Testing middle power’s collective action in a world of diffuse power
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702016686384 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| Author | Andrew F. Cooper |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
International Journal
2016, Vol. 71(4) 529–544
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702016686384
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Scholarly Essay
Testing middle power’s
collective action in a
world of diffuse power
Andrew F. Cooper
Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Canada
Abstract
Middle power conceptualization has been reinvented over the years as the structural
weight of this cluster of countries changes. Moreover, the means by which middle
powers project normative values and operational diplomatic approaches has morphed
with the evolution of the global order.A constant, however, has been the unwillingness of
middle powers to embrace some form of institutionalization. The focus has been multi-
lateralism and/or specific functional issue areas or niches. This article argues that the
combination of a world of diffuse power and a new type of informalism opens the possi-
bility of collective action. Although MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and
Australia) is in an early stage of development, this formation provides a significant test of
the meaning and modalities of middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century.
Keywords
Middle powers, diplomacy, collective action, MIKTA, informalism
This framework article offers some insights into the meaning and modalities of middle
powers in the twenty-first century. As Robert Cox suggested decades ago, the con-
ceptualization of middle powers ‘‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be
rethought continuously in the context of the changing state of the international
system.’’
1
In part, this constant flux and reinvention comes about because of changing
structural conditions, in that in relative terms the material weight of middle power has
shifted appreciably. From 2001 to 2016 all of the MIKTA countries but Mexico
moved up the rankings using the objective criteria of nominal gross domestic product
(GDP). South Korea is listed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as going
from 12th to 11th (1,321,200 millions of US$) in the world, Australia 15th to 13th
Corresponding author:
Andrew Cooper, Department of Political science, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave W,
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada.
Email: acooper@uwaterloo.ca
1. Robert Cox, ‘‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order,’’ International Journal 44, no.
4 (1989): 825–826.
(1,200,780), Indonesia 27th to 16th (936,955), and Turkey 29th to 18th (751,186). Yet
not only is this pattern uneven, with Mexico standing out as the exception to this trend
(falling back from 9th to 15th although with a sizeable GDP of 1,082,430), but this
movement is completely overwhelmed by the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa) through the same period. In the same years, China moved up
from 6th to 2nd (11,383,030), Brazil 11th to 9th (1,534,780), India 13th to 7th
(2,288,720), Russia 16th to 14th (1,132,740), with only South Africa’s standing declin-
ing from 33rd to 39th (266, 213).
2
If useful then as a starting point, reference to economic ranking is not sufficient
to tease out the meaning or modalities of middle power status or role. What is
significant about these figures is that they signal that all the countries clustered
loosely in MIKTA are situated in the upper middle (or ‘‘top 20’’) of the global
hierarchy,
3
thereby allowing them to possess the requisite capacity to operate with
some degree of global reach. How, why, where, or when this role is to be played,
however, is left open. As Kim Nossal reminded us 20 years ago, attempts aimed
at trying ‘‘to establish middle power by statistical means’’ come up against the
‘‘heterogeneity and differing self-perceptions’’ of the middle powers themselves.
4
Throughout the first two waves of diplomatic practices—the first wave in the
immediate post-1945 era and the second through the 1990s and early 2000s in the
post-Cold War years—middle powers shared com mon modes of thinking and oper-
ating in the global system. Such commonalities allowed middle powers to come
together in short bursts of activity. But unlike at the top of the global hierarchy,
there was no institutionalization of these practices. The focus remained on parallel
actorness, not on forging tight bonds. MIKTA has shifted attention to the possibi-
lities of a third wave featuring some degree (albeit still loosely formed) of collective
action. However, thelimitations as well as the possibilities of this new model must be
factored in. Collective action among the ‘‘missing middle’ ’ in terms of the reproduc-
tion of practices located at the apex of power may be asking too much of this still
heterogeneous cluster. Nonetheless, even if marking a false start, the association of
MIKTA to the G20 and related forms of institutionalization in the global system
(including the creation of the BRICS summit) justifies closer examination.
Normative impulses
Moving beyond structural conditions and objective methods of analysis means
a focus on two other factors in the evolution of middle power diplomatic
2. International Monetary Fund, ‘‘World Economic Outlook Database,’’ April 2016. For 2001 figures,
see http://en.classora.com/reports/t24369/ranking-of-the-worlds-richest-countries-by-gdp?edi-
tion¼2001 (accessed 26 November 2016).
3. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘‘Are we a top 20 nation or a middle power? Views on
Australia’s position in the world,’’ Strategic Insights, 2014, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/
are-we-a-top-20-nation-or-a-middle-power-views-on-australias-position-in-the-world/
SI81Australia_as_top20nation.pdf (accessed 26 November 2016).
4. Kim R. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997),
90n67.
530 International Journal 71(4)
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