Substantially confused? The paradox of Golds R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61
| Published date | 01 April 2017 |
| Date | 01 April 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022018317699323 |
| Author | Elizabeth Stuart-Cole |
| Subject Matter | Supreme Court |
Supreme Court
Substantially confused? The paradox of Golds
RvGolds [2016] UKSC 61
Keywords
Murder, substantially impaired, diminished responsibility, abnormality of mental functioning, more than trivial
The term ‘substantial impairment’ exists as one of the few unaltered remnants of the original diminished
responsibility plea. Parliament considered the term unproblematic and its interpretation had been reaf-
firmed in RvHughes [2013] UKSC 56, [2013] 1; RvRamchurn [2010] EWCA Crim 194; RvBrown
[2011] EWCA Crim 2796. Yet interpretation of the term under the revised diminished responsibility
defence reached Supreme Court level following Elias LJ’s ruling that ‘substantial impairment’ could
mean at least two things: not merely trivial or substantial in the sense of distinctly more than just past the
trivial (RvGolds [2014] EWCA Crim 748).
Golds was convicted of the murder of his partner Clare Parrish following trial at Chelmsford Crown
Court in June 2013. Golds admitted to the killing but attempted to claim diminished responsibility
pursuant to s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52).
The defence argued that, at the time of the killing, the defendant suffered from an abnormality of mental
functioning arising from a recognised medical condition, which either caused or significantly contrib-
uted to the killing. The key issue to be determined was whether Golds’ ability to understand the nature of
his conduct, form a rational judgment and/or exercise self-control was substantially impaired at the
material time.
Two medical experts gave evidence at the trial that Golds suffered from a long history of mental
illness treated with antipsychotic medication. He had ceased taking his medication some weeks prior to
the killing, and at the time of arrest, he was believed to be psychotic. Medical evidence suggested that at
the time of the killing, Golds was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which substan-
tially impaired his ability to exercise self-contr ol and rendered him incapable of rational decisio n-
making (at [28]). There was no conflicting medical evidence.
The trial judge supplied the jury with a route to verdict outlining the elements of the defence of
diminished responsibility. On the issue of ‘substantially impaired’, the judge apprised the jury:
I am not going to give yo u any help on the meaning of the wor d substantially, because unle ss it creates real
difficulty and you require further elucidation, the general principle of English law is that where an
everyday word is used, don’t tell juries what it means. They are bright enough and sensible enough to
work it out for themselves, so I am not going to paraphrase substantially. Substantially is the word that is
in the Act of Parliament and that’s the word that you have to work with. If it becomes a stumbling block in
some way, well at the end of the day, you can send me a note and in those circumstances, I am permitted to
offer you a little more help, but not at this stage of proceedings. (at [2])
The Journal of Criminal Law
2017, Vol. 81(2) 99–102
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022018317699323
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