Tay Yak Ping v Tay Nguang Kee Serene
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD,Woo Bih Li JAD,Chua Lee Ming J |
| Judgment Date | 23 May 2022 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 90 of 2021 |
[2022] SGHC(A) 22
Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD, Woo Bih Li JAD and Chua Lee Ming J
Civil Appeal No 90 of 2021
Appellate Division of the High Court
Equity — Defences — Laches — Whether there was substantial lapse of time — Whether unjust to grant relief
Trusts — Resulting trusts — Presumed resulting trusts — Defendant paying for stamp duty for purchase of property — Whether monetary contributions towards ancillary costs of purchasing property should be taken into account in determining parties' respective beneficial shares in that property under resulting trust
Trusts — Resulting trusts — Presumed resulting trusts — Sale proceeds of one property being used to pay for purchase price of another property — Whether former property was purchased using proceeds of business — Whether business was solely owned by plaintiff — Whether latter property (and its sale proceeds) held on resulting trust for plaintiff
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) The salient issues had been comprehensively addressed by the Judge, and there was no basis for appellate interference with the Judge's findings as they were not against the weight of the evidence before him or plainly wrong: at [2].
(2) Contrary to the appellants' suggestion, the evidence of Lah Moi, Nguang Keow and Serene should not be disregarded. The appellants had not adduced any evidence to rebut the Judge's views that these witnesses were honest and truthful, or to substantiate their allegation that Lah Moi and Nguang Keow were biased towards Serene: at [22].
(3) The appellants' reliance on the lack of documentary evidence in the present case did not take them very far. In family disputes involving heavily contested events spanning several years and a lack of documentation, the court would have to carefully evaluate the credibility of the parties to ascertain the truth from the disparate versions of events presented. The Judge did precisely this in making his findings of fact: at [23].
(4) The sole question that arose for determination in relation to Serene's resulting trust claim was whether the presumption of resulting trust arose, based on the parties' respective financial contributions to the purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment at the time it was acquired. The totality of the evidence supported the Judge's key findings of fact and conclusion on this issue – namely, that the Valley Apartment had been purchased using Serene Leather's proceeds, and that Serene Leather and its proceeds were owned solely by Serene: at [25] and [26].
(5) There was no presumption or rule that the proper inference to draw from a testamentary disposition was necessarily that the person making the will was in fact the outright beneficial owner of the property, rather than a resulting trustee. Whether such an inference should be drawn was ultimately a fact-sensitive inquiry: at [33].
(6) While the registration of a business as a partnership provided prima facie evidence that it was a partnership, it remained open to the party challenging the existence of the partnership to prove that an alleged partner who was registered as a partner was merely a nominal partner. Other than the definition of a partnership in the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed), the court would also look at the intention of the parties as appeared from the whole facts of the case in determining whether there was a partnership: at [44].
(7) It followed from the conclusions above that the Valley Apartment had been purchased using moneys belonging to Serene. As it was undisputed that 96.07% of the purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment was paid for using the Valley Apartment's sale proceeds, Serene could be taken to have contributed 96.07% of the purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment. Therefore, following the sale of the Pacific Mansion Apartment, Serene was the beneficial owner of 96.07% of its sale proceeds, and this sum was held by the appellants on a resulting trust for her: at [50].
(8) Serene's claim was not barred by the doctrine of laches. First, the requirement of a substantial lapse of time had not been established. There was no undue delay on Serene's part in commencing the suit against the appellants as time had started to run only when it became clear to her that Yak Ping intended to claim the entirety of the sale proceeds from the Pacific Mansion Apartment. Second, the appellants would not suffer any particular prejudice that would make it unjust for Serene to be granted relief. The disadvantages caused by the unavailability of evidence and the passage of time cut both ways and were simply unfortunate: at [52], [53], [56] and [57].
[Observation: The Judge had expressly declined to include Yak Ping's contribution towards the payment of stamp duty as a contribution towards the purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment. This raised an interesting (and as yet unresolved) question of law as to whether monetary contributions towards the ancillary costs of purchasing a property (such as stamp duty) should be taken into account in determining the parties' respective beneficial shares in that property under a resulting trust. Having regard to the approaches that had been adopted in England, Australia, and Hong Kong, it seemed at least arguable that monetary contributions towards stamp duty should be included by the court in determining the parties' respective beneficial shares under a resulting trust. In addition, it was often fortuitous whether the money of one person or another was used to pay the purchase price or the stamp duty (or even the legal expenses) for the property. The broader approach might also commend itself to the practical importance of this issue, bearing in mind the stamp duty regime in Singapore: at [59], [60] and [68].]
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 (refd)
Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 (folld)
Chiam Heng Hsien v Chiam Heng Chow [2014] SGHC 119 (folld)
Chua Ka Seng v Boonchai Sompolpong [1993] 1 SLR(R) 17; [1993] 1 SLR 482 (folld)
Cong v Shen (No 3) [2021] NSWSC 947 (refd)
Curley v Parkes [2004] EWCA Civ 1515 (refd)
Currie v Hamilton [1984] 1 NSWLR 687 (refd)
Cytec Industries Pte Ltd v APP Chemicals International (Mau) Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 769; [2009] 4 SLR 769 (folld)
Geok Hong Co Pte Ltd v Koh Ai Gek [2019] 1 SLR 908 (folld)
Huntingford v Hobbs [1993] 1 FLR 736 (refd)
Koh Ewe Chee v Koh Hua Leong [2003] SGHC 24 (refd)
Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108; [2008] 2 SLR 108 (folld)
Quek Hung Heong v Tan Bee Hoon [2014] SGHC 17 (refd)
Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655; [2007] 2 SLR 655 (folld)
Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch) (refd)
Sivagami Achi v P R M Ramanathan Chettiar [1959] MLJ 221 (folld)
Sivritas v Sivritas [2008] VSC 374 (refd)
Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 (folld)
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (refd)
Wong Chor Cheung v Wong Hark Chung [2021] HKCU 24 (refd)
The first appellant (“Yak Ping”) and the respondent (“Serene”) were siblings, and the second appellant (“Father”) was their father. Yak Ping and Serene also had several other siblings, including their brother “Jee Soon”, and their sisters “Lah Moi” and “Nguang Keow”.
In 1988, an apartment referred to as the “Valley Apartment” was purchased in the names of Father, Yak Ping, and Yak Ping and Serene's mother (“Mother”). The purchase was financed partly by a housing loan, with the balance purchase price paid in cash in three separate payments in 1988. Several years later, Mother made a will giving her share of the Valley Apartment to Jee Soon, Lah Moi and Yak Ping. In 2005, after Mother had passed away, the Valley Apartment was sold and the sale proceeds paid out to Father, Yak Ping, Jee Soon and Lah Moi in accordance with their respective shares.
In 2006, another apartment (the “Pacific Mansion Apartment”) was purchased in the joint names of Yak Ping and Father. The purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment was paid for mostly using the sale proceeds of the Valley Apartment, save for a sum which was paid from Yak Ping's Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) account. Yak Ping also paid a separate sum from his CPF account towards the payment of the stamp duty for the purchase of the Pacific Mansion Apartment. The Pacific Mansion Apartment was sold in 2018. In 2019, Father was certified to have lost mental capacity.
A dispute subsequently arose between the parties as to the beneficial ownership of the sale proceeds from the Pacific Mansion Apartment, with Serene claiming that the appellants held these sale proceeds on resulting trust for her.
The High Court judge (“the Judge”) found that the Valley Apartment had been purchased using the proceeds of a business known as “Serene Leather”. The Judge further found that Serene Leather was solely owned by Serene. In the light of these findings, the Judge found that the Valley Apartment (and its sale proceeds) had been held by the appellants on resulting trust for Serene. As 96.07% of the purchase price of the Pacific Mansion Apartment had then been paid using the Valley Apartment's sale proceeds, the appellants therefore held 96.07% of the sale proceeds from the Pacific Mansion Apartment on resulting trust for Serene. However, the Judge also ordered Serene to reimburse Yak Ping for her 96.07% share of the sum paid by Yak Ping towards the stamp duty for the Pacific Mansion Apartment, together with accrued interest. Further, the Judge held that Serene's claim was not barred by the doctrine of laches.
The appellants appealed against the Judge's decision.
Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) ss 22(1)(b), 22(2)
Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed)
Yeoh Oon Weng...
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