The anchor of the system: The Iran deal and the decline of realism in US foreign policy
| Published date | 01 September 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702017723356 |
| Author | Liam Hunt |
| Date | 01 September 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
The anchor of the
system: The Iran deal
and the decline of
realism in US
foreign policy
Liam Hunt
Political Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada
Abstract
American nuclear diplomacy generally presents a set of explanatory conditions ripe for
the political realist: rogue states, an alarmed public, and existential risk create a milieu
apt for realpolitik. This case study closely examines the link between the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and the theoretical trends in United States foreign
policy, specifically with respect to the dictates of neorealism. At the time of writing,
the bulk of literature on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its consequent
developments remains lacking in theoretical commentary on how the agreement relates
to broader narratives of United States foreign policy. This essay bridges the gap in the
literature by drawing a connection between the Iran nuclear deal, neorealism, and
liberal institutionalism. The findings suggest that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action marks a significant deviation from the predictions of realism, instead acting as
an example of liberal institutionalism and potentially signalling a greater shift toward
multilateralism in United States foreign policy.
Keywords
International relations theory, international relations, diplomacy, Iranian-American
relations, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), non-proliferation, nuclear
diplomacy, nuclear weapons
International Journal
2017, Vol. 72(3) 318–337
!The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020702017723356
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
Corresponding author:
Liam Hunt, Political Science, Dalhousie University, Henry Hicks A&A Building, Room 301, 3rd floor, 6299
South Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4R2, Canada.
Email: lfa.hunt@gmail.com
Throughout the last half-century, the American foreign policy trajectory has been
largely characterized in the literature as having conformed to the several variants of
realist theory.
1,2
Bearing this in mind, one can reasonably assume that the realist
trend will continue in application, specifically with respect to the United States’
(US) response to the issue of Iranian nuclear non-proliferation. This is particularly
true of the prescriptive, or predictive, outcomes tied to neorealist (structural)
theories of US foreign policy. Moving beyond the limitations of structural realism,
Gideon Rose’s seminal essay coined neoclassical realism as an alternative account
of how and why states operationalize systemic actions. While remaining committed
to the balance of power doctrine, neoclassical realism stresses the role of an actor’s
perceptions of threats and intentions, elites’ psychology, and the role of internal
state pressures such as public opinion and state-specific processes (or the
‘‘innenpolitik’’). In this account, the internal situation is assumed to be the driving
force in foreign policymaking, while the external situation—the implications of the
international sphere—is the limiting force. The following analysis aims to suggest
that the US response to the Iranian nuclear issue, at best, defies this expectation,
and, at worst, suggests the inverse may be true. To accept this as true, I contend, is
to accept the solution as instead being more in keeping with the principles of liberal
institutionalism.
The case design is modelled after the crucial least-likely methodology, a tool
proven effective in testing theoretical arguments.
3
Since liberal institutionalism,
neoclassical realism, and neorealist theory more generally all invoke specific pre-
dictions and explanations of state behaviour, this case model will work to test those
predictions and determine the validity of each theory in explaining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its attendant events. Put briefly,
neoclassical realism leads to a set of policy predictions derived, in part, from the
convergence of rational self-interest, the constraints of the international arena
(and a state’s relative capabilities within it), and various domestic stakeholders.
With these conditions in mind, therefore, proponents of realism would view the
JCPOA case to least likely support liberal institutional explanations, predictions,
and assumptions, particularly in light of the pressing nature of Iranian nuclear
proliferation. These include: international cooperation between states, accruement
of absolute gains, and institutional (rather than domestic) actors being central to
the decision-making process. According to the logic of inference, if the theory
works under the least likely conditions, then logically it follows that it would
also hold true under any other set of conditions. Moreover, this case study
should be particularly friendly to any realist perspective of US foreign policy,
1. Alec Russell, ‘‘U.S. foreign policy takes ‘neo-realist’ approach,’’ The Telegraph, 9 February 2006,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1510075/US-foreign-policy-takes-
neo-realist-approach.html (accessed 3 July 2017).
2. Shibley Telhami, ‘‘Kenneth Waltz, neorealism, and foreign policy,’’ Security Studies 11, no. 3
(March 2002): 158.
3. Jack S. Levy, ‘‘Case studies: Types, designs, and logics of inference,’’ Conflict Management and
Peace Science 25, no. 1 (February 2008): 1–18.
Hunt 319
To continue reading
Request your trial