Stripping and Searching Children

AuthorNigel Stone
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/14732254221134195
Published date01 December 2022
Date01 December 2022
Subject MatterLegal Commentary
https://doi.org/10.1177/14732254221134195
Youth Justice
2022, Vol. 22(3) 339 –348
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14732254221134195
journals.sagepub.com/home/yjj
Stripping and Searching Children
Nigel Stone
Any system of criminal procedure committed to due process will seek to temper the inves-
tigation of suspected crime with regard to the proper interests of the suspect, particularly
where the suspect is not yet an adult. It is trite to observe that some tension is inevitable
between police powers to conduct their investigative responsibilities in a timely and effec-
tive manner and the individual’s human rights, with obvious potential for grey areas of
ambiguity and uncertainty. In this respect the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child Article 40 helps to set the bar by requiring State Parties to
recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the
penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity
and worth . . .
a right augmented in Article 16 by a child’s right not to ‘be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his or her privacy’.1
Dignity and privacy have particular relevance in the context of managing and searching
a youthful suspect, police powers of search being a core investigative avenue both in the
securing of evidence and in protecting the investigator, those in the immediate vicinity,
the wider public and, not least, the young suspect, and in preventing escape. A search or
the protection of the suspect’s person may need to be intrusive to identify whether any-
thing carried has been secreted so as to reduce the likelihood of discovery or because it is
believed that their clothing may be intrinsically potentially harmful.2
PACE in Code
In the jurisdiction of England and Wales, police powers are governed in detail by the
statutory generic Codes that form an intrinsic part of the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act (PACE) 1984, specifically in this context: Code A (powers to stop and search) and
Code C (detention, treatment and questioning); the latter augmented by Code H in respect
of those detained under the Terrorism Act 2000. These provisions (including all-age
Corresponding author:
Nigel Stone, School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Lawrence Stenhouse Building, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK.
Email: n.stone@uea.ac.uk
1134195YJJ0010.1177/14732254221134195Youth JusticeStone
article-commentary2022
Legal Commentary

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT