Structural-Dynamic Arms Control
| Date | 01 December 1977 |
| Author | Gernot Köhler |
| Published date | 01 December 1977 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234337701400404 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Structural-Dynamic
Arms
Control*
GERNOT
KÖHLER
Center
of
International
Studies,
Princeton
University
and
Canadian
Peace
Research
Institute
The
investigation
starts
from
the
observation
that,
in
the
field
of
arms
control,
failure
seems
to
be
the rule
and
points
out
that
this
may
be
due
to
an
empirically
observable
close
relation-
ship
between
long-term
military
and
economic
growth.
Possible
causal
relationships
between
those
two
kinds
of
growth
are
discussed
and
a
causal
hypothesis
is
suggested
which
explains
long-term
military
growth
in
terms
of
a
social-psychological
pusheffect
(the
Vebleneffect)
in
combination
with
an
economic
restrainteffect.
On
that
theoretical
basis,
two
approaches
to
arms
control
are
proposed
—
namely,
arms
control
through
manipulation
of
the
Vebleneffect
and
arms
control
through
limits
to
economic
growth.
These
two
methods
approach
arms
control
from
a
global
perspective,
which
transcends
the
perspectives
of
both
intra-national
antimilitarism
and
inter-national
arms
control
diplomacy.
Introduction
Conventional
arms
control
seeks
to
restrain
or
reduce
growing
armaments
by
a
variety
of
diplomatic
means
which
may
be
multi-
lateral,
bilateral,
or
modest
unilateral
mea-
sures
undertaken
in
the
hope
of
reciproca-
tion
by
the
perceived
adversary.
Anti-mili-
tarism
seeks
to
restrain,
reduce,
or
abolish
armaments
by
such
political
means
as
anti-
militarist
information,
education,
and
pro-
paganda
with
the
purpose
of
de-legitimizing
armament
efforts,
demonstrations,
strikes,
and
the
struggle
for
power
by
anti-militarist
movements
and
parties.
Both
arms
control
diplomacy
and
anti-militarist
politics
are
required
in
order
to
eventually
halt
or
re-
duce
national
and
world-wide
accumulation
of
arms.
A
strong
commitment
to
the
goals
of
arms
control
and
disarmament
notwith-
standing,
we
must
recognize,
however,
that
these
efforts
have
a
long
history
and
that,
despite
a
hundred
years
of
such
efforts,
their
success
has
been
minimal
or
nil.
What
explains
that
apparent
failure?
1.
The
Relativity
of
Arms
Control
There
is
a
fundamental
relativity
in
all
of
arms
control
and
antimilitarism
or,
stated
differently,
the
growth
and
development
of
a
country’s
entire
arsenal
of
arms
are
relative
to
the
economic
growth
and
development
of
that
country.
In
synchronic
statistical
analy-
sis
we
find
a
very
high
correlation
between
military
expenditures
and
gross
national
products
of
countries
(correlation
coefficient
of
about
.9).
Similar
correlations
can
be
found
in
diachronic
analysis
over
long
periods
of
time
(e. g.
for
Canada
1867-
1970) .1
This
empirical
phenomenon
is
generally
kown
in
modern
research
on
arma-
ment
dynamics,
while
its
interpretation
varies.
Choucri
and
North,
for
example,
ob-
serve
for
pre-World
War
I
Europe
that:
As
a
country
grows
in
population,
technology,
industrial
production,
territory,
and
the
like,
mili-
tary
expenditures
are
likely
to
increase
more
or
less
commensurately.2
They
interpret
this
alternately
as
a
growth
phenomenon3
or
as
an
action-reaction
pheno-
menon
(arms
race) .4
Rattinger
reports
con-
curring
empirical
observations
for
post-
World
War
II
Europe,
interpreting
the
link
between
economic
growth
and
military
growth
in
terms
of
’bureaucratic
momen-
tum’.5
Ron
Huisken
of
the
Stockholm
Inter-
national
Peace
Research
Institute
relates
*
I am
grateful
to
Norman
Alcock,
William
Eckhardt,
Anita
Kemp,
and
Hanna
Newcombe
of
the
Canadian
Peace
Research
Institute
for
helpful
discussion
on
this
matter
and
to
Canadian
peace
friends
for financial
support.
This
paper
was
first
presented
at
the
27th
Annual
Convention
of
the
International
Studies
Association,
February
1976
in
Toronto.
It
is
also
identified
as
LIV
Paper
No. 9
of
the
Canadian
Peace
Recearch
Institute.
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