Taking interaction seriously: Asymmetrical roles and the behavioral foundations of status
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| Author | Reinhard Wolf |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119837338 |
837338EJT0010.1177/1354066119837338European Journal of International RelationsWolf
research-article2019
EJ R
I
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
Taking interaction seriously:
2019, Vol. 25(4) 1186 –1211
© The Author(s) 2019
Asymmetrical roles and
Article reuse guidelines:
the behavioral foundations
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119837338
DOI: 10.1177/1354066119837338
of status
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
Reinhard Wolf
Goethe University, Germany
Abstract
Status has once again become a prominent topic in international relations. However,
vague, incomplete, and incompatible definitions continue to stifle the development of a
cohesive research program. Even the most sophisticated conceptualizations proposed
fail to comprehend the full range of status conflicts and ambitions. Current research
centers on collective beliefs about the traits that are valued in individual actors, so
it especially fails to properly account for status differentiations that emerge through
bilateral interactions and for defiant acts that upend local status hierarchies. It also
neglects the most intense status infringements: acts and relationships that are humiliating.
To remedy this conceptual weakness, this article will first review conceptual work in
International Relations and beyond. It will then present an integrated model of two
distinct status hierarchies — prestige and role status — and their causal linkages. In
so doing, the article will attempt to clarify how “status” relates to similar concepts,
such as “authority,” “prestige,” “honor,” and “glory.” The explanatory value of this
consolidated status framework will be demonstrated through a more nuanced and
consistent discussion of Russia’s seemingly erratic status disputes with “the West.”
Keywords
Conflict, hierarchy, prestige, role, Russia, status
Introduction
This article claims that the dominant understanding of status in International Relations
(IR) is too narrow and thus incompatible with many empirical accounts of status disputes.
Corresponding author:
Reinhard Wolf, Department of Political Science, Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany.
Email: wolf@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
Wolf
1187
Its status conceptualization ignores that simple patterns of deference suffice to constitute
asymmetric ranks in social hierarchies (e.g. leaders versus followers, patrons versus cli-
ents). This incomplete conception is not only at odds with recent findings in social psy-
chology. It also fails to properly account for the key role that status needs play in dyadic
contests for dominance, as well as in humiliating interactions. Perhaps most strikingly,
current approaches are unable to explain the puzzling fact that status-frustrated states
frequently resort to defiant behavior — even though such obstructionism and rebellion
often tarnishes those states’ image as responsible members of international society. Yet,
again and again, governments have been willing to sacrifice international approbation to
obtain less submissive roles for their states. In their status disputes with the US, state lead-
ers such as French President De Gaulle and Russian President Putin clearly considered
open defiance as the best way to escape an undignified position of inferiority. Likewise,
in 2015, the government of Greek Prime Minister Tsipras saw confrontation with its coun-
try’s creditors as the only option to restore the nation’s dignity. The following pages will
show that a new conceptual framework, which differentiates between public prestige and
interactional role status, can readily grasp such otherwise paradoxical status strategies and
can put the agenda of status research on a firmer basis.
To clarify the complex nature of status and status disputes, the article presents a
more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of social status. Following common
usage, it understands social rank, position in a social hierarchy, as the core meaning of
“status” (for key definitions, see Appendix I). However, unlike most other contribu-
tions in IR, the manuscript theorizes that all societies contain at least two basic forms
of hierarchy that are closely connected: a hierarchy of prestige (according to perceived
public esteem); and a hierarchy of deference patterns that reflect direct interactions
between parties with dominant and subordinate roles. This integrated conceptual
framework provides a comprehensive view of international ranking orders that explic-
itly incorporates the interactional foundations of status and thereby resolves striking
inconsistencies in the current IR literature. Moreover, this framework can systemati-
cally integrate and properly delineate many of the narrower status concepts advanced
by recent scholarship.1
The article will first show that empirical accounts by leading status scholars give
much greater prominence to interaction than their explicit status definition would permit.
It will then elaborate why the mainstream conceptualization of international status can-
not sufficiently comprehend dyadic conflicts over proper role positions. By focusing
primarily on collective beliefs about actors’ valued attributes and accomplishments, the
predominant view neglects the more fundamental social asymmetries: ranking orders
that are constituted by roles and counter-roles that call for dominant or submissive
behavior. A consistent framework must allow for the fact that actors can also enhance
their status by advancing in deference hierarchies where the other party routinely engages
in submissive deference, that is, in “behaviors … that generally convince the recipient
that the message sender is yielding, appeasing, and honoring the recipient’s position in
the rank order” (Fragale et al., 2012: 374, emphasis added). The third section will further
differentiate the sub-components of the two basic hierarchies. The fourth part briefly out-
lines the possible status disputes that follow from this conceptual framework and dis-
cusses their relative intensity. The article concludes with an empirical illustration which
1188
European Journal of International Relations 25(4)
will argue that Russia’s ongoing status disputes with the US, particularly its acts of open
defiance, can only be properly understood within this more nuanced framework.
How interaction creeps in: Conceptual stretching in
prominent empirical accounts
The recent upsurge of status research in IR is predominantly based on a peculiar under-
standing of status which essentially holds that a state’s rank is determined by public
evaluations of its qualities. According to a widely quoted definition, international status
should be defined “as collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking in valued attributes
(wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organiza-
tion, and diplomatic clout)” (Larson et al., 2014: 7). Numerous scholars concur that sta-
tus ultimately depends on how a reference group is thought to esteem a state’s
characteristics and overall conduct (Barnhart, 2016: 389; 2017: 539; Larson and
Shevchenko, 2010: 69; Onea, 2014: 130; O’Neill, 1999: 193; Renshon, 2017: 4, 40, 262;
Wohlforth, 2009: 55). Following this status notion, one would expect that status conflicts
mostly occur when a state’s representatives reject international beliefs about that state’s
qualities, and that this will lead them to assert their state’s claimed status by trying to
change foreigners’ ideas about the state’s “valued attributes.”
However, these authors’ empirical research frequently tells a very different story. In
their published case studies, state governments rarely express complaints about the (indi-
vidual or collective) views that foreigners allegedly hold about their state. Instead, in
these accounts, status-conscious governments overwhelmingly care about the way in
which significant others treat them and frequently protest against behavior they consider
as disrespectful, often by resorting to direct countermeasures. For instance, Larson and
Shevchenko (2014a: 39) claim that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
do not seek admission to the “club” of advanced Western countries because emulating
the current members would imply “a humiliating relationship of tutelage.” In another
important article on Chinese and Russian status ambitions, Larson and Shevchenko
(2010: 89, 95) point out that “Putin expected Russia to be treated as an equal partner with
the United States,” and ultimately conclude that “the United States must learn how to
treat China and Russia in ways other than as rival or junior partners if it is to obtain their
cooperation.” Renshon (2017: 230–232, 252), in his acclaimed book, argues that Russia
mobilized its forces in 1914 because its status-sensitive government fundamentally felt
that it could not afford to back down to yet another German challenge. In a similar vein,
his chapter on Imperial Germany’s Weltpolitik asserts that Berlin pursued “policies to
coerce [Sic!] other states into ceding status to Germany” (Renshon, 2017: 184). According
to Renshon (2017: 201, 204–206), Germany’s “true motivation” in the two Morocco
crises was not the acquisition of prestigious overseas territories, but rather to change its
peers’ behavior towards Berlin, “to force other powers to take account of Germany,” “to
remind the French that Germany is still there,” and to “demonstrate that German rights
could not be trampled upon.” Thereby, it...
To continue reading
Request your trial