Suresh Deman and Queen's University Belfast

JurisdictionNorthern Ireland
JudgeMcCloskey LJ
Judgment Date12 April 2022
Neutral Citation[2022] NICA 23
CourtCourt of Appeal (Northern Ireland)
Date12 April 2022
1
Neutral Citation No: [2022] NICA 23
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections and in draft until further
direction)*
Ref: McC11826
ICOS No:
Delivered: 12/04/2022
IN HER MAJESTY’S COURT OF APPEAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND
_________
ON APPEAL FROM THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
_________
SURESH DEMAN
Appellant
-and-
QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY BELFAST
Respondent
________
Before: McCloskey LJ, McFarland J and Rooney J
_________
Representation
Appellant: unrepresented
Respondent: Mr Barry Mulqueen, of counsel, instructed by Pinsent Masons Solicitors
________
McCLOSKEY LJ (delivering the judgment of the court)
Preface
This is the unanimous judgment of the court to which all members have contributed.
Introduction
[1] The Appellant describes himself as an academic expert in the broad field of
economics and finance. He is a citizen of India, now aged 67 years. He holds a doctorate
and other qualifications. He appears to have been involved in academia during all of his
professional life. He has worked in several countries. He was first employed by the
Respondent in February 1994. He has made multiple publications. He has evident
extensive undergraduate and postgraduate teaching experience. He has engaged in
various types of research. All of the foregoing, a mere snapshot of the Appellant’s career,
is described in the voluminous papers before this court, which the judicial panel has
considered in full.
2
[2] In September 2017 the Appellant instituted proceedings against Queen’s University
Belfast (“the Respondent”) for alleged breaches of:
a. Articles 3 and 4 of the Race Relations (NI) Order 1997 (discrimination on the ground
of race and discrimination by victimisation - the 1997 Order”)); and
b. Article 3 of the Fair Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998 (discrimination on
the ground of religion the “1998 Order”).
[3] On 18 October 2019 the Fair Employment Tribunal (“FET”) unanimously decided:
(a) Whereas the Appellant’s complaints had been lodged out of time an extension
would be granted.
(b) The Appellant had not been treated less favourably on the grounds of:
ii. His race or his religion
iii. A protected act for the purposes of the 1997 Order;
iv. A protected act for the purposes of the 1998 Order.
The Appellant appeals to this court against the decision of the FET.
Some History
[4] During a number of years the Appellant has engaged in various forms of litigation
against his former employer, the Respondent. These have given rise to a series of
employment tribunal claims. One of these generated the decision of a different
constitution of this court in Deman v Association of University Teachers and Officers at Queen’s
University and Others [2009] NICA 29. This was an appeal by case stated against the
decision of the Fair Employment Tribunal dismissing the Appellant’s case of
discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion and political opinion and unlawful
victimisation. According to the judgement of this court the Appellant is of Indian origin
and is perceived to be a Hindu. His employment with the Respondent, initially as a
lecturer, dates from February 1994. One of his grounds of appeal alleged bias against the
Tribunal. Para [6] of the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal records:
The appellant complained of an institutionalised culture of
general and global bias existing in tribunals in Northern Ireland
and the judiciary was no exception. He made allegations of
bias against the former President and Vice-President of the
Tribunals and the current President and other full time
members of the panel of Chairmen. He made 30 allegations of
apparent bias against the Chairman.
Rejecting this ground the court stated at [11]:
3
The appellant's generic attack on the independence and
impartiality of the tribunals in Northern Ireland is not one
which a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude
established that there was a real possibility of bias in the
Tribunal. Rather a fair-minded and informed observer would
conclude that it represented a view indicating an inability on
his part of the appellant to take a fair and dispassionate view on
the fairness of the Tribunal procedural system which is subject
to rules and practices designed to achieve a fair system of
adjudication. In the result a fair-minded observer would view
the more specific allegations made by the appellant with
considerable scepticism. The appellant's generic criticism is so
lacking in justification and expressed in such unfairly trenchant
terms that it seriously calls into the question the balance and
fairness of his other criticisms. In any event, on a case stated
this court is bound by the findings of fact of the Tribunal as set
out in the case stated. Unless the conclusions are manifestly
perverse, illogical and against the weight of the evidence there
is no material on the case stated on which to conclude that the
Tribunal erred in law in refusing the recusal application.”
[5] By a decision of the United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal (the EAT”)
promulgated on 01 September 2006 the Appellant became the subject of a restriction of
proceedings order. The judgment of the President records that the Appellant had brought
40 claims for (mainly) race discrimination against higher education institutions, trade
unions and others, had engaged in over 40 appeals to the EAT and had been repeatedly
criticised for the manner of his conduct of those proceedings. It further notes that his
period of employment with the Respondent was between February 1994 and October 1995,
as a lecturer, continuing, at para [2]:
In the course of his employment there and following its
termination he brought proceedings against a number of
parties, including the University itself, in the Fair Employment
Tribunal and the Industrial Tribunal: as at March 2003 there
had been a total of 19 complaints to the [FET] (naming 79
respondents) and 21 complaints to the [IT] (naming 68
respondents).
His Tribunal litigation activity in England spanned the period 1996 to 2005.
[6] In making its order the Tribunal concluded that the statutory test, namely that in
bringing the relevant proceedings the Appellant had acted vexatiously and had done so
habitually and persistently, was satisfied. Its judgment adds at para [172]:
We believe that it is in fact right to go rather further. We
believe that in making the applications in question for posts at
the respondent institutions Mr Deman was decreasingly
concerned actually with achieving appointment and

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT