Summary of judgment - In re Michael Gallagher (Omagh Bomb)

JurisdictionNorthern Ireland
Neutral CitationSummary of judgment - In re Michael Gallagher (Omagh Bomb)
CourtCourt of Judicature (NI)
Date08 October 2021
Judicial Communications Office
1
8 October 2021
COURT DELIVERS OMAGH BOMBING JUDGMENT
On 23 July 2021, Mr Justice Horner said he was satisfied that there were certain grounds which
give rise to plausible arguments that there was a real prospect of preventing the Omagh bombing
that deserve to be fully investigated through an Article 2 ECHR compliant investigation. While
not within his power to order an investigation in the Republic of Ireland, the judge said there
would be real advantage if one were to take place simultaneously with one in Northern Ireland.
The court received OPEN and CLOSED material during the hearing. The judge, today, delivered
his reasons for reaching this conclusion in an OPEN judgment. He did not reach a conclusion on
the evidence that there was a real prospect of preventing the bomb and said this was a matter for
any inquiry.
Background
The events leading up to the Omagh bombing on 15 August 1998 and the investigation and inquiries
that took place afterwards are set out in paragraphs [2] to [143] of the judgment. Michael Gallagher
(“the applicant”), whose son was killed in the bomb, was granted leave to judicially review the
decision of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers MP, dated 12 September 2013
refusing to hold a public inquiry (or any inquiry that complied with Article 2 of the ECHR) into
whether there had been a failure to investigate whether the Omagh bomb could have been
prevented. The applicant is seeking a public inquiry that straddles both jurisdictions of Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The court received and analysed a significant amount of
evidence including CLOSED material.
Legal Principles
The focus in this case was whether a plausible argument had been made out that there had been a
breach of the obligation on the State to take reasonable steps to prevent the Omagh bombing and to
conduct an Article 2 compliant investigation into that failure. The allegations relating to the issue of
the preventability of the explosion are set out in paragraph [144]. The judgment also deals with the
relevant legal principles of Article 2 ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998 and the obligations on
the State in paragraphs [146] [189]. The UK Supreme Court 1 (“UKSC”) has recently determined
the characteristics that an Article 2 compliant investigation is required to have (see paragraph [194]).
The court considered the issues of causation, rationality and proportionality, and limitation in
paragraphs [195] – [214].
GROUNDS OF PREVENTABILITY
The applicant put forward 10 grounds relating to the issue of the preventability of the Omagh bomb.
Ground 1: Anonymous phone call of 4 August 1998 in which it was indicated that an attack
would be made on police on 15 August 1998, and the disappearance of the “threat book” at
Omagh police stations which should have recorded all such threats (paragraphs [215] – [236])
1 In the matter of an applicat ion by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review (Northern Ir eland) [2019] UKSC 7

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