Thailand’s new right, social cleansing and the continuing military–monarchy entente
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891120980835 |
| Date | 01 September 2021 |
| Published date | 01 September 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Thailand’s new right, social
cleansing and the continuing
military–monarchy entente
James Taylor
The University of Adelaide, Australia
Chiang Mai University, Thailand
Abstract
The article looks at the nature of the state and society in contemporary Thailand using a com-
parative historical analysis. Thailand is led by an officer corps, faithful only to the monarchy
regime, while the land is at the disposal of the absolute sovereign who unquestionably holds
control over its terrain, resources and people. It is a mix of Siamese palingenetic ultranationalist
sentiment with re-interpretations of a conservative Buddhist ideology which is based on the
morality and right of the rulers to rule. To the military leaders, its general officers, the military–
monarchy nexus embodies a supreme source of secular morality and power with the right to
dominate and where the ends (always) justify the means. Thai society has become irreparably
divided by the interests of the ruling elites, defining the exceptions and, it is argued, comparable
to historical and contemporary authoritarian regimes elsewhere. The article argues that the
country, led by the New Right, articulates disarming elements of semi-fascism under the military,
in a compact with the interests of the monarchy.
Keywords
fascisms, New Right, social cleansing, Thailand, ultranationalism
Thailand has been under a convenient military–monarchy entente continuing throughout the Ninth
Chakri Reign (Bhumibol Adulyadej 1950–2016) to the present Tenth Chakri Reign monarch, King
Maha Vajiralongkorn (r. 2019–).
1,2
Chambers and Napisa (2016) refer to this alliance as a ‘“par-
allel state”, whereas the ideology, rituals and processes within this relationship result in what can
be termed a “monarchised military”’.Theydefinethisasan‘asymmetrical nexus between a
powerful monarch and Privy Council and a military leadership’(Chambers and Napisa, 2016:
Corresponding author:
James Taylor, Department of Anthropology and Develop ment Studies, The University of Adelaide, Adelai de, South
Australia, Australia.
Email: jim.taylor@adelaide.edu.au
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2057891120980835
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
2021, Vol. 6(3) 253–273
Research article
427). But, a ‘parallel state’infers two distinct lines on a plane of continuum which do not intersect.
Indeed, because of the organic control exerted by the palace within the state and its (Foucauldian)
dispositif, the notion of state-within-state may be a more useful consideration (referred to in the
context of Turkish etymology as the ‘Deep State’; see Mérieau, 2016). This unhealthy coexistence
mentioned by Chambers and Napisa between the monarchy and the military subsequently leads to
a‘defective or unstable democracy where non-elected elites hold veto power over the effective
power of popularly elected representatives to govern’(Chambers and Napisa, 2016: 430).
There have been only a few cursory glimpses of a ‘sham’electoral democracy under the lastKing,
Bhumibol Adulyadej, with everydaylife regulated through well-fundedpropaganda. Real power is in
the hands of handpickedmilitary and non-militaryelites, working in the interestsof the palace. Indeed,
even one or twoThai mega-corporations,notably the Charoen PokphandGroup, work closely withthe
monarchy as monopoly contracts are handed out to those deemed loyal and capable and ensuring an
undercurrent offinancial benefits to the summit and maintaining the status quo.
This is no acquiescent modern social contract, but an autocratic, monopolistic centrist arrange-
ment which furthers the interests of national elites. As Reynolds (2010) noted, autocracy ‘contin-
ues to thwart popular yearnings for democracy, and sets limits on participatory politics. Those
already in power figure out how to use democracy to ensure not just longevity of rule, but
permanency of rule’. In the power of continued propaganda, the masses exposed to a reality of
struggle, as in Benjamin’s (1969: 249) reading of Angelus Novus, arguably live in a melancholy
view of Thailand’s historical process, in an unceasing sequence of acceptance, loss and despair.
History and social evolution in Thailand made the ruling elites and their middle-class minions
an enemy of liberal democracy, rather than a part of democracy’s entering wedge. The attempt by
Thailand’s governing regime to ensure obedience in the population as neo-feudal loyalty to the
monarchy is discussed later and serves the purpose of an extensive rent-seeking officer corps.
Political actors, aligned with the monarchy, have been using the national triadic imagery of nation-
religion-king to undermine both the rule of law and democratic institutions (Dressel, 2018).
At the same time, the democratic outflows are continually stemmed by reactionary forces each and
every time these forces show themselves in a dwindling public sphere.
3
But to understand both Thailand’s
social structure and its political system we need to unpack the oft-cited ideological totalising trilogy of
nation-religion-king argument as framing the essence and meaning of Thailand’s identity politics.
In the sense of Lefebvre’s (2009) ‘politics of space’, the royalist Thai state and its compliant
capitalists and public sector servants are directed to ‘pulverise’democratic space into a manage-
able, calculable and abstract grid and prevent diverse social forces from creating, defending or
extending contested spaces of social reproduction and autonomy. The military–monarchy regime
apprises the masses on one hand to become economically self-sufficient and to devotedly serve
their benefactors; while on the other hand elites continually extract rent at will from the nation-
state. It is hard to overstate the influence of the military in Thailand especially since 1957,
controlling prime real estate around the country, spatially divided up with royalty and emplacing
high-ranking officers in parliament and as directors on corporate boards, including all independent
government agencies, ministries, universities and so on. After the 2014 coup, the military generals
manoeuvred quickly to control lucrative state-owned enterprises.
Prajak and Veerayooth (2018) have argued that the military are the only institution which can
ensure the ‘stability and interests’of royalty and elites. In this process the regime must maintain
the illusion of democracy to ensure some legitimacy from domestic groups and the international
community (Prajak and Veerayooth, 2018: 281).
4
How to define contemporary social and political
life in Thailand has been a challenge f or political commentators. Descriptio ns by themselves
254 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 6(3)
To continue reading
Request your trial