Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions
| Author | Vincenzo Bove,Leandro Elia |
| Published date | 01 November 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343311418265 |
| Date | 01 November 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Research Articles
Supplying peace: Participation in and troop
contribution to peacekeeping missions
Vincenzo Bove
Department of Government, University of Essex
Leandro Elia
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Calabria
Abstract
We explore the supply side of peacekeeping – the determinants of a country’s voluntary contributions to peacekeeping
operations.We focus on troop contributionand examine a largeset of operations, from UN-ledmissions to operationsled
by NATO, theAfrican Union, the EuropeanUnion, and ad hoc coalitions.We rely on a theoretical modelof the private
provision of public goods and a dataset on troop contribution across102 states and 45 operations from1999 to 2009 to
explainboth the conditions underwhich third-party actorsare more or less likely to intervenein peacekeeping operations
and the factors determining the size of theirpersonnel contribution.We use the characteristics of the conflict to identify
which typesof conflicts attractoutside interventionand the characteristicsof the intervener to identifythe countries more
willing to providetroops. We show that at the domestic level, contributions are driven by the comparativeadvantage in
manpower– or the relative value of labor– and constrained by thetolerance of casualtiesand the sustainabilityof multiple
and concurrentmissions.At the internationallevel, the most robustexplanations of whenstates choose to interveneare the
level of threat to global and regional stability, the proximity to the conflict area, and the number of displace d people.
In particular, security and humanitarian concerns trigger nation-specific responses. Our empirical findings provide
further evidence of the centrality of country-specific gains in explaining the participation in peacekeeping. However,
contributor-specific benefits play the same role in UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions, in contrast with previ-
ous empirical studies on the financial burden-sharing.
Keywords
panel data, peacekeeping, public good, voluntary contributions
Introduction
In this article we explore the supply side of peacekeeping,
the domestic and international determinants of a
country’s contributions to peacekeeping operations from
1999 to 2009. There are three dimensions to peacekeep-
ing: demand, the situation that allows for foreign
military intervention; supply, the factors determining
voluntary contributions to peace operations and thus the
willingness to provide that intervention and the constrains
faced in meetingthe demand; and the outcomeof the oper-
ation, which is determined by this interaction.
1
The high
demand for multilateral military forces in Africa and the
Middle East ensures that the supply of uniformed
personnel is an increasing challenge for the international
community. Yet, there is only a modest understanding
of why nations with heterogeneous economies and
Corresponding author:
vbove@essex.ac.uk
1
Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu (2009) refer to what we call the
supply of peacekeeping, payments for peacekeeping missions, as the
demand for peacekeeping (i.e. how much the contributing
governments pay for a service they demand, peacekeeping). From
the perspective of the countries in conflict we think that the supply
of peacekeeping terminology is more appropriate
Journal of Peace Research
48(6) 699–714
ªThe Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343311418265
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p
eace
R
ESEARCH
journal of
institutionsagree to dispatchtheir troops to remote conflict
areas.
Peacekeeping is the most common type of action by
armed forces today. It is a purposeful dispatch of national
troops into another sovereign country and can be identi-
fied as a subset of military intervention (i.e. the movement
ofregulartroopsorforcesofonecountryinsideanother,
in the context of some political issue or dispute
[Pickering & Kisangani, 2009]). Peacekeeping was
defined by the Nobel Prize Committee, when the prize
was awarded to the UN in 1988, as the contribution
to ‘reducing tensions where an armistice has been nego-
tiated but a peace treaty hasyet to be established’. There-
fore, it can be conceptualized as a military intervention
designed to maintain or restore peace. As Victor
(2010) points out, while peacekeeping is usually imple-
mented when a ceasefire has been established and peace-
keepers rarely bring heavy armaments, recent cases have
seen these forces engage in active defense to accomplish
their mandate (e.g. Bosnia and Somalia). Moreover, in
examining the quantitative evidence on peacekeeping,
we encountered methodological difficulties in determin-
ing which third-party interventions should be counted
as peacekeeping. The operational criteria we use
(i.e. by SIPRI) state that the deployment is authorized
by the UN with the stated intention (a) to serve as an
instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace
agreements already in place, (b) to support a peace pro-
cess, or (c) to assist conflict prevention and/or peace-
building efforts (see Bellamy, Williams & Griffin,
2010). Therefore, there are features ascribable to peace-
keeping (e.g. the intention to contribute to the imple-
mentation of a peace process) which make it distinct
from other forms of third-party intervention. Thus, we
depart from studies analyzing military interventions by
external powers and excluding multilateral interventions
(e.g. Carment & James, 1995; Regan, 1998). We con-
sider multilateral interventions under the auspices of the
UN. Since peacekeeping generates public benefits,
we develop a theoretical model based on the private
provision of public good. We explain peacekeeping con-
tributions by country-specific benefits accrued by partic-
ipation and by a number of pure public benefits. Indeed,
containing the regional violence generates benefits
spillover to non-participants. Since this provision of
security is costly, states have an incentive to free-ride
on the troop contributions of others. Our theoretical
framework identifies the possible private and public
gains derived from peacekeeping, the potential costs
associated with the participation, and how the interac-
tion between marginal costs and benefits may lead to
an under-provision of troops. Empirically, we single out
only those interventions that conform to our operational
criteria, although in some cases the stated goal may be
just rhetoric and may not reflect the real motivations
of the intervener.
Other quantitative studies analyze the financial
burden-sharing of peacekeeping (e.g. Khanna, Sandler
& Shimizu, 1999; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002; Gaibulloev,
Sandler & Shimizu, 2009). Nevertheless, financial contri-
butions do not mirror personnel contributions. The top
ten countries that accounted for roughly 80% of the
financial contributions to UN missions in the period con-
sidered contributed less than 10% of the personnel
employed in UN operations in the same period.
2
Furthermore, personnel contributions serve as better
indicators of state objectives for a number of reasons.
Firstly, conflict characteristics influence the likelihood
and size of intervention. The risk of casualties, for exam-
ple, is crucial and countries are reluctant to provide
troops that might be placed at risk. Secondly, donors’
personnel contribution is subject to their military capac-
ity (e.g. force size, concurrent commitments). Taken
together, the capability to provide troops – sometimes
configured to engage in combat operations – and the
willingness to pay the human costs involve different deci-
sion criteria. Thirdly, the quality of the troops selected
has an impact on the outcome of the operation, and
indiscipline among peacekeeping troops has also been a
cause of concern.
3
Finally, contributors can choose
whether to deploy troops in particular conflict areas, and
they have more control over the use of their national
contingents than their financial contributions (Lebovic,
2004). Therefore, the procedure for staffing an operation
follows more complex decisionmaking processes. We
believe that personnel contributions are better indicators
of a country’s motivations and constraints.
Two quantitative studies are most closely related to
ours. Lebovic (2004) focuses mainly on the link between
democracy and UN peace operations in the period
between 1993 and 2001. He finds that the UN peace
operations of the post-Cold War era relied on democratic
contributions. Victor (2010) examines African states’
contributions to peacekeeping between 1989 and
2001. He suggests that poorer states, with lower state
legitimacy and lower political repression, are more likely
2
See the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.
3
ECOMOG troops in Liberia were heavily involved in looting, arms
trading, and contraband. Senior officers supplied factions with
weapons in return for looted goods (Meredith, 2006).
700 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 48(6)
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