The Business of Migration Control: Delegating Migration Control Functions to Private Actors
| Author | Tendayi Bloom |
| Date | 01 May 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12188 |
| Published date | 01 May 2015 |
The Business of Migration Control:
Delegating Migration Control Functions to
Private Actors
Tendayi Bloom
United Nations University
Abstract
Private companies are explicitly and implicitly, directly and indirectly, involved at all stages of the migration process.
This delegation of migration control functions to private actors is largely unregulated and the multi-layered policy
implications are not well understood. The lines of responsibility and accountability, but also liability, for decisions being
made and for force used are not always clear and this most seriously affects vulnerable migrants and potential
migrants. This delegation is occurring in some form in all global regions. International agreements relating to migration
do not take this privatisation into account and international discussions about the obligations of private companies do
not consider the Migration Business directly. This survey article presents the situation and argues that informed interna-
tional policy debate is needed in this area.
‘The business of migration control’here refers to the del-
egation to private actors of otherwise state-held (and in
some cases previously nonexistent) migration control
functions across all stages of migration. This survey arti-
cle lays out the increasing role of nonstate actors in
migration management as a crucial change in the trans-
national migration control infrastructure. Indeed, as one
key theorist has put it, ‘nonstate and third-party actors
represent reinvented state forms of power and gover-
nance’(Lahav, 2000, p. 216) and so, ‘[t]he regulatory rela-
tionships and interest exchanges between third-party
actors and the state have become a significant part of
national strategies’(Lahav, 2000, p. 236). Three concerns
regarding the business of migration control will be dis-
cussed here:
1. Nature of available migration control functions is
altered, including enabling forms of prevention
unavailable to state officials.
2. Expertise in migration control is relocated into the pri-
vate sector.
3. Implications of migration control policies are
obscured, including potentially problematic outcomes,
like refoulement.
As such, and as presented in this paper, the migration
business comes into conflict with existing paradigms in
liberal migration discourse and enable a circumvention
of related norms (e.g. see Lahav, 2003; Zolberg, 1999). It
opens with a diagrammatic representation of the modern
business of migration control, explaining the sectors
represented. For reasons of brevity, this paper cannot
address all types of actors but aims to provide an illustra-
tive overview focussing on private actors. It then pre-
sents some of the existing international infrastructure
responding to this delegation and submits that interna-
tional policy debate and further research on the business
of migration control as a whole is urgently needed.
The structure of the business of migration
control
Today, private actors are directly and explicitly contracted
to process visa claims, guard border posts and transport
and detain foreign nationals. Implicit delegation also
occurs, as sanctions are imposed on carrier companies
transporting unwanted passengers and on those employ-
ing persons without appropriate documentation. Indirect
delegation is when, for example, a carrier company hires
a private security company to guard migrants in a transit
country before return. This complex network of privatisa-
tion across all stages of migration occurs in some form in
all global regions and leads to a relocation of migration
control and delegation of key functions.
The role of business in migration is often examined,
but largely restricted to the consideration of businesses
as employers of migrants (e.g. the Dhaka Principles),
something apparent in the various international instru-
ments touching on both business and migration (e.g.
Article E22 of the Code of Conduct for Private Security
Providers). John Salt takes another approach, arguing
Global Policy (2015) 6:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12188 ©2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 6 . Issue 2 . May 2015 151
Survey Article
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