIO
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