The Army after Mao
| Date | 01 December 1979 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207903400403 |
| Author | Ellis Joffe |
| Published date | 01 December 1979 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ELLIS
JOFFE
The
army
after Mao
Developments
in
the
Chinese
army
since
the
death
of
Mao
Zedong
have
been
dominated
by two
somewhat
contradictory
features.
On
the
one
hand,
the
military
has
vigorously asserted
its
professional
interests
and
has
instituted
important
reforms
designed
to
put
the
People's
Liberation
Army
(PLA)'
on
a
more
professional
basis.
On
the
other
hand,
the
demand
of
military
officers
for
large-scale
tech-
nological
modernization
of
the
armed
forces
has
been
rejected,
and
even
the
policy
of
selective
re-equipment,
which
had
apparently
been
agreed
upon,
has yet to
bear
fruit.
Both
features
are
the
product
of
changes
that
have
occurred
in
China
in
the
post-Mao
period.
The
death
of
Mao
and
the
concom-
itant
downfall
of
his
radical
supporters
-
now
stigmatized
as
the
Gang
of
Four
-
removed the
chief
barrier
to
the
expression
of
professional
views
by
the
military.
The
army's
crucial
role in
the
succession
struggle
and
in
the
consolidation
of
the
new
leader-
ship
gave
the
military
substantial
influence
over
national
policy.
This
leadership,
moreover,
shares
the
military's
commitment
to
professionalism
and
views
its
requirements
with
sympathy
and
understanding.
However,
this
same
leadership
is
also
committed
to
the
acceler-
ated
modernization
of
China
and the
military
is
only
one
of
the
four
main
sectors
-
the
others
being
industry, agriculture,
and
Associate
Professor
in
Chinese Studies
and
International
Relations
at
the
Hebrew
University
of
Jerusalem;
author
of
a
number
of
articles
on
Chinese
military
af-
fairs
and
Party and
Army: Professionalism
and
Political
Control
in
the
Chinese
Officer
Corps,
z949.1965
(1965).
It
should
be
noted
that
the
term 'People's
Liberation
Army'
encompasses
air
and
naval
forces
as
well
as
ground
forces.
THE
ARMY
AFTER
MAO
569
science
and
technology
-
whose
development
is
intended
to
trans-
form
China into
a
modern
industrial
nation
by
the
end
of
the cen-
tury.
Given
the enormous
needs
of
the
military,
China's
weak
industrial
base
and
scarce
capital
resources
cannot
support
the
procurement
of
up-to-date
weapons
on
a
massive
scale
without
severely
cutting
into
the
needs
of
other
sectors
which
are, in
any
case,
being
given
a
higher priority.
RETURN
TO
PROFESSIONALISM
The
forceful
and open
affirmation
of
military
professionalism
has
been
one
of
the
by-products
of
the far-reaching
changes
that
fol-
lowed
the
death
of
Mao.
2
For
most
of
the
preceding
two
decades,
the
professional
values
of the
PLA
had
been
suppressed
to
one
degree
or
another
by
a
combination
of
ideological pressures,
political
in-
volvement,
leadership
conflicts,
and
intra-army frictions.
The
deni-
gration
of these
values
intensified
in
the
twilight
years
of
Mao's
rule
because of
the
influence
of
the
Gang
of
Four
and
of
the
mutual
antagonism
between
its
members
and
the
professional
military.
This
antagonism
can
be
traced
to
the
tumultuous
days
of
the
Cultural
Revolution,
when
the
radical
leaders
were
responsible
for
goading
the
Red
Guards into
assaulting
the
PLA
for
restoring
order
and
suppressing
revolutionary
activity.
The
result
was
a
profound
hostility
between
most
of
the
senior
military
figures,
both
at
the
centre and
in
the regions,
and
the
radical
leaders.
After the
Cul-
tural
Revolution had
run
its
course
this
mutual
hostility
did
not
subside
but
rather
hardened
and
acquired
personal,
ideological,
and
political
dimensions.
After
its
downfall,
the
Gang
of
Four
was
blamed
for
a
wide
range
of defects
and
problems
that
plagued
the
PLA.
Although
these charges
were
couched
in
the
uniquely
hyperbolic language
which
the
Chinese
reserve
for
losers
in
political
conflicts,
the
con-
tent
of
most
charges
tallies
with
what
is
known
about
the
situation
in
the
PLA
at
the
time.
Dominating
this
situation
was
the tense
2 For
a detailed
discussion
of
these
changes
and
their
consequences
see
Ellis
Joffe
and
Gerald
Segal,
'The
Chinese
Army
and
Professionalism,'
Problems
of
Com-
munism,
xxvii
(November-December
1978),
-19.
To continue reading
Request your trial