A Tale of Populism? The Determinants of Voting for Left-Wing Populist Parties in Spain1
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720950215 |
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720950215
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(4) 1053 –1071
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720950215
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A Tale of Populism? The
Determinants of Voting for
Left-Wing Populist Parties in
Spain1
Hugo Marcos-Marne
Abstract
Evidence indicates that populist attitudes matter for voting decisions, but findings are still
inconclusive about whether this happens regardless of individuals’ positioning on more traditional
dimensions of electoral competition. This article focuses on the probability of voting for populist
parties in Spain, a country where only left-wing populist parties existed in 2015–2016. Therefore,
not all populist individuals, who were spread across the left–right axis, had a natural voting option
that combined their populist and left–right preferences. Although this situation could make it
more likely that stronger populist attitudes increase likelihood of voting populist regardless of
preferences on other political dimensions, the results of this analysis show otherwise. Stronger
populist attitudes significantly increase the likelihood of voting for left-wing populist parties only
among individuals located in the left side of the ideological axis. The effect seems largely influenced
by preferences related to economic redistribution.
Keywords
populist parties, populist attitudes, electoral behavior, Spain, economic redistribution
Accepted: 22 July 2020
Introduction
The economic crisis that hit Europe after 2008, combined with its political counterpart,
created fertile ground for the emergence and reinforcing of populist parties across the
continent. This was to be expected, because situations of economic and political turmoil
enable the electoral activation of populist attitudes, which in turn are stronger among
individuals who display socioeconomic and political grievances (Hawkins et al., 2020;
Rico and Anduiza, 2019; Spruyt et al., 2016). While different studies have confirmed that
the electoral appeal of populist parties is stronger for individuals who display populist
Department of Political Science, UNED, Madrid, Spain
Corresponding author:
Hugo Marcos-Marne, Department of Political Science, UNED, Calle Obispo Trejo, 28040 Madrid, Spain.
Email: hugo.marcosmarne@unisg.ch
950215PSX0010.1177/0032321720950215Political StudiesMarcos-Marne
research-article2020
Article
1054 Political Studies 69(4)
attitudes themselves (Akkerman et al., 2013; Andreadis et al., 2018; Hawkins et al., 2020;
Marcos-Marne et al., 2020a; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2017), populist parties could
hardly campaign on populist ideas alone. This is so because populism, understood as thin
ideology, does not articulate a comprehensive electoral platform on its own (Freeden,
2017; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013;
Stanley, 2008). The combination of populism with different host ideologies shapes popu-
list parties’ discourses toward topics such as immigration, redistribution, or even the
European Union (Huber and Ruth, 2017; March, 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser,
2013; Plaza-Colodro et al., 2018; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015), and might condition
who votes for them.
Considering this combination of political dimensions, an ongoing line of research
debates the reinforcing or substitution effect of populist attitudes on voting for populist
parties (Hawkins et al., 2020; Loew and Faas, 2019; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel,
2017). The basics of this debate can be presented as two opposing questions: would popu-
list individuals vote for a populist party that do not represent their preferences in tradi-
tional dimensions of competition (crucially, in the economic left–right and the
libertarian–authoritarian divide)? Or, rather, would populist individuals vote for populist
parties only if they agree with the positioning of the party in these traditional dimensions?
A positive answer to the first question could be understood as giving support to the sub-
stitution effect of populist attitudes (populism substitutes traditional dimensions of com-
petition as trigger of voting), whereas an affirmative response to the second would support
the reinforcing effect (populism behaves as an extra reason to vote for a party, besides
agreement on traditional dimensions of competition). Although the opposing questions
scheme is useful to understand the terms of the debate, the solution to this puzzle is likely
to respond to a more nuanced scenario. That is, instead of claiming that populism always
behaves as a substitute or a reinforcement in voting decisions, it seems more interesting
to explore the extent to which party voters’ lack of agreement on traditional dimensions
of competition can be balanced out by proximity on the issue of populism in different
circumstances.
To examine this question, I suggest focusing on individuals’ voting intentions in Spain,
a country where populist discourses have been combined with left-wing electoral plat-
forms. Since 2014, and at least until 2018, populist discourses were clearly associated
with the radical left-wing Podemos and Unidad Popular, its electoral ally after 2015 (the
rest of the parties ranked very low on the populist scale; Lisi et al., 2019; Marcos-Marne
et al., 2020b). Therefore, this case is ideal to test the electoral strength of populist atti-
tudes in a situation where some populist individuals (i.e. right-wing ones) had neither a
“natural” option (populist and right wing) nor a relevant non-populist radical right one for
casting their votes (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015). Thus, the Spanish case could
be considered favorable to finding that stronger populist attitudes increase the likelihood
of voting for a populist party that does not represent individuals’ preferences in traditional
dimensions of competition (substitution effect).
The results of this article indicate, however, that only individuals who locate them-
selves to the left are more likely to vote for left-wing populist parties (LPPs), the stronger
their populist attitudes are (reinforcing effect). Meanwhile, stronger populist attitudes do
not significantly increase the likelihood of voting for LPPs among centrist and right-wing
individuals, which seems mainly influenced by preferences on economic redistribution.
These results highlight the difficulties that populist parties might have in attracting popu-
list voters who do not share their positions in traditional policy terms, even if they are the
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