Swedish Development Aid in Perspective: Policies, Problems and Results since 1952. Edited by Pierre Fruling. Almqvist and Wicksell, Stockholm, 1986. Sw. Kr. 250
| Author | Douglas Williams |
| Published date | 01 April 1987 |
| Date | 01 April 1987 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711788700900107 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
85
Swedish
Development
Aid
in
Perspective:
Policies,
Problems
and
Results
since
1952.
Edited
by
Pierre
Fruling.
Almqvist
and
Wicksell,
Stockholm,
1986.
Sw.
Kr.
250.
Some
years
ago
the
distinguished
Swedish
delegate
at
an
UNCTAD
meeting
asked
for
the
floor.
As
the
other
distinguished
delegates
adjusted
their
headphones
they
heard
coming
over
them
the
unmistakable
voice
of
the
leader
of
the
French
delegation
saying:
&dquo;Ah!
Voici
cet
enfant
de
choeur
avec
son
.encensoir.&dquo;
Fortunately,
the
interpreter
did
not
translate,
but
a
deep
chuckle
ran
around
the
Assembly
(especially
from
the
Francophone
African
delegates,
curiously
enough).
This
book,
written
by
twenty
two
different
contributors
who
have
all
at
one
time
or
another
since
1952
been
involved
in
running
some
aspect
or
other
of
the
Swedish
Aid
Programme,
is
fortunately
not
entirely
a
chorus
of
choirboys.
Indeed
there
is
only
one
chapter
which
falls
into
that
category
and
it
is
just
possible
that
that
may
have
been
written
tongue-in-cheek.
This
is
the
chapter
entitled
&dquo;Altruism
and
Other
Motives&dquo;
by
Thord
Palmlund
to
which
we
will
return.
For
the
rest,
the
book
is
one
of
those
enjoyable
compilations
in
which
the
self-righteous
confess,
not
their
sins
(that
would
be
a
contradiction
in
terms)
but
their
mistakes.
It
is
a
potted,
up-to-date,
Gunnar
Myrdal
extending
beyond
the
.Asian
Drama&dquo;
and
revised
in
the
light
of
another
twenty
years
experience.
Much
of
it
is
discouraging.
It
exemplifies
at
many
points
the
encounter
between
starry
ideals,
harsh
reality
and
the
pursuit
of self interest
which
all
countries
encounter
in
this
field
but
few
find
quite
so
painful
as
the
Swedes.
The
Swedish
dilemma
is
most
sharply
exemplified
in
this
book
by
contrasting
what
is
said
in
the
chapter
on
&dquo;Altruism
and
Other
Motives&dquo;
with
a
chapter
which
begins
the
section
entitled
&dquo;Encountering
Reality&dquo;,
and
which
is
itself entitled
&dquo;The
International
Commitment&dquo;.
For
full
measure
this
latter
chapter
is
prefaced
with
a
quotation
from
Keens
Soper which
reads:
&dquo;And
there
arc
the
Swedes,
the
darlings
of
the
Third
World,
whose
good
works
were
matched
only
by
their
glutinous
smugness&dquo;.
The
quotation
would,
however,
fit
better
over
&dquo;Altruism
and
Other
Motives&dquo;.
The
dilemma
springs
in
the
first
instance
from
Sweden’s
view
of
itself
as
&dquo;a
minor
power&dquo;
which
&dquo;had
not
had
to
relate
its
aid
programme
to
global
strategic
concerns&dquo;
and
which
has
&dquo;been
spared
the
sensitive
task
of
transforming
colonial
relationships
into
relations
of
co-operation
between
independent
states&dquo;.
&dquo;For
a
country
in
Sweden’s
position&dquo;,
writes
Mr.
Palmlund,
&dquo;economic
interests
and
political
and
military
security
are
largely
determined
by
other
relationships&dquo;,
and
&dquo;Sweden
has
tried
to
promote
its
economic
and
security
interests
by
developing
its
role
in
the
UN
and
by
strengthening
its
relationship
to
the Third
World ...
Defence
and
promotion
of
democracy
and
human
rights
are
basic
goals
for
Sweden’s
foreign
policy
which
have
inspired
the
aid
programme&dquo;.
The
main
elements
in
Sweden’s
aid
policy
therefore
were
strong
support
for
the
UN,
which
in
turn
led
to
strong
support
for
the
multilateral
approach
in
aid
matters,
at
least
in
the
earlier
stages
and
in
certain
forms.
There
has,
for
example,
in
Swedish
aid
policy
always
been
an
ambivalence
towards
the
IBRD
which
is
clearly
brought
out
in
this
book.
&dquo;Promotion
of
democracy
and
human
rights&dquo;
has
led
the
Swedes
in
their
aid
programme
to
have
some
peculiar
favourite
sons.
Their
aid
has
been
concentrated
on
some
seventeen
countries
(compared
with
over
100
in
the
British
aid
programme)
and
has
included
such
pillars
of
democracy
and
human
rights
as
Cuba
and
North
Vietnam.
Indeed
the
book
confesses
&dquo;Sweden’s
partners
for
development
had
good
relations
within
the
Soviet
Union.
Some
of
them
can
adequately
be
described
as
falling
within
the
Soviet
sphere
of
influence.&dquo;
In
fact
Sweden’s
choice
of
aid
partners
had
much
more
to
do
with
the
predilections
of
dominant
elements
in
its
domestic
politics,
particularly
the
strong
anti-Americanism
of
the
Swedish
left,
than
with
&dquo;human
rights
or
democracy&dquo;.
Their
defence
of
their
past
policies
is
bogus.
&dquo;Human
rights&dquo;
argues
Mr.
Palmlund,
&dquo;can
best
be
promoted
if
we
insist
that
the
recipients
of
aid
are
the
people,
not
the
regime
and
that
co-operation
has
to
be of
a
long
term
character&dquo;.
But
what
about
when
a
recipient
of
Swedish
aid
breaches
one
of
the
principles
of
the
UN
Charter,
as
Tanzania
did
when
it
invaded
Uganda
or
Vietnam
when
it
went
into
Kampuchea?
The
Swedish
reaction
was
much
like
other
peoples’
has
been
in
the
past-a
tangle
of
inconsistencies.
Aid
to
Tanzania
was
actually
increased
while
that
to
Vietnam
was
not
reduced-not
initially
at
any
rate.
The
chapter
on
the
&dquo;International
Commitment&dquo;
in
the
section
on
&dquo;Encountering
Reality&dquo;
shows
the
emergence
of
a
different
approach.
Though
Swedish
aid
to
multilateral
institutions
has
been
increasing
in
absolute
terms,
as
a
share
of
the
Swedish
aid
programme
it
has
been
declining.
At
the
beginning
of
the
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