Symonds v Cudmore
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1826 |
| Date | 01 January 1826 |
| Court | High Court |
English Reports Citation: 89 E.R. 379
THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS
See Pemberton v. barnes [1899], 1 Ch. 548.
1FRBEMAN.503. IN BANCO REGIS 379 dk term. S. hil. 1692. in banco regis. case 677. symonds v. cudmore. [See Pemberton v. Barnes [1899], 1 Ch. 548.] S. C. 1 Salk. 338. 3 Salk. 335. Garth. 257. 4 Mod. 1. 1 Show. 370. Skin. 284, 317, 328. 12 Mod. 32. Holt, 666. Where tenant in tail with reversion in himself in fee makes a reversionary lease and dies, a fine levied by the issue in tail lets in the reversion and confirms the lease.-ò Ante, c. 666, p. 487. Siderf. 260. 1 Keb. 778. Jones, 61. 2 Bulst. 42. Tenant in tail, reversion to himself in fee, with a power to make leases in posses- Irons v. Smallpieee, 2 ibid. 551-4. Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 301-7. Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. & Bing. 238. Townson v. Tickell, 3 Barn. & Aid. 31, 37. Petrie v. Bury, 5 Dow. & Ey. 152. S. C. 3 Barn. & Cress. 353. Vin. tit. Diaagreemenb. 5 Vin. 508-9. 20 ib. 122-3. The assertion of counsel in argument in the principal case, that a conveyance by feoffment cannot be disclaimed in pais, suggests some observations. It is frequently laid down in the more antient authorities, that an estate of freehold cannot be waived, devested, or disclaimed, but by matter of record, while a gift of goods or a term of years may, before acceptance, be refused by parol, or matter in pais; see Bro. Ab. tit. Jointenauncie, pi. 57. Wayver des choses, pi. 41, 50. Fitz. Ab. Disclayme, pi. 23. Butler and Baker's case, 3 Co. 26. Curtise v. Cottel, 2 Leon. 72. Anon. 4 Leon. 207. Viner, tit. Disagreement & Waiver. Shep. Touchst. 285, 452. Fonbl. Treat, of Eq. B. 1, c. 3, s. 12; and the reason alleged is, that "the tenant to thepnecipe should be the better known." However, in Townson v. Tickell, 3 Barn. & Aid. 31, it was decided, that a devisee in fee may refuse the estate devised by a deed of disclaimer without matter of record; and Holroyd, J. was of opinion that even a deed was unnecessary (Shep. Touchst. 452, accord.). In this case some of the above authorities were cited to shew that the renunciation must be of record ; but no satisfactory answer was given to the inquiries of the Court respecting the mode by which such a disclaimer was to be effected. An examination of those authorities will, perhaps, explain this doctrine, and lead us to the following conclusion, viz. that no estate once vested and settled in the alienee by his express agreement can...
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