Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry
| Published date | 01 March 2005 |
| Author | Douglas M. Gibler,Marc L. Hutchison,Toby J. Rider |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343305050687 |
| Date | 01 March 2005 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
131
Introduction
Arms Races and Strategic Rivalry
Traditional international relations theory
prescribes taking up arms to force revisionist
states to back down; a show of strength
deters aggression and causes tense but
peaceful relations (Morgenthau, 1985:
200–201). Of course, since both rivals are
likely to follow these prescriptions, critics
argue that intense competition over arms
supplies can be fraught with danger as hos-
tilities escalate and potentially spiral out of
control (Vasquez, 1993). Anecdotal evidence
may support both positions, but more
importantly, little conclusive social science
evidence exists as to whether arms races
deter, escalate, or are spurious to conflict. We
wish to change this.
We use this article to develop an empiri-
cal study that takes deterrence theory seri-
ously. Specifically, we construct a dataset of
conventional arms races that are defined
© 2005 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 42, no. 2, 2005, pp. 131–147
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343305050687
Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles:
Conventional Arms Races During Periods of
Rivalry*
DOUGLAS M. GIBLER, TOBY J. RIDER & MARC L.
HUTCHISON
Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky
This article revisits the arms race to war relationship with the hope of resolving a lingering debate in
international relations over the effects of arms races. Previous empirical studies in this area suffered from
a possible selection effect, rendering them unable to differentiate between the escalatory and deterrent
effects of arms races. Specifically, earlier quantitative investigations were unable to test deterrence
hypotheses, because the unit of analysis (dispute) presupposed that deterrence had already failed in pre-
venting dispute onset. In order to take the possibility of deterrence seriously, a dataset is constructed
that identifies arms races independently of dispute occurrence. This article improves on previous studies
in that a measure of interdependent arming exogenous to dispute initiation allows for a test of whether
arms races actually deter the onset of militarized disputes or contribute to dispute escalation. Both the
deterrence and escalation hypotheses are tested using a sample of ‘strategic rivals’ from 1816 to 1993.
The analyses reveal that arms races increase the likelihood of disputes and war. Furthermore, to account
for the possibility that the arms race to war relationship may be spurious to dyadic hostilities account-
ing for both arms races and war, a selection model is employed that differentiates between dispute and
war processes. This indicates that arms races do not contribute to deterrence and are instead associated
with both disputes and war.
* Our thanks to Scott Wolford, Rich Fording, and Steve
Voss for comments on an earlier draft and to Matt Gabel
and Kirk Randazzo for many conversations on the topic.
Of course, they are not responsible for the errors that may
remain. We provide a Web Appendix for this article with a
list of cases meeting the definitions of mutual military
buildup and arms race, a description of our coding pro-
cedures, and the dataset at http://www.uky.edu/~
dgibler/replication.htm. This dataset is for replication
purposes only. Any questions or comments should be
directed to Doug Gibler at dgibler@uky.edu.
01 gibler (ds) 1/2/05 1:46 pm Page 131
independently of dispute involvement, and
thus we are able to test their ability to
provide for peace during intense rivalries. By
limiting our spatial domain to strategic
rivals, we control for the possibility that arms
races may be spurious to periods of increased
hostility when the likelihood of war is high.
Even after these research design changes, we
find a positive, statistically significant
relationship between arms races, militarized
disputes, and war.
The arms race to war relationship is an
important unresolved question, for both
practice and theory. Using military expendi-
tures to gain an advantage over adversaries is
not a thing of the past. As Thompson (2001)
shows, 38 strategic rivalries were still active
in 1999, and several of these – Israel and its
neighbors and India and Pakistan, most
notably – have used arms races before, have
been involved in deadly conflict, and have
nuclear weapons in at least one state.
Moreover, the economic and social costs
necessary to pursue a program of military
spending are enormous, especially if the
anticipated results of the bargaining tool are
misunderstood.
We begin our argument by reviewing the
empirical findings that have tried to uncover
the arms race to war relationship. Since
indirect mechanisms are often used to theor-
etically link arms races to either peace or war,
we also discuss how other variables may
account for both arms races and war. Our
basic argument in the next section is that
while two theoretically rich and equally
plausible claims exist for the arms
race/conflict relationship, the empirical
literature has largely been divorced from
these theories. Instead, as Diehl & Crescenzi
(1998) describe, the empirical literature has
been mired in methodological controversies
obscuring a definitive answer on the effects
of arms races. We conclude the next section
by outlining a research design that takes each
competing claim seriously.
Why the Debate over Arms Races Persists
Quantitative examinations linking arms
races to war are greatly underdeveloped
compared with formal treatments of the
relationship. The formal literature has
demonstrated, for example, that arms races
can not only cause escalation in the dyad
(Kydd, 2000) but also be seen as a bargain-
ing process caused by uncertainty over the
relative strength of two rival economies
(Kydd, 1997). Models that focus only on
deterrence and war show that the nuclear
arms race between the Soviet Union and the
United States may have contributed to the
Cold War peace (Intriligator & Brito, 1989),
but differences in risk and changes in the
military balance might also lead to failed
deterrence (Morrow, 1989).1
The wide gulf between the formal and
quantitative literatures is a direct result of the
inability of empirical studies to differentiate
between the escalatory and deterrence effects
of arms races. As we demonstrate below,
most quantitative investigations of the arms
race to war relationship begin with the obser-
vation of a militarized dispute between two
states. However, this beginning also suggests
that any possible deterrent effects of the arms
races had already failed, leading to a connec-
tion between arms races and war that is
possibly spurious (for this argument, see
Kydd, 2000: 231). For example, Wallace
(1976) provided the first comprehensive
empirical examination of arms races. He
defined an arms race as a very rapid, simul-
taneous growth in military expenditures
exceeding a certain quantitative threshold for
the ten-year period prior to dispute onset
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 42 / number 2 / march 2005
132
1The arms race literature largely began through formal
treatments of the relationship. Richardson (1960) was the
first to examine competitive arms races and argued that one
rival would eventually reach a point of exhaustion, forcing
an attack. However, as Bueno de Mesquita (2000)
describes, there is no formal link to war in the Richardson
arms race model; nothing explains why exhaustion causes
the leaders to attack the other state, rather than simply
giving up the arms race.
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