Technology and intelligence

Published date01 July 2005
Date01 July 2005
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/13685200510621000
Pages227-242
AuthorNeil J. Jensen
Subject MatterAccounting & finance
Technology and Intelligence
Neil J. Jensen
`There is nothing more important in the ®ght
against organised crime than high quality intelli-
gence. Most organised crime groups can only suc-
cessfully be tackled by an intelligence led
investigation. But the importance of good intelli-
gence goes much deeper than that. Good intelli-
gence is also vital to prioritise which targets to
work on in the ®rst place, by assessing the scale
and importance of the threats posed by dierent tar-
gets . . . We also need to ensure that when intelli-
gence is obtained, its value is fully recognised,
shared and exploited. If this does not happen,
there is a high risk that we are not always targeting
the key ®gures in organised crime.' [One Step
Ahead: A 21
st
Century Strategy to Defeat Organised
Crime, presented to Parliament by the Secretary
of State for the Home Department by Command
of Her Majesty, March 2004]
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence and technology are now more than ever
inextricably linked. The development of intelligence
techniques based on technological advancements is
undergoing a worldwide evolution.
Intelligence is classically de®ned as secret infor-
mation about an enemy.
1
This de®nition is often
expanded so that the term refers to secret information
gathered by an agency or oce designed speci®cally
for the task.
2
It is now recognised that such `enemies'
may be organised criminal groups, such as drug car-
tels, arms tracking rings or terrorists. In law enforce-
ment the term `intelligence' is used to draw the
distinction between unassessed or `raw' information
and information that has been analysed as part of the
intelligence cycle.
Technology has developed signi®cantly over the
past decade. The advancements in, inter alia, com-
munications, networking, database technologies, and
the World Wide Web, mean that larger volumes of
information can be accessed and managed from
across the world from many public and other sources
in real time. This means that voluminous quantities of
information, the base product for intelligence, are
readily accessible, as long as there is the technology
and resources to locate it and evaluate it. The result
is increased vital intelligence for law enforcement
eorts.
Advances in technology also mean that huge
volumes of data can be accessed and sent securely,
received instantaneously and stored more eciently
and securely than ever before. Database technologies
are now also extremely powerful and sophisticated
and readily available to meet every budget. Such tech-
nologies are typically developed to meet commercial
needs and are able to readily identify patterns and
extract information upon demand. They also provide
enormous bene®ts for policing and the intelligence
community. Unfortunately, these same bene®ts also
accrue to the criminals, both in their illicit `commer-
cial' ventures and in counter-intelligence.
Policing and intelligence agencies adopt the same
data-warehousing techniques generally associated
with commercial business activities. Law enforcement
agencies are using this o-the-shelf technology with
increasing eciency to collect and analyse huge
volumes of intelligence and use the results to proac-
tively combat crime. Instead of waiting for a crime
to happen, law enforcement agencies can now use
intelligence to initiate and assist investigations through
the analysis of information about criminal, and other,
behaviour and to eectively target and intercept the
activities of national and international organised
crime networks.
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING
Intelligence-led policing is the cornerstone of the UK
National Intelligence Model (NIM), which was intro-
duced in the early 2000s as part of the country's Police
Reform Agenda. The NIM ensures that information is
fully researched, developed and analysed to provide
intelligence that senior law enforcement managers
can use to provide strategic direction, make tactical
resourcing decisions about operational policing and
manage risk.
3
Australian law enforcement agencies
have adopted a similar approach to intelligence-led
policing,
4
as, no doubt, have many other countries
in recent times.
The UK's NIM is a three-step process in which
information is analysed and used to reduce and prevent
crime through eective policing strategies. The ®rst
Page 227
Journal of Money Laundering Control Ð Vol. 8 No. 3
Journalof Money Laundering Control
Vol.8, No. 3, 2005, pp. 227± 242
#HenryStewart Publications
ISSN1368-5201
step to intelligence-led policing is to interpret the
criminal environment; the second step is to identify
the intelligence and promote it to the decision
makers; and, the third step requires the decision
makers to use the intelligence available to reduce and
prevent crime.
5
It is also crucial to ensure that the
police have access to the widest range of intelligence
sources available.
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION
INFORMATION
In the last 15 years, a new form of intelligence has
become progressively available, namely intelligence
from ®nancial transaction information. The base
information of ®nancial transactions has always been
available, but not readily accessible. Developments
in the ®eld of anti-money laundering since 1990
have led to this information, and intelligence derived
from it, being more readily available to law enforce-
ment agencies across the world.
In most jurisdictions prior to 1990 investigators
needed to know that a crime had occurred, that ®nan-
cial transactions had been used in the crime, and that
the transactions had occurred on a particular date
and at a speci®c location, such as a bank. Law enforce-
ment agencies then required a warrant or other court
document before the bank could search for the trans-
action documentation. Thus, ®nancial transaction
information could not be readily used to initiate inves-
tigations because it was not generally available until
well after the crime had been committed.
Three things have assisted the law enforcement
agencies in breaking down these barriers since 1990:
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-
ing's (the FATF) 40 Recommendations on legislation
and technology; technology has already been men-
tioned; and the legislation in many countries has
evolved from the need for jurisidictions to meet the
global anti-money laundering standards, the FATF
40 Recommendations.
The FATF was established in 1990 and immediately
set about developing its 40 Recommendations
6
which
provide principles to counter money laundering. The
FATF published a further eight Special Recommen-
dations on Terrorist Financing in October 2001 in
an attempt to counter this activity and another
recommendation followed in October 2004. Each of
the FATF's 40 Recommendations, which were
signi®cantly revised in 2003, is expected to be
implemented by all countries worldwide. In addition,
many international organisations now require their
members to adopt or support the FATF's 40+9
Recommendations.
7
The FATF 40 Recommendations, among other
things, require that each country should, as a mini-
mum, implement an eective and well resourced
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),
8
and that countries
should require the reporting of, or consider reporting
of, ®nancial transactions described as suspicious, sig-
ni®cant cash, and cross border to the FIU in their
country.
9
The 40 Recommendations further state
that this information should be able to be readily
exchanged between jurisdictions.
10
FIUs have now been established by more than 100
countries around the world with many more in the
early stages of development. An FIU is de®ned as:
`A central, national agency responsible for receiving
(and, as permitted, requesting), analysing and disse-
minating to the competent authorities, disclosures
of ®nancial information:
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and
potential ®nancing of terrorism, or
(ii) required by national legislation or regulation,
in order to combat money laundering and terrorism
®nancing.'
11
In 1995, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units (Egmont Group) was created to foster the devel-
opment of FIUs and information exchange and also to
seek to overcome obstacles preventing cross-border
information sharing. The Egmont Group also requires
that information-sharing arrangements should aim to
foster the widest possible cooperation between FIUs.
The Egmont Group's Principles for Information
Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for
Money Laundering Cases and its Best Practices for
the Exchange of Information Between Financial Intel-
ligence Units together outline the generally shared
concepts, while allowing countries necessary ¯exi-
bility to work within their own legislative frame-
works. FIUs from 94 countries are now members of
the Egmont Group.
12
The intelligence developed by an FIU comes from
information contained in ®nancial transactions.
These transactions are reported to the FIU by ®nancial
institutions; non-bank ®nancial institutions (NBFIs);
the so-called `gatekeeper' professions, such as solicitors
and accountants; and a range of other organisations
and business types. An FIU analyses the material and
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Jensen

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