Team of former rivals
| Author | Paul Poast,Yonatan Lupu |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343316630782 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Team of former rivals: A multilateral
theory of non-aggression pacts
Yonatan Lupu
Department of Political Science, George Washington University
Paul Poast
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago
Abstract
Why do states form non-aggression pacts? Non-aggression pacts are different from typical alliances because the latter
tend to be focused on relationships between members of the alliance and other states, such as by deterring external
threats or mediating the resolution of conflicts between an alliance member and a third-party challenger. We offer
two contributions that build on existing work. First, we provide a theory that explains why leaders use non-aggression
pacts as information mechanisms. Leaders of states that have recently emerged from a rivalry seek to overcome an
important information asymmetry: they know the probability of future conflict among the former rivals has
decreased, but other actors may fear a resumption of hostilities. Such leaders use non-aggression pacts to signal that
the rivalry has truly ended and that future relations are likely to remain peaceful. Second, our analysis recognizes the
often multilateral nature of the non-aggression pact formation process. We use the ‘k’-adic statistical procedure to
model non-aggression pact formation as a multilateral process. To operationalize recent rivalry cessation within a
group, we use a network analytic density measure. Consistent with our theory, we find that groups of states with
greater densities of recently ended rivalries are significantly more likely to form non-aggression pacts. These results
hold across a series of model specifications.
Keywords
alliances, non-aggression pacts, rivalries
Introduction
Why do states form non-aggression pacts? Non-
aggression pacts are different from typical alliances
because the latter tend to be focused on relationships
between members of the alliance and other states, such
as by deterring external threats (Waltz, 1979; Walt,
1987) or mediating the resolution of conflicts between
an alliance member and a third-party challenger (Fang,
Johnson & Leeds, 2015). Like other alliances (Lake,
1999; Weitsman, 2004; Leeds & Savun, 2007; Fang,
Johnson & Leeds, 2015), non-aggression pacts can be
usefully conceived of as a type of international institution
that members may be able to use to overcome coopera-
tion problems (Long, Nordstrom & Baek, 2007; Mattes
& Vonnahme, 2010). Non-aggression pacts are often
used to reduce the likelihood of future conflict (Long,
Nordstrom & Baek, 2007; Mattes & Vonnahme, 2010;
Warren, 2016).
If non-aggression pacts are designed to reduce con-
flict, why do states need to write down these commit-
ments? Many international legal instruments, perhaps
most importantly the United Nations Charter, create
broader commitments to refrain from the use of force.
Formal agreements are far from a necessary condition for
international cooperation (Smith, 1995; Morrow,
2000). Recent work provides explanations. States forma-
lize their commitments not to enter into conflict with
each other in order to generate domestic audience costs
for reneging on these commitments (Long, Nordstrom
Corresponding author:
paulpoast@uchicago.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2016, Vol. 53(3) 344–358
ªThe Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343316630782
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