Strategic hedgers? Australia and Canada's defence adapation to the global power transition
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195633 |
| Author | Maxandre Fortier,Justin Massie |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Strategic hedgers? Australia
and Canada’s defence
adapation to the global
power transition
Maxandre Fortier
Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal,
Montréal, Québec, Canada
Justin Massie
Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal,
Montréal, Québec, Canada
Abstract
The intensification of rivalries between the US and China, and, in recent years,
between the US and Russia, has deeply affected how middle powers relate to these
great powers. Scholars have argued that middle powers are increasingly adopting
“hedging”strategies to maximize their benefits and limit the consequences of the
great power competition for their security and status. This paper revisits the concept
of hedging and assesses whether two prominent US allies—Australia and Canada—
have resorted to hedging in place of conventional alternatives like bandwagoning
and balancing. The paper systematically compares Australia’s and Canada’s threat per-
ceptions and defence policies to ascertain whether they have shifted their policies in
the wake of the US’s relative decline. Since our study began, in 2008, we have found
instances where the two allies resorted to hedging. However, evidence shows that
when pressured to make a choice, Australia and Canada have closed ranks with
the US against revisionist powers. Our paper suggests that threat perceptions play
a fundamental role in this. Going forward, it would suggest that the US is in a stronger
position than commonly assumed. As the competition between Washington and
Corresponding author:
Maxandre Fortier, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, Succ.
Centre-Ville, Montréal (Québec), H3C 3P8, Canada.
Email: fortier.maxandre@courrier.uqam.ca
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2023, Vol. 78(3) 463–478
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020231195633
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
revisionist great powers increases, the former’s ability to build credible coalitions is
expected to improve as it will rely on more dependable allies.
Keywords
Hedging, threat perceptions, security strategy, AUKUS, US allies, balancing,
bandwagoning, China
Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospect of similar Chinese
aggression against Taiwan. Beijing is investing in military capabilities and developing
plans to take Taiwan by force, ramping up the pressure on Taipei by conducting
amphibious assault exercises and deploying aircraft into Taiwan’s air defence identi-
fication zone. This has led to renewed US support for Taiwan, a debate over the neces-
sity to clarify America’s policy of “strategic ambiguity,”and a rising fear of a
Sino-American conflict over Taiwan. To prevent this dreadful scenario, some have
called for a multinational effort in the Indo-Pacific, akin to the one deployed in
Eastern Europe, to contain Russia’s military ambitions. However, as Oriana Skylar
Mastro has argued, this would require persuading “a large coalition of allies to
commit to a coordinated economic, political, and military response,”many of which
are “unwilling to risk their economic prospects, let alone a major-power war, to
defend a small democratic island.”
1
These allies’hesitancy to support Washington’s containment strategy in East Asia
can be referred to as hedging, or seeking to avoid exclusive alignments in favour of
keeping open all options within the context of great power competition. Hedging is
a contested notion, both conceptually and empirically. Its definition, like its empirical
reality, remains vividly debated. Some have argued that second-tier powers increas-
ingly are adopting hedging strategies to maximize their benefits and limit the conse-
quences of the great power competition, while others claim the opposite.
2
This
paper follows a body of work that defines hedging as a security strategy used by
states to offset risks. This approach envisions hedging as a falsifiable alternative to bal-
ancing and bandwagoning.
1. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan temptation: Why Beijing might resort to force,”Foreign Affairs
100, no. 4 (2021): 67.
2. See, inter alia, Cleo Paskal, “Indo-Pacific strategies, perceptions and partnerships,”Chatham House 23
(2021): 53p.; Li López i Vidal and Àngels Pelegrín, “Hedging against China: Japanese strategy towards
a rising power,”Asian Security 14, no. 2 (2018): 193–211; Kei Koga, “The concept of “hedging”
revisited: The case of Japan’s foreign policy strategy in East Asia’s power shift,”International Studies
Review 20, no. 4 (2018): 663–660.
464 International Journal 78(3)
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