Taking one for the team: Partisan alignment and planning outcomes in England
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120985409 |
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120985409
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2021, Vol. 23(4) 680 –698
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120985409
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Taking one for the team:
Partisan alignment and
planning outcomes in England
Liam Clegg
Abstract
Does partisan alignment affect sub-national political units’ performance? When testing for a
partisan alignment effect, local authority planning processes represent a ‘hard case’. Formally,
decision-making processes are insulated against political considerations, and there is a mis-match
between national party commitments to expand house-building on the one hand, and pressure on
local councillors from residents opposing new developments on the other. I find that, in general,
partisan alignment brings an increased propensity to approve large residential planning applications.
This suggests councillors’ willingness to ‘take one for the team’ by prioritising national over local
interests. Consistent with ‘party politics of housing’ insights, inter-party variation sees an altered
effect in left-wing constellations, which display lowered approval propensities. In addition to these
substantive extensions to scholarship on partisan alignment effects, the insights presented into
the drivers of variation in local authority planning outcomes contribute to the pressing tasks of
understanding and addressing the chronic under-supply of new housing within the English housing
system.
Keywords
housing crisis, local authorities, partisan alignment, party politics of housing, planning outcomes,
sub-national politics
Introduction
Partisan alignment effects have been widely studied in relation to inter-governmental
resource transfers. From this literature, we know that central government often seeks to
reward sub-national units controlled by the same party and to target resources towards
electoral districts with narrower majorities (e.g. Bracco et al., 2015; Dixit and Londregan,
1998; John and Ward, 2001; Kleider et al., 2018; León-Alfonso, 2007; Migueis, 2013;
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). In contrast, the effect of partisan alignment on
policy performance is yet to attract significant attention. Given the importance of sub-
national levels of governance in delivering key services and shaping policy outcomes
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
Corresponding author:
Liam Clegg, Department of Politics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK.
Email: liam.clegg@york.ac.uk
985409BPI0010.1177/1369148120985409The British Journal of Politics and International Relations X(X)Clegg
research-article2021
Original Article
Clegg 681
(e.g. Baker and Eckerberg, 2008; Batley and Stoker, 2016; Potoski, 2008; Sellers and
Lidström, 2007), it is of pressing importance that this oversight be addressed. In addition,
the issue of inter-party variation in partisan alignment effects remains under-explored.
Through this article, I specifically explore variation in English local authority propen-
sity to approve large residential planning applications. Local authority planning decisions
are formally insulated from political pressures. As such, planning outcomes represent a
hard case with which to test for a partisan alignment effect.1 Tensions between national-
and local-level party preferences present an additional potential inhibitor of a partisan
alignment effect, with national-level advocacy for increased house-building coming up
against local-level opposition to new developments. Given this context, the confirmation
of a partisan alignment effect in this area is surprising. Overall, this finding suggests that
the influence of intra-party discipline and local politicians’ desire for career advancement
may be shaping planning outcomes.
My analysis covers observed planning application outcomes from 2009 to 2018. This
time period saw Westminster governments under Labour, a Conservative-Liberal
Democrat Coalition, and the Conservatives, and we see that the partisan alignment effect
shifts with changes to the party in power. The overall partisan alignment effect is signifi-
cant and positive across the whole cohort. However, we see a significant difference
among left-wing constellations, where alignment in fact brings a reduced propensity to
approve large residential planning applications. Previously, inter-party variation in parti-
san alignment effects has remained under-studied. The finding is coherent with scholar-
ship on the ‘party politics of housing’, which suggests that left-wing parties stand to make
national-level electoral losses from expansions of owner-occupation (an outcome that
follows from higher levels of housebuilding, given that the preponderance of new build is
used for owner-occupation). In this case, national left-wing governments’ fear of lost
electoral support may be over-riding their proffered policy commitments to expanded
house-building. This finding of inter-party variation in a partisan alignment effect repre-
sents a notable extension of the literature.
By focusing on housing and planning in England, I address the gap in existing litera-
ture on partisan alignment and policy outcomes through an important case study. It is
widely acknowledged that the English housing system suffers from chronic under-supply
of new housing (Wilson and Barton, 2018). Resultant upwards pressure on house prices
and housing costs are recognised as contributing to the emergence of an inter-genera-
tional crisis; ‘Generation Rent’ is less able than previous cohorts to access owner-occupa-
tion, and will face increased housing vulnerability through their middle- and older-ages
(Best and Martin, 2019). By highlighting political economic drivers of variation in local
authority propensity to approve large residential planning applications,2 I shed significant
new light on the foundations of these dysfunctions and tensions. I also more broadly con-
tribute to debates over the nature of central–local government relations within British
politics, presenting evidence of sub-national autonomy within a literature that more typi-
cally offers a vision of a highly centralised state. While local authority decisions on large
residential planning applications take place within an overarching national policy frame-
work, there is significant variation in outcomes.
I develop my analysis of the drivers of variation in local authority propensity to
approve large residential planning applications through the following structure. In the
first section below, I situate the contributions made to scholarship on partisan alignment.
Substantive contributions are made through my focus on policy outcomes in an area that
typically privileges the study of fiscal transfers, and through my exploration of inter-party
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