Terrorism and internet censorship
| Author | Daniel Pemstein,Stephen A Meserve |
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320959369 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Article |
Terrorism and internet censorship
Stephen A Meserve
Department of Politics and International Affairs, Northern Arizona University
Daniel Pemstein
Department of Political Science & Public Policy and Challey Institute for Global Innovation and Growth, North
Dakota State University
Abstract
The internetprovides a powerful tool to terrororganizations, enhancingtheir public messaging, recruitment ability,and
internal communication. In turn, governments have increasingly moved to disrupt terror organizations’ internet com-
munications,and even democraciesnow routinely work to censorterrorist propaganda,and related politicalmessaging, in
the name of national security. We argue that democraticstates respond to terror attacksby increasing internet censorship
and broadening their capacity to limit the digital dissemination of information. This article builds on previous work
suggesting this relationship, substantially improving measurement and estimation strategy. We use latent variable
modeling techniques to create a new measure of internet censorship, cross nationally and over time, from internet firm
transparencyreports, and compare this measure to an expert-survey based indicator. Leveragingboth measures, we use a
variety of panel specifications to establish that, in democracies, increases in terror predict surges in digital censorship.
Finally, we examine the posited relationship using synthetic control methods in a liberal democracy that experienced a
large shock in terror deaths, France, showing that digital censorship ramped up after severallarge terrorist attacks.
Keywords
internet censorship, latent variable models, terrorism
Introduction
Since a core interest of the state is to protect itself, its
agents, and itsrule (Tilly, 1990), theories of states’ survival
interests suggest that governments meet activities that
threaten them with repression. A large literature identifies
the ways in which digital communications technology
facilitates groups that oppose the state by enabling them
to recruit, organize, and coordinate action (Tufekci,
2017).
1
In response, governments developed and refined
tools to restrict digital communications (Tufekci, 2017;
Roberts, 2018)in order to – among other things – protect
against terrorism and insurgency.
But how do findings about tools for digital control and
repression explain behavior by democratic regimes? Most
definitions of democracy rest on a bedrock of freedom of
expression, and all measures of democracy demand that
governmentsallow opposition to freely organize, compete,
and dissent politically. Democraciesmay, therefore, abhor
digital censorship. The literature provides suggestive but
limited answers about democratic digital control (Deibert
et al., 2008, 2010; MacKinnon, 2012), but most of what
we know aboutdigital content restrictionrests on studiesof
autocraciesthat are relatively unconstrained withrespect to
freedom of expression. Do democraticstates control digital
spaces, or do theymaintain free and open communication,
in response to threats? To the extent that they do restrict
online speech, how do they censor?
Corresponding author:
daniel.pemstein@ndsu.edu
1
These expectations in the digital realm parallel recent theory,
measurement, and empirical research on traditional press and
media freedom and civil conflict (Whitten-Woodring & Van Belle,
2017).
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(6) 752–763
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320959369
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