Tariff Wars and a Model of Conflict
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336700400102 |
| Date | 01 March 1967 |
| Author | Michael Nicholson |
| Published date | 01 March 1967 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
TARIFF
WARS
AND
A
MODEL
OF
CONFLICT*
By
MICHAEL
NICHOLSON
University
of
Lancaster
1.
Introduction
This
paper
is
written
from
the
point
of
view
that
there
are
similarities
between
different
forms
of
conflicts
and
that
the
analysis
of
one
form
of
conflict
may
give
insights
into
the
analysis
of other
sorts.
The
very
act
of
comparison
in
itself
might
be
an
illuminating
experience.
Insight
is,
of
course,
all
we
can
expect.
Comparisons
can
be
very
dangerous.
However,
we
pre-
sent
the
analysis
of
one
form
of
conflict,
tariff
wars,
in
the
hope
that
a
cautious
comparison
of
this
with
other
forms,
no-
tably
war,
might
yield
more
useful
insights
than
misleading
ones.
The
central
aim
here
is
to
contribute
to
the
theory
of
conflict
rather
than
the
study
of
tariff
wars
as
such.
The
main
part
of
the
paper
concerns
therefore
a
model
of
the
tariff
wars
and
a
comparison
of
this
form
of
conflict
with
a
wider
set
of
con-
flicts.
Tariff
wars
are
a
useful
form
of
con-
flict
to
analyse,
in
that
they
are
relatively
simple
in
structure.
In
the
context
of
the
simple
form
of
conflict
we
can
build
up
a
set
of
concepts
and
an
analysis
which
can
then
be
tried
out
on
more
complex
conflicts.
2.
Tari, f, f
warsl
From
1870
onwards
a
number
of
Euro-
pean
states
such
as
Germany,
Russia,
France
and
Italy
began
steadily
increasing
restrictions
on
the
import
of
foreign
goods
which
were
in
competition
with
the
domes-
tic
supplies.
The
motives
for
this
behavior
varied
from
some
nationalistic
concept
of
a
largely
selfsufficient
’National
Econo-
my’
as
in
Germany,
to
a
simple
desire
to
pacify
the
pressures
of
some
domestic
in-
dustry
threatened
by
a
more
efficient
for-
eign
competitor -
pressures
which
then,
as
now,
the
agricultural
interests
were
particularly
adept
at
exerting.
While
each
country
loved
its
own
tariffs
and
restric-
tions
dearly,
it
was
harmed
by
the
compar-
able
restrictions
of
those
countries
with
which
it
traded,
and
the
general
growth
of
tariffs
brought
with
it
a
number
of
bi-
lateral
tariff
treaties
in
which
two
countries
agreed
to
operate
reduced
tariff-rates
again
against
each
other.
Most
of
the
attempted
agreements
were
satisfactorily
concluded,
but
there
were
some
exceptions.
After
a
period
of
fruitless
bargaining,
the
would-
be
treaty
makers
would
impose
discrimi-
natory
restrictions
in
the
hope
of
forcing
the
rival
into
a
more
conciliatory
attitude
and
improving
the
conditions
of
the
final
bargain.
These
are
the
tariff
wars
we
shall
discuss.
The
tariff
wars
on
which
this
analysis
is
based,
and
whose
characteristics
the
mod-
el
describes,
are
the
French-Italian
tariff
war
(started
1888),
the
Russian-German
tariff
war
(started
1893),
the
Franco-
Swiss
tariff
war
(started
1893),
the
Ger-
man-Spanish
tariff
war
(started
1893),
and
the
German-Canadian
tariff
war
(started
1897).
While
these
tariff
wars
each
had
their
own
individual
idiosyncracies
they
seem
to
show
a
broad
general
pattern,
and
it
is
their
common
features
which
the
model
sets
out
to
explain.
To
give
an
idea
of
what
a
tariff
war
looks
like
we
shall
describe
two
of
them
in
detail,
the
Ger-
man-Russian
one
and
the
French-Italian
one.
To
allow
more
time
for
analysis
we
shall
omit
the
details
of
the
others.
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