The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute
| Published date | 01 December 1972 |
| Date | 01 December 1972 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787200400601 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
559
THE
ANGLO-ICELANDIC
FISHERIES
DISPUTE
R.
P.
BARSTON
and
HJALMAR
W.
HANNESSON
INTRODUCTION
The
problem
of
declining
natural
resources
and
the
accom-
panying
search
for
new
reserves
or
substitutes
has
become
an
important
feature
of
international
relations
during
the
past
decade.
In
particular,
the
competition
for,
and
management
of,
fish
re-
sources
has
increasingly
occupied
the
attention
of
national
governments
and
a
wide
variety
of
international
agencies.
Several
factors
have
contributed
to
the
intensification
in
the
competition
for
fish
resources:
world
population
growth,
increases
in
nutritional
standards,
industrial
requirements,
over
fishing
of
traditional
grounds,
and,
most
importantly,
rapidly
changing
fisheries
technology.
Post-war
developments
in
the
fields
of
elec-
tronics,
hydroacoustics,
net
and
hull
construction,
as
well
as
freezer
techniques
have
not
only
made
possible
sustained,
larger
catches
for
traditional
trawlers
but
facilitated
the
construction
and
operation
of
factory
type
vessels.’
Thus,
for
the
small
state
especially,
the
roving,
vacuum-cleaner
like
operations
of
factory
trawlers
pose
a
severe
threat
to
resources
which
are
an
important,
and
sometimes
vital,
part
of
its
economy.
Over
the
same
period
state
practice
on
the
law
of
the
sea
has
proved
remarkably
varied,
with,
for
example,
differing
types
of
jurisdiction
claims
of
up
to
200
miles.’
Again,
technological
develop-
ments
have
had
important
implications
in
shaping
attitudes
to
national
limits.
The
1967
Torrey
Canyon
episode
raised
both
the
questions
of
liability
and
state
jurisdiction,
and
emphasised
the
need
for
international
agreement
on
oil
spillage
and
pollution
from
tankers
in
view
of the
massive
increase
in
tanker
capacity.
Advances
too
in
marine
drilling
technology
have
enabled
oil
and
natural
gas
exploration
to
be
carried
out
at
considerable
depths,
as
in
the
North
Sea,
on
the
continental
shelf
beyond
the
traditional
three
or
even
twelve-mile
limits.
It
is
against
this
general
background
of
the
competition
for
fish
resources
and
changing
state
practice
on
the
law
of
the
sea,
that
we
would
like
to
examine
the
fisheries
conflict
in
the
North
Atlantic
between
Britain
and
Iceland
(1971-3).
The
main
aims
of
1
Factory
trawlers
(the
largest
fleets
are
the
Soviet
and
Japanese)
have
long-stay
and
sophisticated
processing
capacity.
They
are
able,
if
necessary,
to
move
between
distant
fishing
grounds
without
putting
into
port.
British
trawlers
fishing
the
Icelandic
grounds
have
generally
been
of
the
traditional
type
(i.e.
trawlers
using
side-winder
gear,
or
the
more
modern
stern
dragger,
and
making
round
trips
of
up
to
twenty-two
days
(see
figure
1).
Some
West
German
vessels
are
factory
trawlers
although
these
have
tended
to
operate
approximately
fifty
miles
off
the
Iceland
coast
for
red
fish,
unlike
British
trawlers
which
have
generally
fished
3-12
miles
off-shore
prior
to
1961.
See
G.
Borgstrom
and
A.
J.
Heighway,
Atlantic
Ocean
Fisheries
(Fishing
News
[Books],
Ltd.,
1961).
2
See
H.
Lauterpacht
(ed.),
International
Law,
8th
edition
(Longmans,
London,
1967),
p.
491;
Ian
Brownlie,
Principles
of
Public
International
Law,
2nd
edition
(Clarendon
Press,
Oxford,
1973),
Part
IV,
p.
194.
560
the
paper
arc to
discuss
the
reasons
for
the
current
dispute;
provide
an
historical
analysis
of
the
main
stages
of
the
conflict,
and
an
assessment
of
the
November
1973
agreement.
The
Anglo-Icelandic
fisheries
dispute
also
provides
insights
into
the
limitations
and
possibilities
for
a
small
power
-
Iceland
-
in
conflict
with
a
seemingly
more
powerful
co-member
of
a
military
alliance.
We
aim
to
reflect
these
as
a
sub-theme
of
the
paper.
First,
the
historical
background.
HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
Iceland
is
situated
approximately
halfway
between
the
North
American
Continent
and
the
countries
east
of
the
Barents
Sea.
Because
of
the
way
in
which
the
warm
Gulf
Stream
and
the
cold
east
and
west
Greenland
currents
meet
around
the
island,
abundant
sea
plant
life
has
developed.?
This,
in
turn,
is
the
foundation
of
the
rich
fishing
grounds
off
Iceland.
The
Icelandic
nation
has
traditionally
fished
these
grounds.
which
constitute
the
only
natural
resources
of
any
importance
to
the
population.
Without
them
Iceland
would
certainly
not
be
habit-
able.
For
nearly
a
thousand
years,
however,
fishing
was
restricted
to
the
fjords
and
inshore
coastal
areas,
for
lack
of
large
vessels.
English
vessels
began
fishing
off
Iceland
during
the
first
part
of
the
fifteent~h
century.4
In
subsequent
centuries
the
Icelandic
grounds
were
fished
by
vessels
from
the
Hansa
towns
in
Germany,
Holland
and
other
Northwest
European
states.
In
1598
Denmark
proclaimed
an
eight
mile
exclusive
fisheries
limit
off
the
coast
of
Iceland
(Iceland
remained
a
Danish
colony
until
1918).
From
1631-62
the
fisheries
limit
was
extended
to
24
miles,
but
was
then
reduced
at
the
end
of
this
period
to
16
miles.
This
limit
remained
until
1859
when
the
&dquo;Scandinavian
SyStem’9 ,
was
adopted,
i.e.
the
limits
covered
bays,
plus
four
miles
from
straight
base
line.’
In
1901
Denmark
concluded
the
so-called
&dquo;Butter
and
Ham&dquo;
agreement
with
Britain.
Under
this
agreement
the
traditional
British
view
on
territorial
limits
-
the
three
mile
and
ten
mile
rules
delimiting
respectively
the
territorial
sea
and
bays
-
was
adopted
in
return
for
British
assurances
to
buy
Danish
agricultural
products.
The
effect
of
the
1901
agreement,
which
lasted
fifty
years,
was
to
open
up
to
British
vessels
many
of
the
larger
Icelandic
fjords
and
bays
previously
closed.
3
See
Unnsteinn
Stefánsson,
Hafid
(Almenna
Bókafélagid,
1961)
Chapter
1;
The
Living
Resources
of
the
Sea
(FAO,
Rome,
1971).
4
See
Bjorn
Thorsteinsson,
Enska
Oldin
(Mál
og
Menning,
Reykjavik,
1970),
pp.
22-4.
5
The
Icelandic
Efforts
for
Fisheries
Conservation.
Memorandum
submitted
to
the
Council
of
Surope
by
the
Government
of
Iceland
(1954),
p.
7
Mimeo.
6
See
F.
G.
Aflalo,
The
Sea
Fishing
Industry
of
England
and
Wales
(Edward
Stanford,
London,
1904),
pp.
43-58;
and
George
Lowe
Alward,
The
Sea
Fisheries
of
Great
Britain
and
Ireland
(Albert
Gait,
Grimsby,
1932),
pp. 233-66.
561
Iceland
did
not
start
trawl
fishing
until
1907.
By
then,
partly
because
of
overfishing
in
the
North
Sea,
Britain
had
developed
considerable
fishing
interests
in
cod,
plaice,
haddock
and
other
species
found
off
Iceland.
The
growth
of
the
British
distant
watcr
fleets
was
largely
made
possible
by
the
development
of
the
steam
trawler&dquo;
and
improved
deep
water
trawling
techniques.
The
use.
too,
of
ice
to
preserve
catches
made
longer
voyages
possible.
Thus,
from
the
1880’s,
British
distant
water
fleets
based
on
Aberdeen,
Hull,
Grimsby,
Fleetwood
and
other
ports
made
more
intensive
visits
to
the
Icelandic
grounds?
During
both
the
First
and
Second
World
Wars
fishing
by
foreign
vessels
off
Iceland
was
discontinued.
But
the
return
of
foreign
Heets
after
both
wars
to
Icelandic
waters
meant
the
resumption
of
intensive
fishing.
(fig.
1,
page
562).
Conservation,
Fisheries
Limits
and
the
Geneva
Conference
Although
the
International
Council
for the
Exploration
of
the
Sea
(ICES)
was
set
up
as
early
as
1902,
most
of
the
existing
regional
fisheries
bodies
were
established
after
the
Second
World
War.’
Britain
and
Iceland
have
both
participated
in
regional
efforts
to
regulate
fisheries,
including
the
1946
London
Overfishing
Con-
vention’
and
the
International
Convention
for
Northwest
Atlantic
Fisheries
(1949).10
The
1946
London
Conference
attended
by
delegates
from
twelve
states,
together
with
an
observer
from
the
United
States,
was
called
to
deal
primarily
with
the
overfishing
problem
in
the
North
Sea.
The
resulting
Convention,
though,
which
made
recommendations
inter
alia
on
mesh
sizes,
applied
(with
the
exception
of
the
Baltic
and
the
Belts)
to
the
Northeast
Atlantic.
But
criticism
of
the
1946
Convention
-
including
the
extent
of
the
Convention
area
and
the
inadequacy
of
enforcement
-
resulted
in
a
new
Commission
(NEAFC),
established
under
the
1959
North-
east
Atlantic
Fisheries
Convention.’1
Iceland
has,
additionally,
taken
unilateral
conservation
measures
in
view
of
the
slow
regional
progress
on
the
overfishing
problem.&dquo;
In
1949
notice
was
given
that
the
1901
Anglo-Danish
7
See
F.
G.
Aflalo,
ibid,
pp.
209-66,
347-50.
Aftalo,
discussing
the
im-
portance
of
rail
for
transporting
fish,
notes:
"If
they
say
the
Danes
can
send
fish
from
Esbjerg
to
Parkstone
(for
Billingsgate)
for
less
than
it
would
cost
to
send
it
to
the
same
market
by
rail
from
the
Humber,
it
is
time
that
the
railway
rates
were
lowered".
(p.
237).
8
See
Report
on
Regulatory
Fishery
Bodies,
FID/C/138
(FAO,
Rome,
1972),
pp.
1-19.
9
Convention
for
the
Regulation
of
the
Meshes
of
Fishing
Nets
and
the
Size
Limits
of
Fish,
UNTS,
no.
3221.
10
UNTS,
no.
2053.
11
UNTS,
no.
7078.
For
a
discussion
of
the
role
of
NEAFC
see
the
article
(in
English)
by
Jon
Thormodsson.
Ulfljlotur,
vol.
XXVI,
no.
2
(1973),
especially
pp.
16-27.
12
In
1964
ICES
recommended
the closure for
ten
years
of
Faxa
Bay,
one
of
the
most
important
Icelandic
nursery
grounds,
as
an
international
experiment
in
conservation.
Iceland
subsequently
called
a
conference.
but
the
British
Government
declined
the
invitation
on
legal
grounds
and
the
conference
was
not
held.
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