The Business of Sigint
| Author | Sir David Pepper |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076709347080 |
| Published date | 01 January 2010 |
| Date | 01 January 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Features Section: Policy and Practice Perspectives |
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0952-0767
20100125(1)85–97
The Business of Sigint
The Role of Modern Management in the Transformation
of GCHQ
Sir David Pepper KCMG
Formerly the Director of GCHQ, UK
Abstract
GCHQ is the UK’s Signals Intelligence agency. The end of the Cold War, the
growth of international terrorism and the arrival and subsequent explosive
growth of the Internet radically changed the environment in which it had to
operate. Recognition of these pressures led GCHQ to begin a wide-ranging
change programme in the late 1990s. It included not only technology but
also deep change in business processes, leadership and culture. A critically
important feature of these changes has been the adoption, and when necessary
adaptation, of a wide range of management techniques taken from the private
sector. The article examines the range of techniques in question, looking at
the extent to which each had to be adapted. It concludes by considering the
issues that arise in the general adoption of such techniques in the public sector,
concluding that that are no insurmountable obstacles.
Keywords
GCHQ, intelligence, Internet, leadership, management techniques, organiza-
tional transformation
Introduction
The intelligence world, by its very nature, is shrouded in secrecy. Little is said in
public about the management of intelligence agencies and of the processes they use.
However, their business is complex and requires careful management if they are
to be effective, properly accountable and secure. Signals Intelligence in particular
demands sophisticated managerial techniques, because it involves advanced tech-
nology, large numbers of people, enormous volumes of data, and large amounts of
intelligence output – a combination that cannot be managed casually.
GCHQ (the Government Communications Headquarters) is the UK’s Signals
Intelligence (Sigint) agency. Originating in Bletchley Park during the Second
World War, it went on to play a vital role in the Cold War. Over the last decade it
DOI:10.1177/0952076709347080
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has undergone a radical transformation in response to fundamental changes in the
geopolitical and technological environment in which it operates. As a result, it is
now well equipped for the challenges of the 21st century.
One important feature of the transformation has been the adoption of a wide
range of managerial practices and techniques from the private sector – a marked
change from its previous approach. This article examines the range of techniques
adopted, the reasons for using individual techniques, and the benefits obtained.
In its final discussion of the more general potential for this approach in the public
sector, it concludes that the benefits of this approach have been key to the success
of the transformation, and that there are no overriding obstacles to similar adoption
throughout the public sector.
GCHQ Background
GCHQ is the largest of the UK’s intelligence and security agencies. Its major role
is the interception of communications and the provision of intelligence derived
from that intercept to government departments and agencies. GCHQ’s other role,
which takes between 10 and 20 per cent of its effort, is the provision of advice to
government on Information Assurance.
GCHQ staff are, and have always been, members of the Civil Service. GCHQ is
an autonomous department, and the Director reports to the Foreign Secretary, who
accounts to Parliament for its activities. Its work, including interception, is control-
led under the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (2000); all its interception is authorized by a Secretary of State by
means of Warrants issued under one of these Acts. The intelligence requirements
and priorities to which it responds are set by the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC), of which the Director is a member (Cabinet Office, 2009).
During the Cold War, GCHQ had between 6000 and 7000 staff. That fell to
around 5000 at the turn of the century, as some of the manpower-intensive Cold
War tasks were dropped; it has now grown again to about 5500, mostly as a result
of the demand for extra effort on counter-terrorism. Those staff cover a great range
of disciplines – analysts, linguists, mathematicians, and many engineers and pro-
grammers. GCHQ is very unusual in UK government in having a large internal
engineering and software development capability. This feature will be important
in the later discussion of the transformation.
Before the transformation process began, the GCHQ culture was very much
a product of the Cold War, and of the Civil Service culture of that period. It was
a static organization, essentially because its main target, the Soviet Union, was
static; in 1990 the basic structure had not changed for 30 years, and organizational
change was regarded as a major venture. The various operational systems were
self-contained and independent, and there was rather little movement of people
and information across internal boundaries. Not that this analysis is intended as a
criticism. Far from it: these features served the organization well during the Cold
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War, in which it was very successful. But they became increasingly inappropriate
as the world changed.
The organization was also very inward looking. It made little or no use of
external management techniques, but relied upon a long tradition of home-grown
methods. This too became a real disadvantage as the pace of change increased.
Drivers of Change
At the start of the 1990s, the Cold War was ending and GCHQ’s world had begun
to change. Not only did the all-embracing intelligence requirements on the Soviet
Union disappear, but even requirements for classic military intelligence on the
new Russia diminished rapidly. So large parts of the organization, and much of the
knowledge in people’s heads, became redundant.
In place of the USSR, GCHQ faced increasingly volatile requirements on a
host of new subjects – such as the proliferation of weapons, both conventional and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the narcotics trade, people smuggling, and
eventually international terrorism on a new scale. There were demands to support
military operations in new places, such as the Balkans. These changes posed a
major challenge for an organization that had no experience of radical change,
and for managers who had learned their trade in a relatively slowly-changing
environment.
While these changes were still being digested, the Internet started to become
an important feature of global telecommunications. The Internet is radically dif-
ferent from previous communications technology, and it fundamentally changed
the technical environment in which GCHQ operated. A detailed discussion of the
implications of the Internet for interception can be found in Branch (2003) and
an examination of the implications for interception legislation in the US context
(which is very different from that in the UK) in Diffie and Landau (2008).
Briefly, the technological difference is this. Communications structures before
the Internet can be thought of as fixed networks in which any ‘message’ (telephone
call, fax, or data transmission) travelled over a single identifiable path between
two communicators. Internet technology, on the other hand, relies upon a complex
and frequently changing global network in which there are many routes between
any two points; and it breaks every ‘message’ (a term...
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